Occupational Hazards

Dekker, M.

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Providing Human Security in the Palestinian West Bank in the Context of Israeli Occupation

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prof.dr. G.C.A. Junne
dr. W.M. Verkoren
prof.dr. J.H. de Wilde

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Occupational Hazards

Providing Human Security in the Palestinian West Bank in the context of Israeli Occupation

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. L.M. Bouter,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen
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door

Martijn Dekker

geboren te Haarlem

promotor: prof.dr. M.J. Faber

I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than our governments. Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of the way and let them have it.

- **Dwight D. Eisenhower**

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Although I have always found it a terrible cliché, and vowed to never write these words myself, I will, for one time only, concede by pointing out to you that despite all the kind assistance given to me by the people mentioned above, the sole person responsible for any error you might encounter is me.

Martijn Dekker, Amsterdam.

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Part 1 – Context

1. Introduction

> "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience."
>
> - C.S. Lewis[1]

1.1. Double-barrelled Occupation

Although Palestinians are not likely to label the Palestinian Authority as a tyranny, the interim government in the West Bank has, since its establishment in the wake of the Oslo Accords, become increasingly authoritarian. Parallel to this development the features of the Israeli occupation have also changed considerably over the years. Could the first period, after the 1967 war, be considered a total occupation, or rather an annexation, the current situation is much more an occupation 'from a distance', in which the Palestinians and Israelis – settlers in the West Bank – are kept separate from each other, and the Israeli military forces are positioned outside the major cities.

The changing face of the occupation has its consequences on how it is perceived by those who are subjugated by it. When asked, many Palestinians living in the West Bank will admit that they felt much more free in the years before the Oslo Accords, when the occupation was total and they enjoyed hardly any political representation, then they do now. In other words, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the interim government of the Palestinians has not improved the sense of freedom, and many would rather say that the increasing authoritarianism of the PA illustrates that the opposite is true.

It is often argued, both by international observers and Palestinians, that the declining freedom is substituted by increased stability and security. But it remains the

[1] Lewis, C.S. (1987) 'The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment'. In: *AMCAP Journal.* No. 13(1). p.151.

question whether this stability will actually improve the sense of security as it is perceived by the Palestinians themselves. As popular revolts against authoritarian regimes that have been stable for decades spring up throughout the Arab world, this question becomes all the more relevant.

A lot of Palestinians living in the West Bank, then, consider themselves to be living under a double-barrelled occupation: on the one hand there are the Israeli military forces, who remain omnipresent throughout the West Bank, and on the other there is the PA, actively suppressing political opposition as well as cooperating with the Israeli authorities. Since 2005, which roughly marks the end of the al-Aqsa intifada, the PA did bring considerable stability to the West Bank, putting an end to the prolonged period of lawlessness and gang wars but trust in the authorities has remained low. Although most people praise the tough crackdown on local militias, the *mukhabarat* – the intelligence service – has now become a major source of insecurity, especially for those who support other political factions than *Fatah,* which is the dominant party in the PA.

This study is an investigation of the ways in which security is provided and perceived in such an intricate situation. I aimed to investigate whether *an analysis of the security fabric in the West Bank would provide valuable insights in the characteristics of the various actors who try to provide human security, in what ways they do this, how they interact, and how the context of the Israeli occupation influences the dynamics between them.*

The so-called *security fabric* is a new concept (Dekker & Faber, forthcoming) that describes the interactions between actors who provide human security from above and below, respectively. During approximately one year of doing fieldwork in the West Bank, I have analysed the security fabric of this particular region, describing the dynamics between, on the one hand, the rapidly developing Palestinian Authority (PA) – most notably the security forces – and, on the other hand, social institutions – like political movements and the clan system – that were pivotal in providing security prior to the establishment of the PA and to a large extent still are of vital importance to people. The analysis entails a specific focus on the context of the Israeli occupation, since it considerably influences and shapes the on-going interaction between the various actors involved.

Territorial occupations[2] with military means, of which the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories is but one example, have occurred throughout history and they

[2] The word 'occupation' can be used normatively and, as such, is a contested and politically sensitive concept. For example, ethnic minorities with secessionist ambitions can employ the term for political gains,

still do today[3] but they are mostly left unmentioned in recent publications on contemporary wars (Kaldor 2001, Münkler 2005, Newman 2004, Findley and Edwards 2007). A reason for this lack could be that most theories nowadays focus on intrastate or civil wars – and coupled with that the changed characteristics of the means and motives of the parties involved and the predominant participation of non-state (or private) actors – while an occupation per definition occurs across state borders and involves at least one standing army. In other words, occupations are not considered to be intra-state wars and therefore do not fit prevailing models and theories dealing with contemporary wars. It implies that occupations are considered to be anachronistic remnants from the era of traditional interstate wars, comparable to, say, the German occupation of several Western European countries during the Second World War or the Soviet occupation of most of Eastern Europe throughout the Cold War.

In this study, it is argued that, on the contrary, military occupations do not only deserve more attention in security and conflict studies because of the suffering they keep on causing up to today, but they also provide valuable data for those engaged in, for example, 'new wars' or 'greed and grievance' theories explaining contemporary wars and conflicts, because of the different forms of interaction between state and non-state actors, and the intricate, political economy of conflict.

"New wars" theory (Kaldor 2001, Münkler 2005) is based on the assumption that contemporary conflicts differ from more traditional conflicts, which, in general, were declared when the governments of rival states were no longer able to pursue their aspirations through dialogue or other, 'soft' forms of coercion; were fought between standing armies, guided by strict codes of conduct and regulations; and usually concluded in the form of a peace agreement, after which a new political reality emerged. For a considerable time, this was also the case for territorial expansion, which was referred to as the 'right of conquest', and it was only after the Second

---

while occupying states themselves usually do not consider territories occupied, in the first place. In this case, some Israelis, for example, maintain that the West Bank (or Judea and Samaria) is disputed territory or simply part of Israel proper. In this study I will only use the word 'occupation' when the particular situation referred to is classified as being 'occupied' by the United Nations. In case of the West Bank, the UN Security Council resolutions 242, 465, 478, among others, refer to the West Bank as "occupied Arab territories" and Israel as "occupying power".

See http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/about.htm?OpenForm for a selection of the most important UN documents related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

[3] Other examples of regions that are considered occupied by the United Nations are Nagorno-Karabakh (occupied by Armenia) and the Golan Heights (occupied by Israel).

World War that it was termed 'war of aggression' in the Nuremberg Principles, and as such became illegal under international law.[4]

War situations – whether they concern inter-state wars, civil wars, resource wars, secession wars, belligerent occupations, wars of aggression, just wars, new wars or any other form of violent conflict – are characterised by grave insecurity and they force people to adapt to atrocious and often life-threatening circumstances. It is therefore that the context of violence is of vital importance for this study. Decision making processes, whether personal or collective, often take place under severe pressures. As such, this backdrop must be taken into account continuously when looking at the actions – and inactions – of people who are involved.

Often, however, when scholars, journalists or policy makers are confronted with human behaviour in war situations that they cannot explain or comprehend, it is labelled irrational. "In many conflicts, reason and rationality have left the building[,]" as Sharon Begley wrote in the Wall Street Journal[5]. The pressures caused by violent conflict add such weight to making choices, that ascribing them to irrational behaviour caused by 'sacred beliefs', as Begley does, simply does not do justice to the people who are suffering from war.

Over the last few decades, the perception of war has considerably transformed in many Western countries, most notably in Western Europe. After almost seven decades of peace following the Second World War, war has become something linked to developing countries, an evil phenomenon occurring in faraway places. Nowadays, however, we are more than ever confronted with the raw reality of war and, therefore, our ability to take the context into consideration has improved. A prime example of this is the Vietnam War, which is considered to be the first 'television war'. It was the first time in history that people in their own living rooms, thousands of miles away from the front lines, were confronted with the bloody images and grave consequences of war. Were war bulletins once published in rather abstract newspaper articles or broadcast in the form of propagandistic short films about 'our boys', from then on the gruesomeness of war was presented to the public eye. The first Gulf War, in the early 1990s, represents a second turning point in the media coverage of war, as (embedded) journalists from major broadcasting companies like ABC and CNN, were able to bring live reports. Although we have become more or less used to it, it was

[4] The full text of the Nuremberg principles can be found in the online archive of Yale Law School: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp

[5] Sharon Begley, "Science Journal: 'Key to peace in mideast may be 'sacred beliefs'', *Wall Street Journal,* 25 August 2006.

quite revolutionary back then that people were actually able to see missile strikes and advancing tanks on TV, practically as they were happening instead of having to go to cinemas to see the war bulletins and propagandistic reports.

The possibility of live coverage did however not bring about much change in the relationship between politics and media. Even though the public perception of war did change because of the gruesome images, governments gratefully used new technology to present the public with the same patriotic messages of the cinema war bulletins. Time and again, the media have been accused of imbalanced or partial coverage, of which bowing to censorship and embedded journalists are obvious examples.

War and violent conflict are as old as mankind but the unremitting flow of videos, photographs and media reports coming from front lines all over the world, remain a relatively new phenomenon. Even more recent is the fact that because of easier access, practically everyone can upload their own witness accounts through mobile phones or post live comments on events on social media websites like Twitter or Facebook. Indeed, the use of new, readily available communication technologies can be considered the third turning point – after cinema war bulletins and television coverage – in how the perception of war has evolved over the last few decades.

In an era where large inter-state wars have become relatively rare, and people are no longer reliant on the dominant media because every person with a mobile phone or internet connection can become a journalist, war has shifted away from the realm of 'big politics' and is no longer an abstract phenomenon one reads about in a newspaper. With the emergence of new information and communication technology, the idea that war was relatively well-ordered, guided by clear guidelines and revolving around agreed upon rituals, has given way to the prevailing image of war as a violent, bloody and unpredictable chaos, of which the conflict in Syria is but a tragic example.

1.2. A critical approach to conflict and security

While scholars are trying to make sense of war, novel labels, like 'New Wars', have emerged, which try to capture the ostensibly changing characteristics of war. But in trying to do so, it is often overlooked that it is perhaps not simply the characteristics of war that have changed, but, to the very least, also our perception of them, as the brief overview of developments in media coverage shows. As social scientists, we are trying to explain the world around us; why things are happening as they are, why people act as they do. And because of the heavy toll war has caused throughout history, and

keeps causing every day, it is a social phenomenon that deserves, and receives, meticulous scholarly attention. But inherent to attempts to create order in the study of war situations, and to grasp what is actually taking place, is the tendency to pour them into the mould of fixed categories and frameworks.

Like "new wars" (Kaldor 2001, Münkler 2005), the concept of *human security* exemplifies just such an attempt. It was meant to categorise and label our evolved perceptions of what security entails (UNDP 1994) and how it should be provided in crisis situations. It still remains a contested concept, however, with debates mainly revolving around two issues: responsibility and scope.

On the one hand, *human security* reflects the notion that states can no longer be considered the ultimate responsible actor for providing security, and as such the referent object of security analyses, and that state sovereignty should no longer be the holy grail in international relations. Such discussions evidently echo long-running theoretical debates about the relationship between states and individuals, with *social contract* theories (Hobbes 1968, Locke 1993, Rousseau 1998) as probably the most notable corollary.

On the other hand, the concept built on the notion that security entails much more than just the absence of conflict but also hitherto development-related issues like nutrition and the environment – developing from a negative to a positive interpretation of security. Indeed, the second series of debates deals with the scope of what is integral to *human security* (MacFarlane and Foong Khong 2006, Mack 2002, Paris 2001, Owen 2004, Kaldor 2008, Krause 2004).

Even though the new paradigm of *human security* pays lip service to a more individual-oriented approach to providing security, I would argue that it is still a concept that is very much rooted in traditional – one could even say Realist – strands of (international) security theories, in the sense that it essentially remains a top-down approach in which states are responsible for providing security or, in case they fail to do so, other (coalitions of) states. This is, for example, reflected by those scholars who write about *securitisation.* By considering changing and expanding conceptualisations of *security* to be new forms of employing political power – it is essentially a 'speech act'[6] (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998) – with paternalistic (De Wilde 2008) or even neo-colonial (Chandler 2008) tendencies, they implicitly emphasise the state-centric tendencies inherent to the very broad, original definition of human security.

[6] According to Wæver, security, interpreted as a speech act, "is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering 'security' a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it." (1995:55).

What I think is needed, is a new approach to human security that actually pays attention to the agency of individuals, and how they cooperate in varying communities, when faced by armed conflict. That is not to say that states and their institutions should be left out of the equation but rather that international organisations, state and non-state actors should be taken into account in security analyses. It does, however, mean that the point of departure for such analyses starts with the actions of those people who are actually confronted with the atrocities of armed conflict. It is therefore that *human security from below*, the initiatives that are instigated by local communities, are not only an integral part of the security fabric but the foundation it is built upon.

Just such a critical approach to human security was called for by Newman (2010), when he stated that, amongst other things, it was necessary for human security scholars to look beyond the idea of the state as main security provider, relate more to international relations theory, thoroughly take into consideration the "pathologies inherent in the structure of the international system" (Newman 2010:93) by including the structure-agency debate into human security discourse, and by looking at what is taking place at the level of communities (Newman 2010:93-94).

I will attempt to provide such a critical analysis of war situations, in this case specifically a belligerent occupation, seeking to look beyond existing frameworks and institutions, and zooming in on individuals and how they collaborate in so-called security communities, in order to improve their security. This critical perspective is of special significance because an occupation is inherently characterised by unequal power relations between those who are living in the occupied territory and those who are in control and because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be considered a status-quo, in which the same people and institutions keep turning in circles without reaching a vital breakthrough.

The frameworks and institutions that have evolved over more than four decades of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories have not proven sufficient to end the on-going situation of oppression; perhaps they have even accommodated it. Currently, there is broad consensus about a two-state solution amongst most of the countries directly or indirectly involved and, as such, this has become the dominant approach to frame the solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of the major institutions set up specifically for the conflict, the so-called Quartet – consisting of the UN, US, EU and Russia – evidently operates within this framework.

Besides fruitlessly trying to mediate between the two parties, these major powers, most notably the US and EU, are currently also actively assisting the Palestinian Authority to prepare for statehood when the two-state solution comes to

pass. However, the Palestinian people, at least those who are not part of the ruling elite, are hardly ever consulted. Indeed, the development of a Palestinian state is still very much treated as a top-down concept, in the sense that a strong state apparatus is thought to be the best way to ensure security for the Palestinian people. This modus operandi defies the way states – as the dominant ordering principle and security providing mechanism of sizeable social groups – have emerged in the first place, and it is also very much the question whether it will facilitate a sustainable solution in the form of legitimate state institutions. Moreover, it mostly neglects the aspirations of the Palestinian people at large and, to a large extent, disqualifies behaviour that goes against a Western-inclined rationale as either illogical or counterproductive.

In this study, I will look at this state-building process from a bottom-up perspective and adopt a critical approach which focuses on *human security from below*. Because security may be considered the prime reason for (nation) states to have emerged in the first place, it is a useful perspective to critically assess the top-down state building process that is currently taking place in the West Bank.

With this study I wish to add the perspective of the people who are actually subjected to violent conflict to the growing body of academic literature on human security. Hopefully, my conclusions will not only provide some markers for rethinking the proposed solutions that are part of the current, Israeli-Palestinian status quo but also add a different perspective to the discussion on how to efficiently and legitimately bring security to besieged people.

Below I will delve into the theories that underpin this study but first I will introduce a number of pivotal concepts in this study, which require further elaboration, and subsequently introduce the historical, social, political and geographical context of the region where my research has taken place, before setting up a broader theoretical framework.

2. Conceptual context

Throughout this dissertation there are several re-occurring concepts that require a brief explanation beforehand. These concepts are *human security, security fabric* and *occupation*, respectively. In chapter 4, the theoretical framework, I will further elaborate on these issues.

2.1. Human Security

For such a widely used and applied concept, there is very little agreement on what human security exactly entails. The theoretical framework will further elaborate on the discussions about security, and how the concept has evolved over the years, but for now I have to explicate by what I mean when I refer to human security.

Due to the relative novelty of the concept and the large body of literature that has been devoted to it, until now, there is no real consensus as to what it constitutes, let alone an unambiguous method to measure human security, or rather the lack thereof. Furthermore, there is no concise strategy for providing it to people and communities in need.

One of the two main issues in human security debates concerns the scope. From a negative interpretation of security – meaning the absence of violent conflict, or freedom of fear – over the years, the concept started to develop into a more positive idea, denoting an environment in which people are able to develop themselves. Various scholars (e.g. Alkire 2003, Thakur 2003, UNDP 1994) have proposed the use of a broad interpretation. They argue that human security entails an enabling environment, echoing Amartya Sen's "capability approach" to development (Sen 1985).

However, human security in its original UNDP definition is often – and rightly so – criticised for being too comprehensive to be applicable (e.g. MacFarlane and Foong Khong 2006, Mack 2002, Paris 2001). The broad definition, which is a clear illustration of the positive interpretation of security, includes for instance various human rights, developmental issues related to food and health, and protection from environmental degradation. As such, it became intimately related to human development (Stewart 2004) and is sometimes – wrongly so – even used interchangeably (Sfeir-Younis 2004). But does human security have something significant to add to the already existing, and widely accepted, frameworks of human development and human rights?

The concept as it was first coined in the UNDP report of 1994, lists seven different dimensions of human security; economic, food, health, environmental,

personal, community, and political security (UNDP 1994). Ultimately, this list was constricted to two fundamental freedoms: *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want,* an obvious reference to Roosevelt's State of the Union address. However, when looking at this broad conceptualisation, the question indeed arises, "if human security is all of these things, what is it not?" (Paris 2001:92)

In the Human Security Report of 2005, the distinction between a broad and narrow interpretation was made. The broad interpretation was the one as it was introduced by the UNDP in 1994, while the narrow interpretation focused specifically on freedom from fear, or freedom from violence and the fear thereof. The report states that the "two approaches to human security are both people-centered, and are complimentary rather than contradictory. But because the 'broad' concept includes everything from poverty to genocide, it has so far proved too all-embracing to be helpful in policy development." (Human Security Report Project 2005: VIII) This is why the Human Security Report focuses solely on freedom from fear. The same approach is, for example, adopted by the Canadian government, which is one of the sponsors of the Human Security Reports. With their human security policy, they aim mainly to provide physical security, in order to prevent violence from taking place – in the words of the chairman of the Canadian-sponsored Human Security Network, "[providing] freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives."[7]

In contrast to the trend of 'securitisation', with which critics refer to the ever-broadening definition of what actually constitutes security, I will utilise a rather narrow conceptualisation. When I speak of security, or its antonym insecurity, I refer to what some have termed 'freedom from fear' but what I consider to be the absence of physical threats to people's integrity and well-being. I do, however, not include development-related issues, such as food or environmental security, although I by no means intend to imply that severe draughts or food crises do not endanger people's physical well-being. It is, however, for the specific purpose of this study that I focus on inter-human violence as the focus of security issues. Insecurity, in this study, is thus directly caused by human agents.

A second series of debates about human security deals with the adjective 'human'. By contrasting the concept to state security, the traditional role of the state as the main provider of security is being questioned. However, as already said in the introduction, the structure of the international system comprising of institutions such as the UN and

[7] *A Perspective on Human Security.* Chairman's Summary, first Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Lysøen, Norway, 20 May 1999.

the World Bank, causes policies to be still based on top-down implementation, implemented by states or coalitions of them.

Because of the ambiguity surrounding the distinction between human security and traditional state security, The Human Security Report, as well as the UNDP and the scholars who have written about the concept are struggling to present their cherished concept as a completely new paradigm. They contrast human security to state or national security but paradoxically also stress the interconnectedness of the two.

The Human Security Research Group, which is headed by the earlier mentioned Andrew Mack, specifically states that human and state security should be interconnected, and that they are only at odds in anomalous situations, in "weak states which allow warlords and militias to flourish, and [in] strong states which themselves commit abuses such as torture and summary execution." (Human Security Research Group 2008: 3). States thus still are the main – and supposed – provider of security and, as such, the focus of many human security studies. The so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework, which was adopted by the UN as a formalised alternative to the *force majeure* approach of humanitarian interventions, also still acknowledges the failing state's authority and sovereignty. When the available prevention strategies are depleted and a foreign intervention does become an imperative, the final aim is to support or replace the state's institutions, i.e. providing human security by re-establishing a monopoly on violence, and ensuring that security is not only utilised as an instrument for the perpetuation of (authoritarian) state power but actually provided to the population.

In this analysis, as reflected by the conceptualisation of the *security fabric,* I follow Mack's line of reasoning in that security and actors on various levels are interconnected. Especially in the anomalous situations Mack refers to, the dynamics between the levels are of importance but in contrast to most studies, which focus on either state or non-state actors, I will take both into consideration. The point of departure will be the non-state actors, the ways they organise themselves, and how they interact with each other and with state actors.

Although discussions about the role of the state as security provider tend to depart from a state-individual juxtaposition, this study will take communities – the varying and sometimes rather fleeting alliances between people, based on one or more shared characteristics, such as religion or political conviction – as the referent object, since, in the words of Edward Newman, "the individual is a social animal in various contexts and communities[.]" (2010:94) A thorough discussion on the relation

between security and development, and the emergence of a more individualist approach to security are dealt with in the theoretical framework**.**

2.2. Security fabric

To analyse the changing security dynamics within certain territories, for example states and specifically those which are relatively unstable and prone to violent conflict, I will use the so-called *security fabric*. The security fabric can be conceptualised as the composition of a definite territory in terms of its security architecture, meaning the actors involved, their (sometimes self-imposed) mandate and actual duties, territorial boundaries in which they operate and the level of influence they exert over that area, and their respective ethnic, religious, social, and cultural affiliations. In brief, the security fabric consists of the formal and informal actors involved in security issues; the state's official security apparatus, which I define as human security from above, and non-state actors – security zones and communities – which provide human security from below.



Illustration 1: Stable, democratic state

For reasons of clarity and comprehensibility, certain institutions related to security, such as those related to law and justice, are not shown in this representation.

The security fabric does not solely consist of tangible components, however. A vital element that runs through the fabric – both strengthening and weakening the various seams – is trust, since it plays a vital role in feeling secure. In turn, trust is inextricably linked to the legitimacy of the various security providers, be they from above or below.

When security initiatives are taken by a group, there is usually a single characteristic, or a combination of them, that defines such a group, binding it together, as well as bolstering the mutual trust among its members. These communities vary in size, and revolve around, for instance, religious, tribal or family ties, ethnicity, or simply the vicinity of like-minded neighbours. Familiarity and tradition play a vital role in this respect, since they bring a certain sense of stability and predictability to a situation that is otherwise very disordered.

The legitimacy of actors that provide human security from above – the state's security apparatus – is, however, based on a different foundation, than that -of non-statutory actors, such as clans or political factions. Max Weber's typology of three different types of legitimacy (Weber 2009:78-79) is useful to make the distinction discernible. Although legitimacy can best be treated as a multi-dimensional concept that cannot be classified as purely being one of either three ideal types of the Weberian tradition[8] (Beetham 1991), I consider the legitimacy of the actors from above to be rooted in the rational-legal type and that of the actors from below in what is dubbed traditional legitimacy.

The former type of legitimacy, based on laws and regulations, has an inherently abstract and impersonal character and it is therefore also appraised as such. Since the state's actors are embedded in a well-defined framework of laws and a setting of state institutions, rational-legal legitimacy is assessed according to rather tangible characteristics like the quality of the services provided. As such, this particular type of legitimacy is closely related to what Francois and Sud call "performance legitimacy" (2006). Traditional legitimacy, on the other hand, is based on the "beliefs established within a given society about the rightful source of political authority." (Beetham 1991:44)

In this study, the security fabric will first be visualised by a simplified graph, in which the main actors are shown. These actors are represented by arrows, of which the width represents their legitimacy and the length their ability to exert political power. The total area of the arrow thus represents an actor's significance in the security fabric. Following the graph, of which *illustration 1* above is an example, the actors will be described in more detail, specifically focussing on the characteristics that are mentioned above; ethnic, religious, social and cultural affiliations, territorial footing, size, command and leadership structures, and, finally, their actual operational tactics. Different aspects will be emphasised in accordance with what I consider to be of importance.

2.3. Occupation

The concept of human security, at first sight, appears to be of special significance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while we are dealing with a specific kind of conflict,

[8] For the purpose of this study, Weber's third category of authority, based on charisma, is excluded. Even though clan elders can arguably be ascribed certain charismatic qualities which bolster their societal status, I focus on the institutional legitimacy of clan traditions in general and not on specific individuals.

namely an occupation. It implies that state actors, which are traditionally considered to be responsible for providing security, play a particularly contested role. Since an occupation means that a certain '[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of [a] hostile army'[9] it becomes clear that the traditional paradigm of state security, in which a monopoly on the use of violence ensures the security of inhabitants living in a certain sovereign territory, is not applicable.

As said earlier, the subject is mostly left unmentioned in recent publications on contemporary or 'new' wars, or simply characterised as 'asymmetric warfare' (Münkler 2005, Kaldor 2001, De Nevers 2006; Cohen 2010; Findley and Edwards 2007). It appears that occupations do not fit the recently introduced typologies but it is, however, of vital importance to address this lack, because an occupation raises serious concerns about human security in a situation where territorial sovereignty is absent.

Occupations are considered to be fundamentally temporary in nature (Roberts 2006: 582) – either leading to permanent annexation, the retreat of the occupying forces, or secession. While the foundations of international laws of war were already laid in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – in The Hague and Geneva – the rules and regulations dealing with occupations, which were hitherto interpreted as territorial expansions, followed only after the Second World War, in 1949. In short, these conventions read that the occupying force had a certain number of responsibilities towards the occupied (Ibid.: 583). Amongst these, one of the most prominent is that the occupying power is responsible for the security of the people living in the occupied territories, in the sense that they should ensure that there are adequate amounts of foodstuffs, sufficient medical care, and arrangements to provide education, and that they should safeguard the freedom of religious communities. The occupying power thus bears responsibility, which reflects the notion that *states*, even when they occupy other territories, are accountable for people's human security.

Already having referred to *human security* several times but not quite touched upon the on-going conceptual debates associated with it, it is important to elaborate on the concept's history, which will be discussed in chapter 4. First, however, I will introduce the socio-historical context of the West Bank, since it is important to take into consideration the background of certain societal phenomena that have become typical for the Palestinians in the regions, in order to better appreciate the subsequent theoretical discussion, which already includes several references to the local context.

[9] "Laws and Customs of War on Land" (Hague IV); October 18, 1907: "Section III Military Authority over the territory of the hostile State." On: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp#art3 (Accessed 23 July 2012).

3. Socio-historical context

With an area of almost six thousand[10] square kilometres and a population of about 2,5 million, the West Bank is the larger of the two Palestinian Territories. Bordering on Jordan in the East, the territory remains under occupation, with Israel controlling all borders. Besides the external borders, Israel to a considerable extent dominates internal movement within the West Bank. An intricate network of Jewish settlements, roadblocks, both permanent and flying (ad hoc) checkpoints, fences and walls determines the face of the West Bank landscape and limits the freedom of movement of its Palestinian inhabitants. Although the restrictions have been eased over the last years, following cooperation with the Palestinian Authority – especially where it concerns security issues like threats against Israeli targets – there remain considerable limitations on private as well as commercial traffic.

As in every conflict, history is a sensitive and highly contested issue. There are probably as many 'true' historical accounts as there are people involved, which makes it difficult for an independent researcher to present a single, as objective as possible history. In fact, one's starting point can already be politically motivated.

The occupation of the West Bank commenced after Israel's decisive victory in the Six Day Way in 1967 but since this study also deals with deep-rooted and traditional social institutions, I will begin this account earlier in history, in the early 20th century. I will then jump to the Jordan annexation of the West Bank, in the wake of the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, which the Arabs refer to as an-Nakba (the catastrophe). The instances I refer to times prior to that decisive moment in 1948 are of particular importance where it concerns the role of clans in Arab-Palestinian society.

In the following paragraphs of this chapter I will discuss this socio-historical context in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is taking place. It is not by any means a complete historical account, nor is it intended to be, but certain historical developments are beneficial to understanding the contemporary – local, regional and international – context and the dynamics between the developing state institutions – the Palestinian Authority – and the non-state actors who are rooted in social traditions prior to the establishment of national political institutions. I will therefore focus on the societal consequences of the two major wars and the occupation, the economic strategies of Israel vis-à-vis the West Bank, the role of international organisations, and conclude with some remarks about the political divisions within Palestinian society.

[10] This figure includes occupied East Jerusalem.

3.1. 1948 – Independence and Nakba

One of the first major milestones in the West Bank's recent history is the Israeli declaration of independence, on 14 May 1948[11]. The run-up to the subsequent war is, however, of even greater importance when one wishes to understand the outcome of the war.

During the Ottoman times, the local Arab communities were evidently part of a larger empire with centralised institutions but they mostly enjoyed a considerable part of autonomy where it concerned maintaining social order and, hence, security. It was only when these communities where confronted by a growing Jewish community, which itself became ever more centrally organised, that this fragmented autonomy became apparent.

The massive waves of Jewish immigration that had started in earnest in the wake of the First World War and after the British Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly declared in a letter that his country supported the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine, increasingly led to dissent amongst the Arab population of the British Mandate. They began to feel threatened by the rapid development of the Jewish presence, which was characterised by well-developed human security from below, and a simultaneous process of rapidly improving social organisation and an organised campaign of acquiring land, that was until then cultivated by the Arabs and considered communal property. According to the 1930 report of the Shaw Commission, led by Sir Walter Shaw, the consequence could be a growing class of Arabs without land and, thus, without income. In the 1939 British White Paper, it was concluded that "there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created."[12]

The commission advised the British government to critically re-evaluate the Jewish immigration policies and reaffirm its intentions of safeguarding the rights of non-Jewish communities. What complicated the British course of action, however, was the considerably asymmetric level of social and political organisation amongst Jews and Arabs. The Jews in Palestine were clearly developing their society with a future statehood in mind.

[11] The uprooting of hundreds of thousands of people that accompanied Israel's determining its borders is referred to as *an-Nakba*, the catastrophe.

[12] British White Paper of June 1939. On: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1939.asp (Accessed 24 July 2012).

Another British advisory document, referred to as the "Churchill White Paper" and published on the 3rd of June 1922 to further explain the Balfour declaration, acknowledged this, saying that the Jewish community in Palestine, which numbered 80,000 around that time, had

> *an elected assembly for the direction of its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for the control of its schools. (…) This community, then, with its own town and country population, its political, religious, and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, [had] in fact 'national' characteristics.*[13]

This process was not mirrored amongst the Arab population. Although there were notable Palestinian Arabs who were in favour of establishing a National Home, in effect, they remained largely disorganised (Morris 1989). As said before, politics revolved mainly around villages and clans. Initiatives on a supra-village level did occur but even they were largely clan-based. In the early 1930s several Arab political parties were established by the elite families in Palestine. While these parties were not democratic but rather based on clan loyalty and local affiliation (Morris 2009), they reinforced clan divisions, rather than bridging them.

The most important political organisation during the early 1930s was the Palestine Arab Party, which was established by the Al-Husayni clan. The main opponents of the Al-Husaynis were the Nashashibi clan members, who set up the National Defence Party. Other parties, established by other notable families, usually identified with either the Al-Husaynis or with their adversaries. The latter became known as the Opposition. The British were very much aware this on-going feud, and in fact reinforced it, while they appointed an Al-Husayni as the Grand Mufti, in order to counter the influence of Raghib Al-Nashashibi, who was the mayor of Jerusalem. The ongoing rivalry between the Al-Husaynis and the Opposition caused serious in-fighting amongst the Arab groups. It eventually left the Nashashibi leadership decimated and the Arabs in general practically without any form of leadership.

After the Britons expressed their wish to discontinue the Mandate of Palestine, they asked the newly formed United Nations to provide a solution for the

[13] British White Paper of June 1922. On: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1922.asp (Accessed 24 July 2012).

developing conflict between Jews and Arabs in the region. In August 1947 the UN Special Committee on Palestine presented its so-called Partition Plan and three months later it was approved by the UN General Assembly. The plan was accepted, albeit hesitantly, by the majority of the Palestinian Jewish community, represented by the Jewish Agency, but refused by the Arabs. The main reason for this was that the Arabs considered the partition to be unfair, while they would receive roughly 45 per cent of the land area, despite forming two thirds of the population.

In the wake of the apparent failure of the 1947 Partition Plan, the Jewish community decided to take its fate in its own hand by rapidly taking control over as much territory as possible and eventually, unilaterally, declaring its independence in a considerable part of the former mandate of Palestine. In the process, the newly formed state of Israel determined its geographical borders with Jordan, which in turn annexed the territory that we today refer to as the West Bank (of the river Jordan).

The 1948 war led to the uprooting of dozens of Arab villages and a massive wave of refugees, who sought refuge in the surrounding countries and in what are now considered to be the Palestinian Territories: Gaza and the West Bank. The complete breaking up of a society that was already fragmented in the first place, had drastic consequences for the social cohesion within the local communities, as well. Social hierarchies that had been prevalent for so long, and had provided people with a clear sense of order and stability, were turned upside down; broadly accepted traditional values and practices suddenly became contested because of the abruptly changed living circumstances. In order to alleviate the plight of the refugees, the UN decided to establish an organisation that was specifically aimed at providing humanitarian aid and assistance. It can be argued that the indiscriminate aid provided by UNRWA has exacerbated the breaking down of social hierarchies but I will take this into further consideration in chapter 8, when discussing human security from below.

Already operating for more than sixty years, the UNRWA was originally thought to be a short-term solution. Its mandate has however continuously been renewed, most recently in 2008, although it is experiencing considerable shortfalls in funding. In absolute figures, the US is UNRWA's biggest donor, with almost 270 million dollar, closely followed by the EU, with approximately 230 million. Together, these two donors provide more than half (53%) of the overall budget.[14] In 2009, the UNRWA received about 950 million, while a budget of 1.2 billion was projected.

That UNRWA is the only UN agency that is exclusively dedicated to a specific conflict says something about the special status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and

[14] UNRWA website 2011. On: http://unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=87#funding (Accessed 23 July 2012).

the international community's apparent obligation towards Palestinian refugees. This uniqueness is also exemplified by the fact that UNRWA, which provides aid specifically to Palestinian refugees, is a separate entity from the UN's general body for refugee aid, the UNHCR. In fact, Palestinian refugees are usually not included in the UNHCR's figures about refugees worldwide, since the UNRWA uses a distinct definition of what exactly constitutes a refugee. Currently the UNRWA operates in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, where it provides aid, education and medical care to some five million Palestinian refugees.

3.2. Arab Politics

Palestinian political life in the first decades after the establishment of the Israeli state took place in the context of the Jordanian political arena. Although the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank was deemed illegal by most of the Arab countries, the UK and US actually recognised the annexation of the territory, and the refugees were granted Jordanian citizenship, as well as the same civil rights as the original inhabitants.

Despite their new passports, not much changed for the Palestinians in the West Bank. This was particularly harsh for the inhabitants of the many refugee camps. Their living conditions were not alleviated by the Jordanian state and, up to today, the camps remain rather shabby looking shantytowns, consisting of temporary emergency shelters, despite their existing for several decades. After living under Jordanian rule for nineteen years, the situation was about to change considerably in 1967, when Israel became the new occupying force.

In June 1967 the Six Day War broke out, when after increasing hostility from its neighbours, Israel lashed out with a pre-emptive attack on Syria, Jordan and Egypt (Oren 2002, Hammel 1992). The quick victory had profound consequences for the regional balance of power. Besides its triumph over the three Arab countries, Israel also claimed on them respectively the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.

Furthermore, the blitzkrieg style war led once again to the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, of whom 300 thousand fled to Jordan. For the 600 thousand remaining Palestinians in the West Bank, the war meant most prominently that another occupying army had become the new reality; a reality that still lasts today.

Despite the relative success of the later Yom Kippur war, in which particularly Egypt managed to challenge Israel's ostensible invincibility, the Six Day War and the

continuing occupation of the aforementioned territories remain a decisive psychological factor in Arab-Israeli tensions. Currently, Israel does not have diplomatic ties with twenty out of the twenty-two countries that make up the Arab League. Of its neighbours, Israel does have official ties with Jordan and Egypt but the relationship between these countries is often referred to as a 'cold peace'.

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank brought many changes for the inhabitants. From 1967 onwards, geographically speaking, Israel to a considerable extent determined the prevailing settlement patterns of the West Bank population, specifically where it concerns the expansion of existing cities and villages, by confiscating large parts of the area. This process, which is sometimes referred to as 'creeping annexation', has continued throughout the more than four decades of occupation.

The Israeli administration of the West Bank between 1967 and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 did not only to a large extent shape the region's geographical features but also had fundamental consequences for the social and economic development thereof. After the 1948 Israeli-Arab war, West Bankers were confronted with the new realities of life under occupation; traditional small-scale politics that typified village life had to be taken to a whole other level. A politicisation of society was set in motion that, until today, remains exceptional in the Arab World, and a crowded political landscape of several factions, sub factions, movements and splinter groups emerged. When asked, practically every Palestinian claims affiliation with one of these political groups (Roy 1995, ICG 2007).

Being confronted with radical societal changes on the one hand and the on-going occupation on the other, it was especially the refugee communities who more and more organised themselves in groups, committees and other forms of cooperation, in order to transform their social environment. Increasingly they became aware of the possibilities and impossibilities of social organisation, which made them very politically conscious.

Due to the large Israeli demand for unskilled labour, many from the poor refugee population got the chance to earn an income. This flow of capital to the Occupied Territories had its consequences for the internal social relations. It turned the existing but already challenged hierarchy upside down, especially because it was mostly the young who were benefiting. The position of the former village elders, which was already weakened by the indiscriminate loss of property and comprehensive UNRWA aid, eroded even more. In an International Crisis Group report, the Palestinian economist Omar Shaaban is quoted, saying, "Some said, 'I'm richer than the *mukhtar* and more powerful, why don't I decide.'" (ICG 2007:2) The tumultuous events that

erupted all over the Palestinian Territories in December 1987 and onward should therefore not only be interpreted as a struggle against Israeli occupation and oppression but also as evidence that a young generation no longer abided with the traditional structures of their own society.

3.3. From PLO to Palestinian Authority

No matter the internal political frictions, on the international level the PLO remained the sole representative of the Palestinians. In 1988, while the intifada was still going strong, the PLO with a newfound pragmatism, personified by former-Fatah leader Yasser Arafat, historically recognised the state of Israel and started to opt for a two-state solution. This strategic revision turned out to be the start of a serious dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians, which culminated in the peace talks in Washington and Oslo respectively, in the early nineties.

In September 1993, the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) by Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signalled a radical change in Israeli-Palestinian relations. However, it must be said that with hindsight it can be argued that the factual improvement of the relations turned out not to be that impressive, with violence continuing, a steady growth of settlements in the occupied territories, and with the second intifada still to come. In fact, the current *bantustanisation* of the West Bank is the direct result of the Oslo accords. What is more, the most difficult issues, such as Jerusalem and the refugees' right of return were left out of the agreement and subsequently not dealt with until now. The most important accomplishment was the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the formal governing body of the Palestinian people, albeit on an interim basis and in certain designated territories only.

Despite the controversy the Oslo agreement remains a pivotal point in the development of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Furthermore, the foundations that were laid during the talks in Oslo, still to a large extent determine the geographical and political composition of the Palestinian Territories. With the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, eleven years after the signing of the “Gaza-Jericho first” agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian governing institution, in which Israel dismantled the settlements and by and large pulled back its forces from the territory, there thus came an official end to the occupation of Gaza. There remains however dispute about whether the occupation of Gaza has factually ended, while Israel is still in full control of the borders. As Palestinian-American attorney and legal advisor for Palestinian negotiations Gregory Khalil puts it, “Israel still controls every person, every good,

literally every drop of water to enter or leave the Gaza Strip. Its troops may not be there (...) but it still restricts the ability for the Palestinian authority to exercise control."[15] Several large international organisations and institutions – the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights Watch, amongst others – therefore still consider Gaza to be under Israeli occupation.[16]

The situation in the West Bank is considerably different. Since Oslo, the Territories have been split up in three different sections, namely A, B- and C- areas. The first type is under full control of the Palestinian Authority and consists of the major cities in the West Bank – Jericho, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilya and Jenin. The second type concerns the smaller towns and villages surrounding the aforementioned cities, which are under civil control of the PA but, for security reasons, remain militarily controlled by the Israeli Defence Forces. The third and last type, the rest of the territories and by far the largest of the three areas, remains completely under Israeli command. Gaza has since the Israeli disengagement in 2005 been freed from internal closures, and can thus be considered hundred per cent A-area, albeit *de facto* no longer governed by the PA, but the West Bank, with settlements, roadblocks and special bypass roads separating the areas from each other, is effectively cut up in largely isolated enclaves, severely limiting the freedom of movement and transport (PASSIA 2008).

3.4. Political economy

Contrary to the rapid development of the political sphere, the West Bank's economy deteriorated considerably, because it was countered by an effective, double-barrelled Israeli strategy. On the one hand, Israel tried to stall the West Bank's economic development, in order to keep its population dependent on Israel, while on the other hand simultaneously exploiting the available natural and human resources – land and water, and the sizeable cheap labour force residing in the cities and refugee camps – to the maximum.

The motivation behind policies to keep West Bank's economy from developing was strongly political. For obvious reasons, Israel feared Palestinian

[15] Quote taken from a panel discussion about the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza, held at Virginia Law, University of Virginia. See: http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2005_fall/gaza.htm (Accessed 4 February 2009).

[16] Their respective websites still refer to the Gaza as being occupied. UNOCHA website: http://www.ochaopt.org/ (Accessed 23 July 2012); Human Rights Watch website: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/10/28/israel-disengagement-will-not-end-gaza-occupation (Accessed 23 July 2012).

nationalist aspirations and in order to forestall any form of sovereignty, processes that might have bolstered autonomy, specifically economic development, were intentionally frustrated. It must thus be noted that the Palestinian economic situation was not a case of underdevelopment. The deplorable economic conditions were the result of deliberately applied Israeli policies (Shlaim 2009). Some, therefore, have aptly termed this process 'de-development' (Roy 1995, Shlaim 2009), which refers to a set of policies aimed at "expropriating and dispossessing" the Palestinians' own vital economic resources, making them dependable on Israeli produce, and by thwarting the emergence of an institutional structure meant to foster and improve economic planning and development (Roy 1995:161, 209, 263)[17].

At the same time, Israel sought to exploit whatever resources they could extract from both Gaza and the West Bank. In that sense, the Occupied Palestinian Territories were "a classic case of colonial exploitation in the post-colonial era." (Shlaim 2009) Israel was indeed very much interested in the primary Palestinian economic assets – water and land – something that is, for example, clearly illustrated by the continuous Israeli restrictions on Palestinian water sector development (World Bank 2009).

Furthermore, because the prospering Israeli economy was in need of cheap, unskilled labour, travel restrictions between the Occupied Territories and Israel proper were eased, which enabled the authorities to draw from a considerable workforce. Not only the crowded refugee camps but also the cities and villages were filled with thousands of unemployed young men, eager to make a living. It was part of what Israel's Defence Minister at the time, Moshe Dayan, termed the "open bridges" policy, mainly referring to the bridges over the river Jordan that were opened in the wake of the 1967 war. Besides it being a method to allow for exporting to the surrounding Arab countries the surplus of Palestinian farm products, which were potential competition for Israeli products, it was thought that a gradual increase of living standards in the Occupied Territories would "compensate for the loss of political freedoms suffered by the Palestinians under permanent Israeli rule" (Tamimi 2007: 300).

[17] In her book, Roy specifically refers to the de-development of Gaza but the same strategy was applied to the West Bank.

3.5. Gaza versus the West Bank

Currently, both Israel and the international community at large employ separate strategies in dealing with the two geographical and political entities that make up the Palestinian Territories – Gaza and the West Bank.

The differing strategies are often framed in terms of religion. Since 9/11 and the subsequent 'war on terror', Hamas, as the *de facto* ruling party of Gaza, is often categorised under the same heading as *al-Qaeda* and, as such, considered to be an Islamic terrorist organisation. Furthermore, because of Hamas' adherence to fundamentalist principles and its attempts to maintain *sharia'* rule in Gaza, it is frequently compared to the Afghan *Taliban* regime. Muslim majority states, such as Syria and Iran, on the other hand, vehemently support the Hamas regime, both in words as well as in funds and weapons.

In 2006, eager to justify the shifting power balance with electoral evidence, Hamas for the first time since its establishment in late 1987, participated in the general elections. Their decision to enter the elections, which implied the acceptance of "power-sharing in a non-Islamic regime" (Tamimi 2007: 211), and adherence to democratic principles in general, was in line with their view on democracy as being compatible with Islam, just like that of their predecessors of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ibid.). The main reasons for participating were "the utter failure of the peace process, the disappearance of Yassir Arafat from the political scene, and Israel's unilateral decision to end its occupation of the Gaza Strip." (Ibid.)

Knowing they could already count on a considerable number of loyal supporters, they also anticipated a commonly experienced dissatisfaction with the current leadership, which was perceived as corrupt and too consensual in their negotiations with Israel. Hamas registered under the name "Change & Reform", thus directly positioning themselves against the Fatah dominated political establishment.

Quite to the surprise of many[18], Hamas won the 2006 elections with a landslide victory. Not only did they beat Fatah, but while winning 74 of the total number of 132 seats in the PLC, they were able to form a majority government on their own. After Hamas winning the elections, the international community immediately responded, however, as if the results signalled a general turn to violent radicalism amongst the Palestinian people. While the US and several European countries officially considered Hamas to be a terrorist organisation, an international boycott was

[18] Even a respected pollster like Dr. Khalil Shikaki had not expected Hamas to actually win (personal communication, Ramallah, 18 January 2009). The margin between Hamas and Fatah continually became smaller as the elections date approached, but even during exit polls, Fatah was expected to win (Source: *Pollsters stumped by Hamas Victory.* Jerusalem Post, 26 January 2006).

instigated. This course of action further deteriorated the economic situation, with the circumstances in Gaza worsening even more. When in December 2006, Ismail Haniyeh, Prime Minister of the Hamas dominated PA, declared that the PA would never recognize Israel, the international mistrust in Hamas was confirmed. With the conditions in the Palestinian Territories continually deteriorating, it became clear that the Hamas led government could not stay in charge.

In addition to the external pressure, internal tensions between the two major political factions also increased. Fatah's elite commanders were unwilling to take orders from the Hamas-led PA and started to organise attacks against Hamas members, while Hamas responded with more violence, and Hamas Minister of Interior Siam established his own security organisation – Executive Force – as an attempt to break Fatah's hold over the security forces. In an attempt to resolve the internal struggle, as well as the financial and diplomatic impasse, the Hamas-led government together with PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas agreed to form a unity government. On the 15th of February 2007, Haniyeh resigned and the unity government was formed on the 18th of March, again under Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, but now with members from Hamas, Fatah and other parties, as well as independents.

The unity government turned out to be a short-lived solution to the internal strife. In what is now referred to as the Battle of Gaza, Hamas and Fatah exchanged violent blows; after several rounds of fighting, which led to dozens of casualties, Hamas took over the Gaza Strip. The result was that the West Bank was ruled by the Fatah-led PA and Gaza by Hamas, adding a political dimension to the territorial separation that already characterised the two regions.

Since the 2005 disengagement, the Israeli forces have by and large pulled back from Gaza, only occasionally targeting (suspected) militants, mostly from the air. The Israeli army remains a heavy presence along Gaza's borders, controlling all border crossings apart from Rafah, in the south, which is controlled by Egypt. It is not without reason that Gaza is sometimes referred to as an open-air prison. Its borders are completely controlled and the area is sealed off from the outside world, while the ruling Hamas regime is treated as an international pariah, suffering from a diverse range of economic and political sanctions imposed by the international community.

The marginalisation of Hamas, and Gaza accordingly, has led to the peculiar situation in which the territory is often neglected in discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; at least, when talking about a political settlement of the conflict. Peace building efforts are solely focused on PA-Israel relations and, thus, on the West Bank, even though the dynamics there seem much more complicated.

Indeed, in contrast to the situation in Gaza, the Israeli security forces remain present throughout the West Bank. One major reason for their continued presence are the numerous Jewish settlements but, arguably, the main consideration concerns the Jordan border. Since defendable borders and the security of its territory are Israel's main priority, it is not likely that it will ever give up the Jordan valley, which constitutes roughly one third of the West Bank.

When an autonomous Palestinian state would be able to control and supervise its own borders with Jordan it, according to Israel, *de facto* creates a corridor between Israel and the greater Arab and Muslim world, including enemy states such as Iran and Syria. Without the West Bank as buffer zone, terrorists would be able to come to the actual borders of Israel proper and pose a great threat to Israeli society by, for example, launching rockets from inside the West Bank. As such, the West Bank is considered to be of much greater strategic importance than the small coastal enclave of Gaza. It is therefore that Israel has, on numerous occasions, vowed to never give up control over this border, and it explains why a viable, contiguous Palestinian state in the whole West Bank remains difficult to imagine, and why Gaza, on the other hand, can be treated as a separate, contiguous area and for the time being remains as is.

It is an interesting paradox that although the West Bank remains under tight Israeli control, it continues to be the focus of Palestinian autonomy, in one form or another. As was envisioned in the Oslo accords, the PA operates as the interim embodiment of this autonomy, albeit under supervision of Israel. With the context of violent conflict and on-going occupation ever present, security has been the defining focal point for the development of Palestinian autonomy, both for Israel as well as the Palestinians themselves, and as such the Israeli-Palestinian cooperation is considerably geared towards this, supposedly shared goal. Following the establishment of the PA as the interim governing body in the West Bank and Gaza, there has been a steady development of an official security apparatus, ostensibly under Palestinian ownership, which is the main subject of this research. Before delving into an analysis of the various security providers in the West Bank, however, first the theoretical and methodological framework has to be set up.

Part 2 – Theory and Methodology

4. Theoretical Framework

"In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to *worship* God in his own way--everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.
That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb."

- Franklin D. Roosevelt, excerpt taken from the State of the Union Address to the United States Congress, 6 January 1941.

4.1. Individual insecurity in a global context

One of the most fundamental characteristics of life in the twenty first century is a phenomenon that is usually referred to as globalisation. It is an on-going process that considerably influences the machineries of contemporary business and politics but also has far-reaching consequences on the level of the individual human being. The global interconnectedness brings obvious advantages with it but simultaneously presents us with the awareness that our security and well-being are dependent on myriad, diverse, intertwined and often unknown causes, originating in unknown places. There remains, however, a gap between objective (actual) and subjective (perceived) insecurity (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1998:30). Even though, for example, crime figures are declining, public perception shows of this phenomenon shows an opposite interpretation (Pfeiffer, Windzio and Kleimann 2005, Lee 2007) or indicates an increased preference for more 'punitive' action (Demker et al. 2008).

Events and processes with global consequences, such as economic and financial crises, global terrorism, climate change, and natural disasters add to an increasing sense of insecurity (Beck 2002), not in the least in states that seem rather well-off where it concerns the socioeconomic living conditions (Pain 2009). What causes, or at the very least aggravates, this sense of insecurity is the feeling of impotency that stems from an acute understanding that these elusive phenomena can hardly be effectively controlled (Beck 2002). People feel they have lost control. Indeed, although human beings are undeniably causal actors of economic crises and climate change, either direct or indirect, the solutions to these issues are extremely difficult to accomplish.

As social scientists, we are interested in the human side of this growing sense of insecurity and the attempts to harness it. It is therefore that much attention is paid to causes of insecurity and strategies to ameliorate them, in which the human factor can be effectively distinguished. Wars and conflicts are a prime example of this tendency, because they pre-eminently consist of social, political and economic processes; human beings cause, fight and suffer from wars. And since wars constitute a substantial source of insecurity worldwide, they are a social phenomenon that deserves, and receives, meticulous scholarly attention, which can be illustrated by the numerous varieties of security- and conflict-oriented studies that are being taught at universities around the globe.

However, since social scientists mainly focus on interactions between human beings, the role of the individual, and his or her agency, in conflicts is not often touched upon, even though security in a war situation is, first and foremost, an issue of self-protection. Life-threatening circumstances force people to consider strategies they had never considered before and to act like they had never thought possible. When

you are suffering from, or threatened by, violence and seek to protect yourself and those around you, you are confronted with numerous dilemmas. The choices you make and the way you act when war breaks out depend on the available options and your individual capabilities. Where you live, which social or ethnic group(s) you are member of, your financial situation, and even your social capital – who do you know? – all influence your actions, the possibility of finding security and, ultimately, your chances of survival. It is the difficult choices and the consequences thereof that are the ontological foundation for a critical analysis of security improving initiatives in war situations – human security from below.

In a war situation, human security from below starts with the most elementary forms of self-protection; boarding up your house; seeking shelter with your family; relocating to a neighbourhood that is predominantly inhibited by people of your own ethnicity or religion; forming your own militia; et cetera. Although these acts are all aimed at improving one's own security, they do not occur in a vacuum and, as such, they obviously influence the behaviour of other people.

When looking at war situations from a 'security perspective' and taking the human instinct for self-protection as the point of departure, it becomes clear that one person's actions, aimed at improving his or her security, may well lead to the insecurity of others. The complicated dynamics in situations of violent conflict can be illustrated by analysing the so-called *security fabric,* as it was conceptualised above. Although this representation presents a wide array of actors, a distinction is made between those who are considered to representatives of a state's security apparatus (be it from the state in case or, for example foreign troops) and non-statutory actors.

Since the Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of force is considered to be one of the fundamental characteristics of states, it logically follows that the security fabric of stable modern states is typified by a top-down structure. An illustration of the Weberian state's security fabric would thus mainly show actors who are involved in providing human security from above, like the civil police, the army and intelligence services. Non-statutory actors such as private security companies may also be present but they operate solely by government consent and they usually play a minor role.[19]

Although it is rather difficult to assign quantitative characteristics to the influence or strength of the various actors or to measure the balance between human security from above and below, it is important to note that the often precarious

[19] Although it can be argued that security is increasingly being privatised and delegated to private security companies. The numerous Private Military Companies (PMCs) that operate in Iraq, such as Titan Corp. and Blackwater, or in various African countries, such as Executive Outcomes, are prime examples of this development.

balance between the two levels has all the features of a zero-sum game. If the state's security apparatus fails to deliver or loses its grip over a certain territory, non-statutory actors will certainly jump in and rise to the occasion.[20] The illustrative value of the security fabric lies herein that it shows how these shifting power relations should not simply be qualified as opportunistic 'warlordism' by spoilers or the criminalisation[21] of post-modern warfare but should rather be assessed from a security-oriented perspective, because the urge to self-protection prevails in times of crisis.

Wars and conflicts are difficult to be abstracted or generalised but what most of them, especially intra-state wars, have in common is that the ever present threat of violence and the lack of a stable, predictable environment – usually in the form of a central authority, i.e. the state – gives people the sense that they have only themselves, and those they trust, to rely on. This is exactly why in conflict situations, when a state fails to provide security to all of its citizens or when the governing institutions cease to function at all, people shortly seem to fall back to the ultimate human inclination for self-preservation and -determination, as described by Hobbes (1968), Locke (1993) and Rousseau (1998) in their social contract theories.

All three philosophers took this instinctive need for human self-preservation as the central idea of their so-called social contract theories, although their interpretations vary. While Locke and Rousseau reasoned that the natural state, without a form of social organisation, was not only characterised by self-interest but that people's behaviour was, in various ways, bound by certain moral values and a sense of collective interest, Hobbes argued that, while trying to gain and preserve individual power, men are forced to continuously compete with their peers. Hobbes' argument explains why the security of one person, or group of people, may well lead to the insecurity of others and why generally agreed upon rules, in the form of a social contract, are needed to regulate the on-going competition.[22]

Hobbes' reasoning meant a radical departure from the peace paradigm that was dominant during the Middle Ages. Until that time, the prevalent thought, vocalised by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas amongst others, was that human beings were ultimately inclined to live peaceful together, by God's will (Dekker and Faber

[20] There are evidently also certain regions where state institutions have more or less never been effective at all, like in certain parts of Afghanistan, and where tribalism has prevailed throughout history.

[21] That being said, it must be noted that criminalisation is most certainly an important aspect of conflict. The chaos that prevails during war obviously presents those looking for extra income with novel opportunities.

[22] On a global level, this phenomenon refers to what is called the "Security Dilemma". This concept, first coined by John Herz (1950), describes a process in which states improve their security by arming themselves, which at the same time leads to increased insecurity of other (surrounding) states. The arms race of the Cold War was an evident reflection of this.

2009). Hobbes, however, argued that a human being is in a constant and "competitive struggle for power (...) or at least [struggling] to resist his powers being commanded by others." (1968:37) In other words, people living in what he called the natural condition, were engaged in a war of all against all, *bellum omnium contra omnes* (Hobbes 1968).

Hobbes' war of all against all has been pacified through a metaphorical contract between the citizens, in which they delegated the power to rule over them to the Leviathan, a large sea monster referred to in the Bible, with which he meant the sovereign or state.[23] In other words, people gave up their 'state of nature', and part of the freedom they enjoyed, in exchange for security delivered by the Leviathan. Although the latter party does guarantee the first a certain degree of freedom, that freedom should not undermine the state's necessary security and ability to uphold law and order. It is therefore that Hobbes pleaded for a rather authoritarian form of statehood, headed by an absolute monarch.

Heavily influenced by the English Civil War, Hobbes held a rather negative image of human nature, calling life in the state of nature "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". It is an apt description of what life in various war situations is like. War, and contemporary civil wars arguably even more so, is more than anything characterised by self-interest. Alliances between different people and groups involved are not uncommon, and they may consist of the most unlikely of combinations, but they are almost always fleeting, based on self-interest and short-term gains. The well-known proverb "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" often rings true in the chaos of war.

The choices people make when trying to improve their own security do not occur in isolation. Indeed, there is an on-going dynamic in which one person's or group's quest for security, and the corresponding actions and inactions, influences the security of others. As such, it may well endanger other people's security. It is true that heroism and self-sacrifice are not uncommon in times of conflict; although war often unveils the ugliest and most ruthless face of human nature, it can also bring about the good in people. Ultimately, however, in a war situation, self-preservation remains one of the driving forces of human behaviour, and this has far-reaching consequences, not only for the people involved but also for the way their actions should be assessed and appreciated, especially when being done by outsiders.

When war breaks out, the social fabric is torn apart and prevailing patterns of social organisations, be they in the form of a state or a loose configuration of tribes, fall apart. This breakdown of society, and of the corresponding framework of laws and

[23] This metaphorical contract was the outcome of a social contract designed by rational people living in a certain definite territory.

social conventions, leads to a situation in which self-interest simultaneously becomes an opportunity, a necessity and a hazard. As Baron de Montesquieu, founder of the *trias politica* theory, stated it in his The Spirit of the Laws (1989): "Liberty is the right to do what the law allows (…) if a citizen could do what they forbid, it would be no longer liberty, because others would have the same powers."

Security and freedom (i.e. liberty), although inextricably linked, are not interchangeable. Freedom is a prerequisite for feeling secure, but either too much or too little of it, will increase an individual's insecurity. That is why a set of agreements and an authority to enforce them are needed and this is exactly why the culmination of social contract theories, the social forms of organisation we have come to call states, have always been at the heart of security studies. Recently, however, this centrality of the state has been criticised, as the limits of the state as holder of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force and, thus, the sole provider of security to its inhabitants, have become more visible, not in the least because of the advanced possibilities of communication technology. Due to the increased awareness of states' inability to provide security to all of their respective citizens or the malevolence of certain regimes towards parts of their populations, a different perspective on the referent object of security was called for, as well as new theoretical paradigms.

Inherent to attempts to create order in the study of wars and conflicts, and other situations of grave insecurity, however, there is the tendency to pour them into the mould of fixed categories and frameworks, which is not always helpful to comprehend what is actually taking place. Indeed, generalisation, and the fervour to put an end to enduring violence and therefore be accommodating to those who are considered to be able to stop it – mainly policymakers and governments – may very well obscure processes and phenomena that do not match *a priori* assumptions about security and the peaceful settlement of violent conflicts. We must therefore be very careful with universalistic interpretations about such sensitive and politically contested issues.

Human security, which was introduced in the 1994 UN Development Report (UNDP 1994), exemplifies just such an attempt to devise a generalising concept that seems to be tailored to the policymaking community (Newman 2010: 87-92), specifically meant to categorise and label our evolved perceptions of what security entails and how it should be provided in crisis situations. It clearly reflects the changing views – in the West – on what security means in a globalising world and is directly linked to scholarly debates on the declining importance of nation states (Castells 1996, Sassen 1996, Nederveen Pieterse 1995). Human security indeed followed the awareness that security does not solely revolve around states and their sovereignty.

4.2. The history of Human Security

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is considered to be one of the turning points in security thinking (Bruggeman 2008: 51; Faber 2008: 172; Kaldor 2008: 22). In the wake of the mass slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, it once again became obvious that states in certain circumstances could simply not be considered the sole provider of security; in this particular case the state was the very source of insecurity by actively calling upon civilians to participate in the atrocities. 'State security', as the prevailing Realist paradigm prescribed, became more and more contested by many in academic, political and policy-making circles (Kaldor 2008: 56).

The acknowledgement of human security apparently prevailing over state security raised an important question: if a certain state cannot or does not want to provide security to its citizens, who, then, must bear this responsibility? Since negligence is not a morally accepted option, the answer to that question signalled the inevitable need, at least on paper, for foreign assistance to address the insecurity of individuals and communities under threat. But this assistance was also meant to control spill-over effects and the spread of conflict to other regions, while in an increasingly interconnected and mutually dependable world, failed or oppressive states can no longer be considered as just a 'local population's Hobbesian nightmare', as Milliken and Krause call it (2002:764). The lacking strength of institutions in a fragile state may prove fertile ground for criminal and terrorist groups, which justifies the 'high-profile attention [for failing states] in recent years from both the scholarly and policy-making communities.' (Ibid.)

Since President Roosevelt coined the four fundamental freedoms in his 1941 State of the Union address, they have been used countless times to invoke the primacy of human dignity and the responsibility of people to help others in need. Since then they have become enshrined in the UN charter and followed by the emergence of such admirable and internationally acknowledged notions like human development, human rights and, more recently, human security, the ambiguity has more than faded.

The philosophy behind the aforementioned concepts can be traced back to classical times but the foundations of contemporary interpretations were laid in the wake of the Second World War; starting with the founding of the United Nations, replacing the League of Nations, in 1945, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948, and the reaffirmation of the Geneva Accords, in 1949.

Although a concept like Human Rights implies a more human-centred approach, security for a considerable time remained a matter of state policy. The Realist international relations paradigm, which depicts the world as an anarchic system

of competing, self-interested states, prevailed for the decades to follow. The sovereignty of states was considered to be the foundation of international relations, which meant that the security of individual people was only to be provided by the institutions of the state they were living in.

The end of the Cold War and the earlier discussed technological advancements with respect to ICTs considerably changed this perspective. It was also within states, traditionally considered to be 'black boxes' by (neo-)realists, who do not take state's domestic characteristics into account, that problems became more prevalent and, at the very least, more visible. While large-scale inter-state wars became increasingly rare, (cross-border) intra-state conflicts gained prominence as the most common, and thus threatening, form of organised violence. Sub-state actors, from armed militias to full-fledged secessionist movements, added to the multitude of causes that undermined the state's power and monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Dr. Mahbub ul Haq, the Pakistani economist and founder of the United Nations Human Development Reports, may be considered responsible for the conception of an alternative for state security, *human security,* since it is widely acknowledged that his 1994 report was the instance when the concept was introduced. Since the early stages of its rise to fame, it has offered policy makers a new paradigm to assess security issues and scholars of diverse disciplines an initially promising new dimension to security and conflict studies. It has, above all, proven to be a versatile and broadly interpretable concept.

Many have attempted to define it – suiting it to their own purposes and visions – and the ambiguity of the broad definition is both being criticised and praised (Owen 2004:373-387). How are *fear* and *want* to be specified in order to render them useful for policy and measurement? Although attempts have been made to quantify human security (King and Murray 2001, Mack and Nielsen 2005), they all fail to capture its implied universality. The development of the so-called Human Security Index (HSI), which started in 2008, may be a useful start, combining several other indices, but the initiators remain troubled by finding comparative datasets[24]. And besides the difficulty of comparing different types of data, it still remains unclear what one single index, spanning such a vast range of country specific indicators, says about the human security of individual citizens. Indeed, why is the HSI still measured on the level of states?

[24] See http://www.HumanSecurityIndex.org (accessed 20 January 2011) for the latest developments of the index and an overview of the difficulties the developers are faced with.

Obviously, not specifying human security does have a certain appeal. The concept's morally charged discourse, giving a voice to the oppressed, is often praised (De Wilde 2008, Paris 2001) and has propelled several authors to refer to human security as a successful promotional tool to further causes – a rallying cry. As Roland Paris formulated it, "[c]ultivated ambiguity renders human security an effective campaign slogan." (Paris 2001: 88) Simultaneously, this moral connotation is an inherent weakness. Although the notion of human security suggests universality, it is still mostly applied in a "North-South context" (De Wilde 2008:226), in the sense that human security problems mostly seem to arise in the Southern hemisphere, while states from the North have the responsibility to resolve them (Ibid.).

A clear example is the Human Security Doctrine for Europe, in which the authors argue that "[i]n an era of global interdependence, Europeans can no longer feel secure when large parts of the world are insecure." (Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2004:5) Such a way of formulating implies that human security, whether it involves freedom from fear, want, or both, is apparently not really an issue in European countries themselves. This is of course a fallacy, while, for example, almost 10 per cent of the Dutch population is considered to be poor (European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research 2008), and thus suffering from want, and violent crime figures in the UK rank amongst the highest in the world. Why, then, if human security is so broadly defined and is to include all human beings, do most of its proponents not apply it as such, maintaining their focus on developing countries? Apparently, the answer is that industrialised states are able to solve their own security issues, while developing countries are not.

Such issues have prompted some authors to interpret human security as neo-colonialism or imperialism in disguise (Chandler 2008), by giving militarily advanced states a moral imperative and the legal authority to intervene in other states, thereby creating more desirable political realities. Aside from these moral implications, it can indeed be argued that all – or both – of the earlier cited dimensions of human security attribute to an individually perceived sense of security. But because of its immeasurability and the heavily politicised moral discourse surrounding it (Wæver 2004), the concept does not, and cannot, provide for a single well-defined strategy to attain it globally.

Whether human security is captured in a single index or not, the sheer multitude of issues that arise when taking into account the different dimensions and, subsequently, the number of strategies and visions on how to confront all of them, make it impossible to apply it as an integrated approach. So if an integrated solution is not feasible, what is the use of a single concept to denote the problem? What is more,

with the availability of the human rights discourse and the widely used human development index as key indicators of the quality of life, human security in the broadest sense simply does not seem to have much new to offer (De Wilde 2008).

The concept is indeed so broadly interpretable, that many countries, in order to formulate effective and realistic policies, felt the need to focus on specific elements of human security. Indeed, over the years, policy makers and scholars alike have started to disassemble the concept again, into workable strategies, and what logically followed was the prioritisation of the different dimensions. Many authors have occupied themselves with conceptualising and further specifying human security, as well as finding out whether the concept has an added value at all. Ultimately, two major human security schools emerged, which, paradoxically, marked the split of the supposedly holistic vision of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

Several scholars (MacFarlane and Foong Khong 2006, Kaldor 2008, Krause 2004, Mack 2004), who specifically study wars and conflicts, have endorsed a more narrow interpretation, focussing mainly on physical security or *freedom from fear*. In this approach, human security is to serve as a guiding principle for peace-enforcement and peacekeeping missions and, ultimately, can be used as a justification for humanitarian interventions.[25] However, this narrow approach has also been criticised, precisely for its possible legitimisation of foreign military interventions, in addition to the ostensible, neo-colonial tendencies inherent to it. According to political (neo-)realist critics, directly addressing the security needs of individuals and communities, and thereby bypassing the state as the main provider of security, corrodes one of the principles that has been a pivotal governing mechanism of post-Westphalian international politics: state sovereignty.

Despite such (neo-)realist tendencies, there is a broad consensus about the changed relationship between the state and the individual where it concerns security. It is therefore that one of the tenets of human security, the challenge to the state-centric thinking of conventional, (neo-)realist-oriented, security studies, is of vital importance. The following section deals with the precarious bond between state and individual.

[25] The word 'intervention' used here specifically refers to military interventions. These may be legal or illegal, have a peace-enforcement or peacekeeping character, and concern a (non-UN-mandated) humanitarian intervention or a (UN-mandated) Responsibility-to-Protect operation. However, the specific type of intervention is not of major importance here, while it is not the IR discourse or political background that concerns us but the actual consequences on the ground, i.e. all mentioned varieties have in common that foreign armed forces are deployed and their mission is to achieve and/or maintain security.

4.4. Human security and the state

The paradigm shift from *state* to *human* security entails the blurring distinction between internal and external security, the contested role of the state as the sole provider of security, and the emergence of so-called new wars. Before I will discuss the seemingly changed reality of contemporary wars, I will take a closer look at the supposed shift from state to human security, and specifically at the relationship between the state and the individual; a relationship that revolves around security.

In order to compare, or even contrast, human security to the hitherto prevailing state security paradigm, it is first important to define what a state actually entails. The most basic definition on which most would agree, reads that a state is a complex of institutions that have the authority to govern a group of people living in a definite, geographical territory. What *is* being debated is the scope of the state's responsibilities, the grounds on which its authority is founded and why this particular form of organisation has emerged in the first place, and the way its authority is being preserved.

Of these three issues, both the state's tasks and responsibilities, as well as how its authority is to be maintained, for a large part depend on one's political preferences and vision on how a society should be organised. Such visions may vary from a very limited government, with few regulatory powers, to a full-fledged social-democratic or even socialist state. At the core of debates concerning the functions of governments lays the distinction between positive and negative liberty, as described by Isaiah Berlin (2002).

The two approaches to liberty (or freedom) are very much intertwined but they do represent different perspectives on the relationship between the state and the individual. Negative liberty has traditionally been a starting point for the more liberally oriented philosophers, of whom the most famous are probably Thomas Hobbes (1968), John Locke (1993) and Adam Smith (2010); these philosophers very much valued individual freedom. Principally, their understanding of the concept of freedom, which is now being referred to as negative freedom, means the absence of human caused restraints, specifically those placed upon people by the state. In the ultimate sense, it means that an individual should be free from interference by others.

Positive liberty on the other hand has traditionally been linked to more collectivist philosophies like socialism and communism. Jean-Jacques Rousseau illustrated the difference between individualist (negative) and collectivist (positive) approaches to freedom by saying that even though a law prohibiting a certain action might be interpreted as a restraint on one’s freedom, when this law serves the common good, then it ensures the freedom of the collective; obeying a law that

people prescribe to themselves is actual freedom (Rousseau 1998). Proponents of negative freedom, however, argue that this shows the innate weakness of a positive approach to freedom, while it may lead to a situation in which the law-prescribing state becomes too powerful, authoritarian even, and a threat to minority communities. Isaiah Berlin also acknowledged this inherent danger in the aforementioned lecture (2001).

Rousseau himself furthermore never explained how we were to discover the contents of the 'general will' of the people and his discourse was severely abused during the reign of terror in France in the late 18th century. Although German philosopher Hegel was rather critical of Rousseau's contractual interpretation of the relationship between the individual and the larger community, he did consider freedom to be the fundamental character of one's will (Rockmore 1997), out of which follows that the common (or general) will as the collective exponent of this, as envisioned by Rousseau, is embodied in the state. The spiritual and political leaders of Hamas in Gaza claim that positive freedom points to the realisation of one's higher destiny, which is an Islamic state. Membership of that ideal state is the only way for individuals to be genuinely free and become fulfilled (Gunning 2008).

How the state as an organising principle has gained prominence throughout the world is a different question. The three best known alternative explanations of how states came to exist, correspond with three widely acknowledged core functions of its institutions: (1) as the main provider of security; (2) as the main (re-) distributor of welfare and social justice; (3) as the political representation of its constituents (Smith 2004, Stokke 2006, Milliken and Krause 2002).

While this research deals with wars and conflicts, and thus situations of grave insecurity, I will depart from the first and most basic feature of the state, as the main provider of physical security. In the words of ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, "human security is the primary purpose of organizing a state in the beginning."[26] In short, this line of reasoning, which was also a point of departure for Hobbes, argues that conflict, and the fear thereof, shaped the social organisations we have come to know as states. "War made states, and vice versa," as British sociologist Charles Tilly put it unambiguously (1990:67). According to Tilly, states are "coercionwielding organisations, that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organisations within substantial territories." (Ibid.) As did Hobbes, Machiavelli and Weber before him, Tilly assumes that the monopoly on the legitimate use of force is the key characteristic of a state. As Norbert

[26] Pitsuwan, S. (2007) *Regional Cooperation for Human Security*. Keynote address to the International Development Studies Conference on Human Security: The Asian Contribution. October 2007.

Elias wrote, "When a monopoly of force is formed, pacified social spaces are created which are normally free from acts of violence." (1982: 236)

Interestingly enough, in describing the evolutionary process of state-building, Tilly compared states to organised crime. “If protection rackets represent organised crime at its smoothest, then war risking and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organised crime.” (Tilly 1985: 169) However, as is the case with protection rackets, when the consequences become too severe, people who are 'protected' may start to resist the 'protector'. In other words, the legitimacy Tilly speaks of, surely has its limits. When focusing on security, this implies that the more powerful a state and its security apparatus are, and the more constraints they will place on the individual to provide for his or her own security, and, the more people’s (negative) freedom is curbed, the less safe they feel. Eventually, too powerful a state will negatively influence human security.



Illustration 2: Hobbes-Orwell scale

Indeed, when a state's security apparatus becomes too powerful, the monopoly on the use of force may lose legitimacy, specifically among the people who do not benefit from the state’s ubiquity, because their freedom is curtailed too harshly. This means that the success of a state, in this case expressed by its legitimacy, largely depends on finding the right balance between liberty and law enforcement, or, put differently, between individual freedom and security by government regulation (Zakaria 2007). But how does human security fit into this model?

Illustration 2 is an oversimplified representation of the state’s power and its ability to place restraints on individual people’s freedom. In this model, state power refers to the state's grip on the monopoly on the use of force. The word 'legitimate', as it was used in Weber's definition, is left out on purpose, while an authoritarian state may have an absolute monopoly on violence which may not be considered to be legitimate by part of the population.

The extreme ends of the axis, from bottom to top, are the violent state of nature as it was described by Hobbes and the totalitarian state as it was envisioned by George Orwell in his '1984', respectively (Orwell 1990). For Hobbes, the ultimate answer to his natural state, in which there was no governing body, was the Orwellian state of repression, in the form of an absolute ruler.

States' positions in the graph are obviously not fixed, they change over time. When, for example, looking at Iraq, it's fairly obvious that its position moved from a top position on the scale, with Saddam Hussein's pre-2003 strong Orwellian state apparatus, to a position on the lower end, with a very weak state and a civil war raging, in 2006 and 2007.

A brief study of this proposed model inevitably leads to the conclusion that human security, i.e. freedom from fear, is neither guaranteed in a Hobbesian nor in an Orwellian state. When putting "the individual at the centre of debate, analysis and policy" as Ramesh Thakur from the United Nations University did (2003:347), and considering the state as the traditional, "collective instrument to protect human life and enhance human welfare", then it must, in addition, be stressed that "[t]he fundamental components of human security (...) can be put at risk by external aggression, but also by factors within a country, including 'security' forces." (Ibid.)

Indeed, "states and multilateral organizations [have become] increasingly aware that the state itself – owing to incapacity or malevolence – might be the most significant threat to the safety" of citizens (MacFarlane and Foong Khong 2006:165). In addition to this, other people's insecurity, even if they live half a world away, may prove to be a source of insecurity for those living in Western countries. A lengthy quote from the Dutch Defence Doctrine, clearly underlines this argument.

> *Political instability and the poor economic and social conditions in many parts of the world also have repercussions for Europe and thus for the Netherlands. Examples are migrant movements and organised crime as well as drug and human trafficking, the proceeds of which are also used to finance terrorist networks and their activities. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, countries are facing serious administrative problems; in some instances it is even a case of a 'failing state', where central authority is absent or no longer functions. Generally speaking, there is an*

> *increasing correlation between internal and external security. The promotion of stability and the fight against international terrorism by Dutch military personnel elsewhere in the world can be seen less and less in isolation from the security of Dutch and European citizens in their own environment.*
>
> (Netherlands Defence Staff 2005:30)

The responsibilities and consequences, and also the circumstances that could precede foreign interventions, were comprehensively put on paper in "The Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), a report in which the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) proposed "the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states." (2001:viii)

This responsibility was earlier articulated by John Rawls in his Law of Peoples (1999) "[Although] peoples are to observe the duty of nonintervention", their "right to independence and self-determination is no shield from (…) coercive intervention by other peoples in grave cases [or human rights violations]". Furthermore, they are obliged "to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime" (Rawls 1999:37-38). So, when gross human rights violations occur, or in the case of intra-state conflicts, i.e. when the state is either oppressively authoritarian or fragile, the international community can – and must, so argue Rawls and others – decide to intervene.

R2P, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, can be considered the formalisation of humanitarian interventions, and is the culmination of attempts to justify the breach of state sovereignty by embedding it in international law. When humanitarian interventions, such as the NATO bombing campaigns on Serbia in 1999, which were labelled as a humanitarian intervention afterwards, are executed without the consent of and permission from the United Nations Security Council, they lack legitimacy, which is why the R2P doctrine provides a framework for how to legally and legitimately operate in cases of large-scale human rights violations. The framework consists of three pillars; prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. Although R2P does not rule out a foreign military intervention as a last resort, emphasis is placed on the first pillar, prevention. Dialogue, diplomacy and economic or political sanctions are amongst the instruments, which can be used to force states to improve their human rights record.

Although the R2P is hailed as a step forwards by many, there is also a considerable number of critics. On the one hand there are those who argue that foreign interventions are merely a form of neo-colonialism (Orford 2003) or a means to pursue geo-political goals, disguised as humanitarian missions (Chomsky 1993). A legal justification of such interventions is therefore not at all desirable. A second group of critics consider the formalisation of humanitarian interventions to be a step backwards. While force majeure is no longer a valid motivation to intervene in humanitarian crises, and the United Nations have become the official and sole arbiter on whether or not an intervention is legitimate, the so greatly required urgency in such cases is largely nullified, partly because of the "inevitable features of the way the UN does its collective business: compromise, inertia and avoidance of difficult issues." (Roberts 1993: 443)

What is furthermore interesting about the R2P framework is that, despite the emphasis on human security, and ultimately letting it prevail over state sovereignty, the general idea remains that the state is responsible for its citizens' security. When a state fails to provide human security – whether in a weak or totalitarian state – other states must step in, while they thus bear the responsibility to protect. When in the ultimate case an intervention is initiated, aimed at providing human security, the goal is to reach out directly to the people in need. This is to be accomplished by either assisting the state's own (developing) security institutions or by completely replacing them, as was the case with the UN mandated International Force for East Timor (INTERFET).

Whether foreign forces are to assist the state's own weak institutions, or to completely replace them, in both situations a restoration of a centralised security apparatus is the aim of the intervention, mimicking the conventional situation in which the state owns the monopoly on the legitimate use of force and provides human security. This is exactly why foreign interventions have proven to be rather difficult to successfully execute (Dorff 2000, Dekker and Faber 2009), because restoring the stability and a centralised security apparatus in a failing state requires an enormous amount of manpower and the means are often insufficient to do what is needed.

4.5. Human Security and New Wars

As has become abundantly clear, war, insecurity and the emergence of states are inextricably linked. A major discursive development in security thought, which commenced after the end of the Cold War, concerns an increased awareness of the supposedly changed nature of contemporary warfare. It was linked to the drastic

changes in international power relations and it entailed a specific focus on the role of the state in modern-day conflict.

With the acknowledgement of the globalising world's interconnectedness– the global economic meltdown that occurred in 2008 and 2009 was a clear indicator – and the various sub-state communities longing for autonomy, the question has risen whether the state's core responsibility, which is providing physical security to the people living in its territory, is losing its primacy.

In different parts of the world, communities are contesting their state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. These groups range from (small-scale) rebel groups and militias, like the FARC in Colombia or the former West Side Boys in Sierra Leone, to large-scale uprisings such as the one that commenced in Syria in 2011, to sizeable ethnic or religious minorities that have established pseudo-states, like the Kurds in Iraq (the Kurdish Regional Government) and the Armenians in Azerbaijan (the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). In the popular discourse, states that are unable to uphold their monopoly on the use of legitimate force, are referred to as having "failed"[27] or being "fragile" or "weak".

At the same time there are pressures from supra-state institutions, like the UN and NATO, who are increasingly, though still hesitantly, willing and able to intervene in failing states, i.e. providing human security where weak or oppressive states are faltering. Besides aiding the people and communities in need, an often used and decisive argument for a military intervention is, however, the supposed necessity to protect the population of the intervening countries themselves[28], through preventing spill-over effects, like forced migration, arms trafficking, illegal trade, environmental degradation, or diseases (Newman 2009: 429-431). Besides that, since international terrorism has become a top security priority, most notably after 9/11, regaining control over territories where international terrorist networks make use of the absence of central government rule has become an important reason for intervention. The regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq are prime examples of this line of reasoning.

But is this emphasis on the intervening countries' own security justified? Following the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire, two prevailing representations of what the post-Cold War political arena would look like

[27] The Failed States Index of Foreign Policy utilises a broad range of twelve factors to calculate an aggregate index of 'failedness', which they interpret as the "vulnerability or risk of violence for one time period each year". Fore more information, see the Foreign Policy website on http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_faq_methodology (Accessed 8 October 2009).

[28] See for instance the Dutch Defence Doctrine (2005).

emerged, but despite there being arguments for both of them, the era did not herald the coming of a Kantian (Kant 1976) democratic peace, "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government[,]" as Fukuyama (1989:4) famously wrote, nor was the coming to an end of the bipolar world order the start of an increasingly chaotic and violent era, as suggested by Snow (1996), Huntington (1997), and Ogata, Sen et al. (2003). In fact, statistics do not support an increase in the number of conflicts, some even suggest a slight decrease (Newman 2004, De Wilde 2008).

Violent conflict, as the ultimate manifestation of political struggle, has remained rather constant in occurrence (Heirman 2009), but some authors argue that the nature of conflicts did change. "New wars" theory, advanced by Münkler (2005) and, most notably, by Kaldor (2001), became a principal theoretical paradigm to describe the dynamics of contemporary conflicts. According to new wars theory, the novelty of modern-day conflicts, compared to the more traditional inter-state wars that had been prevalent for the last few centuries[29], revolves around six main features: the actors, motives, means, spatial context, impact or human suffering, and the political or war economy (Newman 2004).[30]

Much can be argued against new wars theory. All of the supposedly new characteristics attributed to contemporary conflicts have clearly been present in wars before, whether it concerns the involvement of private actors, the occurrence of intra-state (or civil) wars, the explicit targeting of civilians, the funding by non-state actors, or the importance of the illegal war economy (Hossein-Zadeh 2006) and the myriad small-scale criminals who benefit from conflict. Indeed, according to Newman (2004) it is not so much the characteristics of war that have changed themselves but rather our perception or, rather, awareness of them. "Shifts in the causes, nature, and impact of war are more apparent than real." (Ibid.:179) This has much to do with the lack of detailed historical sources and, in contrast, the current abundance of available information and statistics on conflicts, because of advanced ICTs. Newman claims that the social reality of contemporary wars may have changed, compared to historical ones, but not so much as to justify the introduction of a new theoretical paradigm.

[29] Examples of *traditional* wars, as opposed to *new* wars, are the so-called "cabinet wars" during the 17th and 18th centuries, the two *total* (or *world*) wars of the 20th century, and inter-state wars like the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and the first Gulf War.

[30] Herfried Münkler, who actually discerns only two major changes in the nature of warfare – the privatisation and the commercialisation of war and the divergence between military strategy and political reality (2005:30) – adds that 'traditional' wars were formally declared and – after a decisive victory of either one of the warring parties or a political stalemate – concluded with a cease-fire or peace agreement, while new wars, in contrast, are not as clearly defined temporally.

Although challenging “a number of assumptions and theses” (Ibid.:186) related to new wars theory, Newman does however acknowledge its “great service in deepening understanding of civil war.” (Ibid.) It is exactly why human security is inextricably linked to new wars theory and why the latter is of importance, despite an apparent lack of empirical proof. New wars theory seeks an explanation for the chaotic and combustible mixture of failing states, identity politics, organised crime, terrorism and other gruesome forms of violence that characterise war, and human security theory is presented as the ‘answer’.

Especially in the chaotic context of war, when it is difficult to apprehend and prosecute human rights violators and human development is obviously lacking, human security does have considerable added value. Not as an aggregated index, while it remains a definition that is highly contextualised, but in its most narrow definition, as freedom from fear, it constitutes the basic motivation of all the actors involved, and as such it can be used to better understand wars. Despite the financial gains or improvement in social status some actors seem preoccupied with, in a violent conflict, seeking physical security for oneself and the people close by is the first and foremost priority. That is why the behaviour of the actors must be viewed from a human security perspective; human security starts and ends with individual human beings.

However, as said above, most human security scholars still depart from the idea of the state as the main security provider, despite presenting their theory as a shift away from neo-realist security thinking, and thus a departure from traditional state security, signalling a human-centred approach. This state-centric propensity is exemplified by the policy-oriented and problem-solving tendencies inherent to human security thought, which renders it 'uncritical', working within existing political and institutional settings, and prevailing power-relations, rather than critically assessing them (Newman 2010). Solutions for human insecurity are devised in the hallways and conference rooms of cosmopolitan institutions like the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union and others, like NATO.

This chapter offers a critical view of the cosmopolitan peace project, and its use of human security as a guiding principle in particular. Although the R2P doctrine is an admirable attempt to update the prevailing Westphalian sovereignty paradigm to a 21st century, universalistic, moral obligation to protect every human being on the planet in spite of (arbitrary) state borders, it remains rather doubtful whether a cosmopolitan approach will be an effective answer to elusive phenomena like new wars and international terrorism. I therefore share the critical stance towards human security, as voiced by critical security scholars like Krause (1998, 2004), Booth (2005, 2007) and Grayson (2008), amongst others, in the sense that I consider its discourse to

be manoeuvring within, and 'uncritically' reinforcing, the prevailing status-quo of global power-relations. I will further elaborate on this argument in the following section, building on the premise that a bottom-up, rather than a top-down approach is the only way forward to try to grasp contemporary, violent conflicts, and by doing so, I echo Newman's (2010) call for the development of so-called Critical Human Security Studies (CHSS).

4.6. Human Security from Below

The point of departure for my critical interpretation of human security boils down to the assertion that a local protection racket, set up by non-state actors, does not differ from the one on state level. Indeed, human security, in its end terms, does not differ much from state security. This is not to say that human security should be discarded and that the realist notion of state security should prevail. On the contrary, if a state is no longer deemed able to provide security to its people, not only the international community but most certainly non-state actors who are confronted by an acute sense of insecurity may be forced to act by reinstating a new monopoly on the use of force in a specific area – a street, neighbourhood, village, region, province – it is an act by people who wish to improve their own security. The result of a human security initiative from the international community at large may result in either an international occupation or a large-scale peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation, and on the sub-state level it may lead to the emergence of shielded-off areas, in which a localised monopoly on the use of force is established: human security from below (Faber 2008).

4.6.1. Security zones

The emergence of a localised monopoly on the use of force does not automatically imply that all inhabitants feel more secure, that is, the leaders of such zones may very well have authoritarian tendencies, although their order and stability are often preferred over the chaos and insecurity of the Hobbesian war of all against all. The acknowledgement that human and state security share the premise of a centrally organised monopoly on the use of force to be effective, asks for a different way of analysing contemporary conflicts. The only difference between them, is that one is provided from above, and the other is initiated by people who are confronted by war themselves – *human security from below*.

In a stable state, where conflict is absent, it is usually clear which institutions are responsible for providing security; the police, intelligence, and the army. In war situations, a whole new dynamic emerges, in which other actors are also occupying power positions. Especially in conflict situations, human security from below is of vital importance. When security is no longer entrusted to the sovereign power and people are confronted by the acute threat of physical violence, they tend to take matters into their own hands – non-state actors challenge the state's monopoly of force, and try to establish one of their own in a definite territory.

The end terms of human security from below do not differ from those of UN or other (inter)national human security operations, the addition from below merely means that these initiatives are instigated by people or communities on a sub-state level; ranging from provinces, cities and neighbourhoods to small, local organisations or even extended families (and individuals) in their own house. The defining characteristics of these groups can be attributed to, for instance, religious, tribal or family ties, ethnicity, or simply the vicinity of like-minded neighbours.

The first and foremost instinctual reaction to the outbreak of war is self-protection. This starts with barricading your house and protecting yourself and your family, but may develop into considerable areas that are protected by armed groups. In Dekker and Faber (2009), areas in which not the state but non-state actors have taken responsibility for the provision of physical security are called security zones. The state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force has successfully been challenged. In many fragile states, these non-state actors have set up rather complex security structures, which are sometimes tantamount to pseudo-states. But also in so-called no-go areas in large cities, criminal gangs sometimes successfully keep the state's official security institutions from entering, roaming the streets with their own weapons.

If security zones are conceptualised as definite geographical areas in which the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force has successfully been challenged by third parties, then churches, mosques or other buildings of religious significance may also be included, while in many cases they are regarded as sanctuaries, in which the use of weapons is prohibited, even by official forces such as the police or army. Take for instance the Israeli army's reluctance to enter the Nativity Church in Bethlehem, because of which they decided to lay siege to the sanctuary for several weeks instead, in April and May 2002, when Palestinian militants had sought refuge there.

Self-organised security zones may emerge when state institutions are failing or perhaps even breaking down completely. Indeed, these zones are meant to fill in

the gap that the state leaves. Although the functions of these security zones will most likely develop simultaneously, I consider the first and foremost function of a security zone to correspond with the most elementary need of people (in conflict situations), which is the provision of physical security (Salomons 2006, Herrero 2005, Stokke 2006). It is therefore that most security zones will likely emerge as very rudimentary forms of self-protection – communities such as families, ranging from households to tribes, that are seeking shelter together are a prime example of this.

When a situation of protracted violence endures and a security zone (or a multitude of them) becomes more or less entrenched in the dynamics of conflict, the need for other services than providing physical security may emerge. It seems logical that when thousands of people are residing in a fortified area, shielded off from the outside world, internal order also has to be maintained. In other words, the need for policing and basic forms of jurisdiction – rule of law – arises.

In war-torn Somalia, community based security arrangements demonstrate a clear effort to preserve the rule of law. "Neighbourhoods and towns have in some places organised the equivalent of 'neighbourhood watch' systems, sometimes absorbing former young gunmen into paid protection forces." (Menkhaus 2003:412) Although these arrangements seem "hardly ideal, and sometimes engender local resistance, [they] do provide a more predictable security environment for local communities." (Ibid.) Furthermore, local jurisdiction in the form of sharia' courts – although their rulings may be harsh, and therefore not of indisputable reputation – is widely acknowledged to have brought temporary stability and sense of security (Ibid.).

In parts of Iraqi cities Mosul and Baquba, for instance, sharia' law was (re-)introduced for a certain time, replacing official Iraqi law. In neighbourhoods of Mosul, under temporary al-Qaeda rule, taxes were raised, specifically from Christians, who were threatened to be killed if they refused to pay. The Mosul neighbourhoods indeed also constitute security zones, in which particular groups – in this case al-Qaeda – occupy power positions and create an almost Orwellian security zone.

The harsh circumstances in which security zones emerge, often have the consequence that the security zone's leaders have authoritarian tendencies, which means that the locally established monopoly on the use of force may lack legitimacy and is forcefully maintained. But although, to the outsider, it may seem a lawless micro society and even though the leaders may not be that benign – using extortion and fear in order to maintain their rule – there may well be strict rules and regulations that give the inhabitants at least, as Menkhaus calls it, a predictable security environment (Ibid.). The security zones that certain powerful clans managed to establish in Gaza, in the wake of the 2006 war, were also simultaneously and paradoxically regarded as

both a threat to and a source of security. Although the circumstances in these shielded neighbourhoods were far from ideal – especially for people who were not members of the clan in charge of the area but simply happened to live there – the fact that inhabitants, of whom many were affiliated with Fatah, were more or less safe from the revengeful and violent tactics of Hamas militants, was considerably appreciated.

Security zones may develop into more than just a shielded-off territory and acquire what renowned British historian Christopher Bayly calls "statishness" or "governmentality". Emerging institutions in security zones acquire these characteristics of "statishness", when they, in Bayly's discourse, start to count, register and categorise their citizens and try to apply certain common principles of improvement and civilization (Bayly 2004:257).

However, this does not imply that security zones necessarily evolve into something more substantive at all. What is more, these zones may not even have started as a shield-off area at all. There are communities, for instance, that already had large networks of social facilities and, only after being directly triggered, contested the state's monopoly on the use of force and started to secure certain territories, becoming a geographically distinguishable security zone. These social services may include schooling, providing basic health care and, very importantly, giving spiritual guidance through networks of churches, mosques and other religious institutions. This course of action was adopted by Hamas, prior to their participating in national elections and, ultimately, taking over power in Gaza.

In many cases, security zones will dissolve when the conflict has ended. Only very well developed zones with a strong community sense, like for instance Iraqi Kurdistan, will remain playing a vital role and become part of the (new) state's configuration. When regions do have a traditional desire to secede from the state in which they live, wars may help them to reach their goal (Kosovo, Kurdistan, South-Ossetia, etc). In most other cases security zones will dismantle themselves as soon as the war comes to an end.

4.6.2. Security communities

There is a clear relationship between security, trust and having a group identity but their connection and reciprocity is often debated. Extrapolated to the national level, these debates touch upon the relationship between nation and state and more specifically, the question which one of these social institutions emerged first.

Nationalists will typically argue that the nation came first. A group of people who share a language and a culture, and have an agreed upon common history, start longing for political autonomy and sovereignty, which would eventually lead to what is

known as the nation-state. The concept of the nation state thus refers to a geographical coincidence of a sovereign state and a uniform group of people – a nation. Pure nation-states, where the two phenomena indeed completely coincide, are non-existent but up to today there are states where only very small minorities of people who do not belong to the principal nation, reside. Examples of such states are Albania, Malta and Egypt, where more than 95 per cent of the population is considered to be part of the dominant ethnic group.

The idea of the nation as an actual entity, preceding the formation of the state, is often attributed to German thinkers from the Romantic school of thought, most notably Johann Gottlieb Fichte (2009) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Rockmore 1997) .

The majority of contemporary social scientists has discredited these Romantic ideas about the nation as a uniform group of people, specifically since they have been linked to ideas about racial superiority and the rights of nations to certain territories, which were taken to extremes by the Nazis, illustrated by concepts and phrases like '*ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer', 'Lebensraum'* and *'Übermenschen'.*

Contrary to the nationalists' claims, there is Eric Hobsbawm's line of reasoning (1990) about the relationship between states and nations. He writes that the claim for the political autonomy of a community – based on a shared history and common destiny – followed state formation. The idea that nations are socially constructed and emerged only in modernity is also furthered by, for example, Ernest Gellner, who referred to nationalism as a mainly political argument for the boundaries of the political and the national unit to coincide (2006).

This line of reasoning very much relates to Benedict Anderson's conceptualisation of a nation as an "imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." (2006: 6) Anderson explains that it is imagined because, except for small villages, members of communities will likely "never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." (Ibid.) Furthermore, it is limited while each group has finite, though flexible boundaries, and is perceived to be sovereign because the idea of nationalism was born in the age of Enlightenment, when the universal claims of religion were contested and the formation of smaller geographical entities led to a longing for freedom through self-determination. Finally, the fact that nations are imagined as communities, stems from the "deep, horizontal comradeship" that constitutes them (Ibid.:7).

In conflict zones, when identity can be the very reason for feeling insecure, the development or awareness of such a shared identity is most likely to precede the

actual formation of a defined community, or will develop simultaneously. The horizontal comradeship that Anderson describes can be substituted by the mutual trust among the members of a community and is therefore directly related to feeling secure.

In order to describe this sense of community and its contribution to security, Karl Deutsch coined the concept of '*security community*' (1957). It referred to a group of people, living within a certain territory, who have attained such a sense of community, bolstered by various institutions, practices and traditions, that it is reasonably expected that if conflict should arise among them, that it can and will be solved in a peaceful manner (Ibid.:5).

Despite this rather generic conceptualisation, and thus its applicability to sub-state communities such as the ones discussed in this study, Deutsch' concept is mostly applied in International Relations theory (Adler and Barnett 1998, Shaw 1998). This is not the reason why I have chosen to formulate my own conceptualisation, but rather that Deutsch's definition, despite its many merits, does not take into account the conceivable fleeting character of security communities and the ad-hoc ways they sometimes emerge. Although communities may indeed revolve around traditions and tried and tested practices, as Deutsch argues, or even around blood ties, they can also be socially constructed around identities that were hitherto irrelevant.[31] In such cases it is often armed conflict, combined with political opportunism, that provides for the right context.

This use of group identity, which is sometimes referred to as identity politics, can for example be employed by group leaders, in order to bolster the internal cohesion, especially when the own identity is pitted against one or more enemies. In more formalised structures, regionalised politics or patronage systems, merely aimed at pleasing the own community and simultaneously impeding others, can promote social divisions between different groups (Brancati 2006).[32]

Security communities, as they are described in this study, are groups of people, living within or across states, with clear, socially constructed borders, of which members with a (imagined) shared identity associate their security, and physical, as

[31] The Balkan wars provide for a clear, albeit horrendous, example of identity politics. Social identities such as Croats, Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and others hardly played a role in Yugoslavia under Tito but became the cause for large-scale killings and even genocide. In a famous quote, Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic, on entering Srebrenica, directly linked the Muslim presence in the region to the times when that part of Bosnia fell under Ottoman rule, claiming that he had recaptured the town of Srebrenica from the 'Turks'.

[32] Identity can, on the other hand, also be employed as part of a "divide-and-rule" policy. Although hard to substantiate, the strife between Fatah and Hamas can, according to several foreign commentators as well as popular opinion in the Palestinian Territories, be partly attributed to Israeli interference.

well as, cultural and economic well-being with membership of the community. Their shared identity may revolve around political affiliation, religion, kinship, geographical vicinity or any other unifying characteristic. What is more, group boundaries may intersect and membership of a group is certainly not mutually exclusive. People can obviously be member of a certain clan, church and political party at the same time and, as such, have multiple affiliations.

Is it possible to explain the frequently violent competition between these different communities? There are scholars who assert that the emergence of these rival social groups is part of the larger process we have come to know as "globalisation" (Castells 1997, Kaldor 2006 and Huntington 1997 amongst others).

In times of political turmoil, communities may develop a yearning for self-determination, after which they become a factor of importance. What is more, when the socially constructed borders are complemented with actual ones, and a guarded security zone is created, the foundations for a state-within-a-state are created, and identity politics may be put into effect with violent means.

On the other hand, many authors argue that local circumstances considerably influence the possibility of inter-community violence. Often these causes are categorised under either greed (economic motivations) or grievance (historical motivations mostly revolving around ethnicity) but armed conflict is too complex a phenomenon to ascribe it to a single cause (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Kalyvas 2003, Sherman 2003).

Local conditions that may add to the intricate causes for armed conflict include resource scarcity and environmental degradation (Homer-Dixon 1999, Homer-Dixon, Boutwell and Rathjens 2011), economic or financial gains (Sherman 2003, Collier 2000), historical animosity between social and/or ethnic groups (Kaufman 2001), the supply of development or emergency aid (Anderson 1999, Polman 2011), political opportunism (Mueller 2000) or the mere fact that armed conflict is financially and militarily feasible (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009).

Indeed, it seems that during a conflict, what constitutes the emerging social and ethnic divisions would better be attributed to localised processes, what is referred to as 'glocalisation' by Robertson (1992). Robert Kaplan builds on this, when painting a gloomy picture of a future where state power diminishes increasingly and city-states and anarchic regionalisms become the hegemonic forces (Kaplan 1994:72). This breaking up of nations, as British historian Robert Cooper (2004) called it, will however not come to pass without one or more of the earlier mentioned accelerants.

In a conflict situation, when people have to fear for their lives, their group identity not only cements the internal cohesion but also fuels the competition – to put

it euphemistically – with antagonist groups. The emergence of militias and rebel groups, affiliated with or belonging to a security community, and sometimes able to create their own fortified or protected areas, must not be seen as the cause of a conflict or merely an obstacle to peace. This phenomenon is a logical consequence of the threats that occur in war situations. These sub-state actors are not just groups of opportunists seeking financial gains, but their actions are also the culmination of attempts to create a space of stability and security, and thus freedom from fear. The premises of human security from below do not differ from human security from above, as it is provided by states.

5. Methodological approach

In this chapter I will discuss my methodology, the specific methods that are used, and I will conclude with methodological issues that I encountered while preparing and doing fieldwork.

5.1. Ethnography

As a political anthropologist, I am quite familiar with the advantages and disadvantages – or strengths and weaknesses – of doing qualitative research, specifically ethnography. Although ethnographies are not typical in political science literature, I do think that their 'situatedness' – the particular social context in which the studied phenomena are taking place – has considerable added value to studying politics. In a different field, organisational research, two renowned scholars accordingly plead for a qualitative approach, even though it is not common, and probably even *because* it is not common (Van Maanen 2011, Watson 2011).

After having read several ethnographies myself, amongst which the obvious classics of the social sciences canon[33], I have come to value the 'thick description', manifold details, and literary tricks that are used to convey the findings of a research project. Even before starting with my own PhD research, I already knew that the end result would have ethnographical qualities, full with rich descriptions, but also accessible, both to experts as well as non-experts. But simply branding my dissertation as an ethnography does not do justice to the concept. By saying that I want to *write* an ethnography, I echo Watson's definition by considering it to be a

> *style of social science writing which draws upon the writer's close observations of and involvement with people in a particular social setting and relates the words spoken and the practices observed or experienced to the overall cultural framework within which they occurred* (Watson 2011: 205).

I think this is only part of what ethnography means. As Van Maanen (2011) argues, ethnography is both a methodology and a method. The former implies that it involves a range of particular research methods – most notably participant observation – while

[33] Examples are the famous ethnographies by Malinowski's work about the Trobriand Islands, Evans-Pritchard's on the Nuer in Sudan, Liisa Malkki's 'Purity and Exile', and Marcel Mauss' study on the cultural importance of 'gift exchange'.

the latter relates to the 'end product' of the research project, which I referred to in the preceding paragraph, and that has much to do with, for example, writing style (Ibid.). Van Maanen (2011) thus partly agrees with Watson (2011) but extends his definition by including the research methods that are used.

The most comprehensive definition of what ethnography entails, which comes from Karen O'Reilly's handbook about ethnographic methodology (2005), reads that it draws "on a family of methods, involving direct and sustained contact with human agents, within the context of their daily lives (and cultures), watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions, and producing a richly written account that respects the irreducibility of human experience, that acknowledges the role of theory, as well as the researcher's own role, and that views humans as part object/part subject." (2005:3)

I fully agree with both Van Maanen's and O'Reilly's conceptualisation, because I am aware that my choice for writing an ethnography does not only entail the dissertation itself but also has profound consequences for the different methods that have to be employed in order to gather and analyse the fundamental data. Indeed, my methodological choice made (participant) observation as well as doing interviews absolute necessities. In order to relate the words and practices of the Palestinians I wanted to give a voice to the cultural context, I actually had to go 'out there', and talk to people – I had to do fieldwork.

Trying to give 'others' a voice or representing them in ethnographic work, even if you do not claim to speak on people's behalf, comes with a considerable responsibility. This obligation does not only present itself during the writing process or when discussing your work but already while conducting fieldwork. Especially when asking people about politically sensitive subjects, like I did, being honest about your motives and transparent about what you want to find out are of the utmost importance. Gaining consent, and only after first explaining the topic of my research, was a key issue for me, especially when conducting interviews. Like ethics in general, consent of the research subjects involved, revolves around the idea of "trying to ensure that you cause as little pain or harm as possible and try to be aware of your effects on the participants and on your data." (O'Reilly 2005:63)

Although some consider the process of doing fieldwork to be a particular method in itself, I follow both Van Maanen's (2011) and Watson's (2011) argument that fieldwork entails a set of methods and can therefore be considered a kind of methodology. Immersing oneself in the field, using one's own body as a research instrument, is the common denominator of the different methods, of which

participant observation, doing interviews, and analysing documents are the most common.

5.2. Grounded theory

The coding process and study of interviews are based on the Grounded Theory (GT) approach, as it was first developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and later on expanded in Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1990). GT helps the researcher to generate theory from qualitative data. The three elements around which GT evolves, are concepts, categories and hypotheses. Concepts are the labels that can be assigned to certain incidents or events that are described or observed. On a somewhat higher and more abstract level, these concepts can be grouped under certain coding categories and subsequently hypotheses may be assigned to propose relationships between categories and concepts. This way of working is also aptly described in Eisenhardt (1989), although she does not apply it to ethnographical research but to a set of case studies. What all GT scholars share, though, is their emphasis on 'raw data' as the source for developing theory, instead of verifying existing theories and assumptions. As such, this methodology very much suits the explorative character of my own research.

5.3. Methods and techniques

The methods or techniques that are described below logically follow the methodological choices described earlier. Writing an ethnographical account, doing fieldwork, and adopting a 'grounded theory' approach have led me to employ a certain range of what you may call stereotypical qualitative research methods or, as you may also label them, tools that are part of the 'anthropological toolkit'.

5.3.1. (Participant) observation

In order to grasp the daily reality of living in a conflict situation and, importantly, experience security operations from below against physical dangers, I have lived among the different security communities that were the focus of this research. I have indeed, as Watson formulated it, joined the community being studied as a partial member, who "both participates in and observes activities, asks questions, takes part in conversations, and reads relevant documents." (2011: 206). In order to record my daily life experiences, I used a diary, from which I also selected certain parts for a

public weblog. As with regular observation, it was often best to take notes afterwards, both practically as well as safety-wise.

In general, I did my observations while 'hanging out' with friends and joining them on work-related visits to, for example, human rights organisations, marginalised communities and villages, universities and other locations. In addition to this, I joined people in more leisure-oriented activities, such as having a drink, going to a wedding or birthday, or simply enjoying a water pipe outside on the porch. By befriending a police officer in Hebron, for example, I was able to join him and his colleagues regularly on after-work drinks. During these sessions they recounted their experiences and talked about the problems they encountered while doing their work, allowing me to take notes.

Despite my 'partial membership' of the various communities I have lived with, however, I was continuously aware of being an outsider, or was made aware of it by others. This is one of the reasons I was unfortunately not able to attend an actual *sulha* session, in which a conflict was being mediated. I have been able, though, to thoroughly discuss this process with both the people who were part of the conflict and those who were trying to mediate.

The main reason for not being able to completely 'blend in', was obviously my appearance – blonde, light grey eyes – which clearly indicates my foreign background, but in addition to this came the fact that I was not fluent in Arabic, which also sometimes led to situations in which I could not take part in discussions. What is more, I have undoubtedly been the subject of jokes without my being aware of it. Despite these issues, though, I certainly felt accepted by those people I worked with, especially after some friends decided to give me an Arabic name – *'Aqab*, which means 'eagle' – and another group of friends started to refer to me as *nus Filastini-nus Hollandi*, which translates as half Palestinian, half Dutch.

5.3.2. Structured interviews

Despite the single use of the term 'West Bank', this study is a multi-sited research project, in the sense that fieldwork has been conducted on several different locations, each with their own dynamics. The most important locations were the cities of Hebron (including smaller, surrounding villages), Ramallah and Nablus, as well as the refugee camp Askar. It implied that a certain portion of the interviews had to be structured to distil common grounds from interviews held across different locations.

The interviews proved to be a valuable source of information on daily experiences of people involved, different discourses on human security and opinions on the effects of security operations, i.e. the daily work of providing security. In order to explore the issues raised in the section describing the background of this study, both

people who were operating within the official framework of the Palestinian security forces, as well as people who were considered leading figures in traditional security structures but also those who merely benefit from these initiatives, were interviewed.

In total I conducted forty one structured interviews, of which I was able to record twenty five. Information coming from these interviews is referred to as 'interview' in the footnotes. A list of interview is included as an appendix, although, due to security reasons, I have not included those interviewees who preferred to remain anonymous and have their interviews not recorded.

5.3.3. Unstructured interviews and informal conversations

Everyday conversations are a rich source of information for qualitative researchers. When people become used to the presence of the researcher and start to trust him or her, they tend to express themselves in a somewhat different way. It usually takes a lot of time and patience, however, to become a regular attendant – the so-called 'fly on the wall' – and to build up trust but during the several months of fieldwork, I did manage to build up good relationships with people, which made them comfortable enough to 'open up', providing much more personal feelings and observations than they would have if I had met them only on the odd occasion.

Obviously I have talked to many dozens of people, including taxi drivers, shopkeepers, hairdressers and farmers, and have used some of the information they provided me with as well, but during the informal conversations mentioned in this section, I specifically asked the interlocutor to be interviewed and openly took notes. I conducted seventeen of such unstructured interviews and due to the somewhat informal character of them, none were recorded. The information and quotes I used from these occasions are referred to in the footnotes as coming from 'personal communication'.

5.4. Issues encountered

Doing fieldwork, immersing oneself in unfamiliar situations, can be quite difficult at times. Inevitably, things do not go as you planned them beforehand. It does not mean, however, that one cannot learn from such experiences. Therefore I will assess the process of applying the earlier described research methods and recount some of the things that proved difficult below. Several issues can be raised, of which not being fluent in Arabic, doing participant observation in difficult situations, and the tense dynamics of doing research in the context of a violent conflict, are most prominent.

5.4.1. Language

A first and obvious obstacle encountered during fieldwork abroad is the issue of language. In January 2009, at the time of departure, I had only basic knowledge of Arabic. I did successfully complete a course, in which basic everyday conversations were practiced, and I also knew how to read Arabic script. Consultations with experts and teachers confirmed that one's vocabulary will expand very quickly while using the language every day and, prior to departure, I expected to be able to do basic interviews in Arabic after a period of three months.

Unfortunately, it rather quickly turned out that I was wrong. Not only was learning a whole new language – not in any way related to Dutch – far more difficult than I had expected, it also turned out that many of my friends, whom I was in contact with most, spoke English rather well. The fact that I was not forced to speak Arabic was detrimental to my learning process and ultimately I had to rely on translators the whole period of fieldwork. I did manage to do a lot of casual conversations in Arabic, and it also proved quite sufficient while doing participant observation, but, save two occasions, I had to use a translator for every structured interview.

5.4.2. Observation and taking notes

I thoroughly tried to observe and describe the different fieldwork locations in order to paint a clear image of the context of a conflict area. Besides that, simply observing situations and being present, over time, have led people to getting used to my attendance, helping to build up trust. It was important, however, to be careful while writing down information, because people must not get the impression that they are being watched or spied. Quickly jotting down keywords and notes in a private place in between observing was usually the best way to avoid problems. When people were informed of my role and reason for being there, however, the very act of observing was usually not a problem.

The same precautions had to be taken during interviews. Many times, people did not object to my use of a voice recorder but on several occasions, especially when talking to people from the intelligence services, I was forced to take notes rather than record the interview. But while my notes were not checked afterwards, I was able to write down anything I wanted, and allowed to use all of it for my research, if, however, the respondents were given false names.

5.4.3. The context of occupation

Taking the above into consideration, some notes have to be added with respect to doing fieldwork in the context of a violent conflict and, thus, potentially dangerous situations.

A most obvious point of attention deals with the physical safety of both the fieldworker as well as the informants. There are several social scientists who have written about the dangers a fieldworker might experience.[34] One of the most practical texts is an article from Christopher Kovats-Bernat, written for the *American Anthropologist* in 2002. Unlike many others, the author gives pragmatic solutions and a useful "strategy for dealing with threats to the safety, security, and well-being of anthropologists and informants who work amid the menace of violence." (2002:1)

Doing research in a 'dangerous field', requires a "fundamental shift in how methodology is defined – not as a rigid or fixed framework for the research but, rather, as an elastic, incorporative, integrative, and malleable practice." (Ibid:3) Instead of presupposing a secure location where structured and well-organised interviews can take place and power relations be maintained, the techniques used should be informed by a minute-to-minute reassessment of the circumstances in which the fieldwork is being done. (Ibid:6) A fieldworker working amid violent conflict has to, as Raymond Lee puts it, "cope with ambient danger by developing a sensitivity to potentially hazardous situations." (1995:28)

Christopher Kovats-Bernat also pleads for a reconfiguration of the existing assumptions on the unequal power relationships between the anthropologist and the informant and the former's responsibility for the security of both. During his own research, he relied on his local assistant and several other local associates in negotiating his own safety and the ethical issues he was confronted with (2002:7). Security is a shared responsibility of both fieldworker and informant, instead of the traditional image from colonial times of the omniscient researcher (Ibid: 3-7).

As a personal ground rule, I considered my personal safety and that of the people I worked with as the first priority. What followed from this, is that potentially dangerous situations were mostly avoided. Furthermore, when the situation became increasingly unsafe, I did not hesitate to consider an early departure or a temporary change of fieldwork site. As Timmer notes, "in some cases not doing research at all is the best option." (2002:20)

[34] Timmer (2002), Lee (1995), Nordstromm (1995) and Robben (1995) amongst others.

5.4.4. Validating data

Timmer (2002), amongst other relevant topics, also discusses the issues a researcher has to deal with, while evaluating the usefulness and trustworthiness of data retrieved in a conflict situation. In his paper on doing fieldwork in a violent setting, he warns for the fact that both perpetrators and victims of violence often have a personal or political stake in persuading the fieldworker to settle for their interpretation of the conflict dynamics (Ibid:3). It is something Robben (1995) considers to be a form of "impression management" (Timmer 2002:3) – the neglecting of certain parts of events or interviews. In other words, one must be careful to always be aware of one's own ethical responsibilities and remain as impartial as possible. Reflection on ethics and used research methods is essential (Ibid).

Besides discussing methodological suggestions for doing fieldwork in a violent context, Timmer also asserts that anthropologists can play a distinctive role in down-playing over-sensational stories of terrorist organisations and deconstructing hegemonic discourses on the motives of people who engage in (political) violence. According to Timmer, "[a]nthropologists can contribute significantly as they are used to hearing and taking seriously people's stories, which prevent them from concluding that militant groups or parts of the military (...) are necessarily 'irrational', 'twisted', 'dangerous' or 'wicked'." (Ibid:21) I definitely hope to provide such a contribution with my ethnography on Palestinian security providing mechanisms in the context of occupation.

Part 3 – The Security Fabric

6. Analysis – introduction

> "High hopes were once formed of democracy; but democracy means simply the bludgeoning of the people by the people for the people. It has been found out. I must say that it was high time, for all authority is quite degrading. It degrades those who exercise it, and degrades those over whom it is exercised.
> When it is violently, grossly, and cruelly used, it produces a good effect, by creating, or at any rate bringing out, the spirit of revolt and Individualism that is to kill it.
> When it is used with a certain amount of kindness, and accompanied by prizes and rewards, it is dreadfully demoralising. People, in that case, are less conscious of the horrible pressure that is being put on them, and so go through their lives in a sort of coarse comfort, like petted animals, without ever realising that they are probably thinking other people's thoughts, living by other people's standards, wearing practically what one may call other people's second-hand clothes, and never being themselves for a single moment.
> 'He who would be free,' says a fine thinker, 'must not conform.' And authority, by bribing people to conform, produces a very gross kind of over-fed barbarism amongst us."
>
> - Oscar Wilde[35]

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers important insights on contemporary relations between security, statehood, sovereignty and the often precarious relationship between a (developing) state and sub-state communities. Since security is central to conventional definitions of statehood, which take the monopoly of the state over the

[35] Wilde, O. [1948] (1999) The Soul of Man Under Socialism. In: *Collins Complete Works of Oscar Wilde.* Centenary Edition. Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers. pp. 1174-1197.

means of violence as a defining characteristic, we can conclude that a sovereign state is one that, relying on this monopoly, wields ultimate authority over its territory.

In its efforts to achieve state formation, the PA is faced with various challenges in this regard, however. The most obvious is the fact of Israeli occupation and the power of the IDF to use force with relative impunity. In addition to this foreign impediment to sovereignty, the activities of various non-state or rather non-statutory actors in the field of security, *the security communities*, challenge the PA's sovereign power. An additional challenge is posed by the non-contiguous nature of the Palestinian territory – the split between the West Bank and Gaza – and the fractured authority between Hamas and Fatah. Taken together, these factors result in a security fabric that is characterised by what is alternatively dubbed as, for example, *legal pluralism* (Berman 2007, Galanter 1981, Tamanha 2000), *hybrid political orders* (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009)*, or fragmented sovereignty* (Gazit 2009, Davis 2010), in which the control over specific spaces and groups of people is divided between different actors, connected uneasily through various unstable networks of collaboration and conflict. In this study I have chosen to work with *fragmented sovereignty,* since this concept very well suits the intricate dynamics in the *security fabric,* between not only state and non-state actors but different states as well.

The difficulty with territorial occupations lies within the fact that when the state actors who enforce the occupation operate outside their own territorial boundaries, i.e. in foreign environments, they have to work in a context that often lacks "a firm bureaucratic administration or a formalized legal system that affixes authoritative control." (Gazit 2009: 84) A situation ensues, in which *fragmented sovereignty* characterises the environment and "multiple, localized and temporal cores of political power" (Ibid.) emerge, such as soldiers who are stationed at a particular checkpoint and there, in spite of given orders, develop their own regime of harassing the local population or, on the contrary, decide to ease certain restrictions. Such cases entail social and geographical spaces in which the Israeli state has no *de facto* authority but, rather, bottom-up configurations of political autonomy have emerged (Ibid.:88).

Gazit argues that this is not an unintentional process but that Israel, as the occupying state, has voluntarily reduced its own power in the occupied territories, because of which local actors, i.e. soldiers and police officers, become "the creators and enforcers of a local and temporal control." (Ibid.) Although I support Gazit's analysis, I do consider it to be rather one-sided, since it completely leaves out the Palestinian Authority. Although at first sight it would seem debateable, I wish to argue that the PA, by cooperating with Israeli authorities, and actively fighting terrorism

against Israel, is also an enforcer of Israeli control, as are the ground-level Israeli state agents. In fact, the destruction of the PA's institutions during the second Intifada – a process which can be which be branded "*politicide*" (Kimmerling 2003) – evidently illustrates that the whole PA merely exists and operates by the grace of Israel and that its political power is granted rather than autonomous and, thus, can also be revoked if the occupier so wishes.

The actions of Palestinian security forces during the second Intifada[36], which started in the fall of 2000, present us with a striking example of such dynamics. From 2002 onwards, the Israeli Defence Forces reoccupied considerable parts of the West Bank that were hitherto administered by the PA, in what was referred to as Operation Defensive Shield. Coupled to this reoccupation was the specific targeting of the Palestinian security infrastructure, most notably in the larger cities, where the major headquarters were bombed. Due to the specific targeting of the PSF and their headquarters, many of them went into hiding. In Nablus, for example, after the security forces' *muqa'ata* (headquarters) was destroyed by Israeli fighter jets, many of the police officers fled to an office building in the city centre, where they took shelter from the Israeli soldiers.[37]

The absence of security forces left behind a significant power vacuum and coupled to the violent context of reoccupation it caused a prolonged period of lawlessness, referred to as *al-falatan*, in which armed militias and gangs roamed the streets, using violence, protection rackets, and methods of extortion to reign over their own neighbourhoods or streets. Most notably in the cities of Hebron and Nablus such armed groups, which were mostly affiliated with political factions but also with families or clans, were regularly involved in violent clashes, each of them trying to defend their own community and interests. *Security communities* such as these groups are indeed not inherently benevolent.

The situation in the West Bank is, however, much more complicated, since the PA is not allowed to operate in substantial parts of the West Bank, outside the major cities. In many of these areas, Palestinian non-state actors have successfully taken over part of the PA's responsibilities. Writing about, primarily, Latin American countries, Davis (2010) applies the concept of fragmented sovereignty in precisely this sense when she describes situations in which non-state agents have been able to carve out considerable autonomy within certain territories, by providing "new forms of welfare,

[36] The second intifada is sometimes referred to as the al-Aqsa intifada, since the event that is considered to be the start of this second, major Palestinian uprising was Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to the al-Aqsa compound. I will continue to refer to this uprising as the second intifada.

[37] This story was told to me by Saed, a friend from Nablus, who actually went into hiding with the security personnel, willing to serve as some kind of human shield.

employment, security, and meaning, [often operating] as the functional equivalents of states" (Ibid.: 401). The main difference with Gazit's conceptualisation of fragmented sovereignty is that the non-state agents operate as actual alternatives for the state's institutions and, as such, appear to be part of a different power relationship in the sense that sovereignty is not granted to them but rather acquired.

Davis' (2010) conceptualisation of fragmented sovereignty can also be seen in the West Bank, when looking at the role of clans and families, and political factions. This phenomenon provides an explanation for the widespread commitment to such rooted non-state communities and traditions, and the fact that such localised forms of identification often prevail over allegiance to the PA as the developing Palestinian nation state. Although Palestinian nationalism has flourished since the second half of the twentieth century, the PLO's legitimacy, and subsequently that of the PA, as representative of the Palestinians, was based much more on international and Arab recognition, "than [that] it derived from recognition extended to it by the Palestinian people." (Hroub 2000: 100-101)

The Palestinian nation has not yet reached Benedict Anderson's (2006) famous conceptualisation of the ultimate "imagined community", while it lacks the "deep, horizontal comradeship" that is supposed to constitute it (Ibid.:7). Indeed, in the West Bank, the occupation has led to severe fragmentation, with various security communities existing within Palestinian society, because of which the legitimacy of the developing nation-state is severely undermined. The efforts to build up a Palestinian nation-state, as part of the envisioned two-state solution, appears to be much more a project of the Palestinian political elite and the international community, than it being broadly supported by Palestinian society at large.

At the heart of this issue, lies a lack of, what Francois and Sud have coined, "performance legitimacy" (2006). "[S]tates which fulfil the two core functions of security/territorial integrity and improvements in living standards possess performance legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens" (Ibid.:147) and on the face of it, the PA fails on both accounts. A high unemployment rate, especially among young people, a substantial number of people living below the poverty line, and a complete lack of both territorial and security integrity have led to a situation in which many Palestinians, as Davis puts it, albeit in a different context, have "become less connected to [the national state] as a source of political allegiance or social and economic claim-making, and more prone to identify with alternative 'imagined communities' or networks of loyalties[.]" (2010: 400-401)

The PA's lack of legitimacy presents those who endorse the two-state solution for Israeli-Palestinian conflict with significant difficulties. Therefore, this dissertation

offers a much-needed critical view of the Palestinian state-building project and its state-centric application of human security as a guiding principle in particular. As tragic events in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, the narrow focus on state-building, whether in the context of occupation or not, taking the form of exporting liberal democracy as the blueprint for a peaceful and stable society, is not by definition the right strategy. Fragmented sovereignty, and the PA *de facto* serving as an extension to the Israeli security apparatus, will furthermore exacerbate the already existing difficulties that are caused by the current indirect occupation of the West Bank, while it strengthens identification with sub-state communities and, as such, severely undermines the legitimacy of the PA and its various institutions, the security forces in particular.

In this chapter I will analyse the security fabric of the West Bank and the fragmented nature that characterises it, looking at both the official PA actors, as well the non-state agents, cooperating within various security communities, who play a role in providing security, making extensive use of my fieldwork findings. When looking at the earlier coined conceptualisation of the security fabric it becomes clear that a distinction is made between the actors who provide human security from above and those providing it from below. Before discussing the fragmented nature of these dynamics between the various actors operating in the West Bank, however, I will subsequently discuss these two categories separately, starting with the actors from above.

7. Human Security from Above

7.1 The Palestinian Authority

As can be gleaned from the concept's name, *human security from above* deals with those actors who operate within an official state-organised framework of security providers. As such, human security from above is firmly rooted in the Weberian tradition of the state-owned monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Such a framework can, in principal, entail international actors sanctioned by for example UN or NATO as well but in this particular case the label 'from above' only deals with those security forces in service of the Palestinian Authority, operating within the framework that has been implemented with the Oslo accords.

Newman's (2010) introduction of so-called critical human security studies (CHSS), seems of particular interest for my analysis of the Palestinian attempts to reform their security sector, by looking beyond existing frameworks and institutions. The critical approach to studying security that Newman suggests, is a point of departure for this study, although Newman mainly proposes some concerns for future research and does not provide for an actual methodology (Ibid.).

The existing frameworks are of vital importance and should also be assessed in their own right but the Palestinian security sector cannot and should not be analysed as an autonomous entity within the proposed two-state solution discourse, since it operates in a context of occupation. Therefore, the actual composition of these frameworks and institutions need to be taken into account, as well as the IDF and other Israeli actors.

The Israeli Defence Forces, although representing – and protecting – a different state are also discussed in this chapter. Since I am specifically looking at the developing Palestinian state, I have chosen to first focus on Palestinian actors, and their respective role in society. Subsequently I will discuss the ways in which the IDF influence the West Bank's security fabric. Because this case represents a belligerent occupation, the foreign forces are considered to be outsiders and, as such, will be discussed in a different and separate context. Therefore, the Israeli occupation will be treated as an external constraint on the West Bank's security fabric, both on those actors providing human security from above and below.

Before describing the various actors, I will shortly highlight some important issues regarding the historical development of the Palestinian Authority with a specific focus on its supposed role as security provider.

Although the Palestinian Authority is the official governing body in the territories, it remains subordinate to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). What is more, in international organisations, like the UN, it is the PLO that is the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and thus not the PA. The PLO remains, according to its charter (article 26), "responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle – to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination in it – in all military, political, and financial fields and (...) on the inter-Arab and international levels." (PASSIA 2008:368)

Also, the PA does not represent Diaspora Palestinians, for example the hundreds of thousands living in refugee camps in Jordan, Syria or Lebanon, while the PLO, operating on the international level is the representative of all Palestinian people. Besides there being this hierarchical issue, with the PLO as the ultimate decision-making body, there is another major difference, which is that Hamas, having won the majority of the PLC's seats in the 2006 elections and currently *de facto* governing Gaza, is not a member of the PLO.

As an interim institution, the PA, has a rather limited mandate. Many legislative issues are currently excluded, and remain for the final status negotiations. In short, according to the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), the PA has hardly any "control over its borders, overall security, currency, fiscal or monetary policy, natural resources, or foreign policy. It did not determine citizenship and its trade is either with Israel or passed through its ports." (PASSIA 2008)

Officially the PA was set up with three consecutive branches, legislative, executive and judiciary, but most notably the latter branch has not been fully developed yet. The executive branch of the PA exists of the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers (government) and the security and police forces. The government is the highest executive and administrative body, consisting of a maximum of twenty four ministers, and is responsible for drafting laws, devising and implementing general policies, preparing the general budget, supervising the ministries, and, ultimately, responsible for maintaining public order and internal security.

The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC or parliament) and the PLC Presidency's office constitute the legislative branch of the PA. The parliament consists of 132 members, proposes and ratifies laws, forms specific ad-hoc committees and, with a two-thirds majority, can amend the Basic Law, which is the highest source of legislation and comparable to a written constitution.

As stated above, the Palestinian judiciary remains a weak link in the PA's efforts to establish the rule of law, despite much domestic and international attention devoted

to developing it. Over the past years, significant improvements have been achieved, however. The number of judicial staff has increased considerably, amongst whom more than fifty judges; the infrastructure has improved with new buildings constructed to house Magistrate Courts, the Court of Appeal, the High Judicial Council and other institutions; the financial status of judicial staff has been improved; and parallel judicial organisations, such as the State Security Courts, established by Arafat, have been abolished (Id'ais 2007: 89-90).

Corruption, factionalism and politicisation remain prevalent throughout the judicial system, which is why the EUPOL COPPS programme has labelled judiciary reform as one of their priorities, aimed at making the PA's judiciary more effective, transparent and accountable.

The Palestinian judicial framework dealing with security is an intricate mix of newly passed laws and regulations introduced by the PA, and pre-PA legislation stemming from the British Mandate, the Egyptian (for Gaza) and Jordanian (for the West Bank) administrations, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, respectively, of which some are still in force. Officially, the Palestinians do not have a written constitution but the Basic Law, which serves as a close alternative and is the foundation of all legislation. In addition to the Basic Law, there are three other legislative sources. In the graph below, they are presented hierarchically.



Illustration 3: The Palestinian legal framework. Source: Friedrich, R., A. Luethold and F. Milhem (2008).

The regulations, or bylaws, as they are also known, are transitory forms of legislation used as instruments to introduce ordinary laws.

Special attention has to be paid to the category of executive decisions. Since the PLC has stopped functioning properly after the wave of arrests following Hamas' ascension to power in 2006 – and completely after Hamas took over Gaza and the subsequent, *de facto* end of the unity government – newly introduced legislation has been limited to such executive decisions, most notably Presidential Decrees or, as they are also known, Decree Laws.[38] President Abbas' practice of chiefly ruling by decree has provoked a considerable amount of criticism amongst political commentators and pundits. According to them, the authoritarian character of the PA, and President Abbas in particular, is clearly demonstrated by this process, since democratic oversight on newly introduced legislation is impossible. It must, however, be noted that Presidential Decrees eventually have to be approved by the PLC, as soon as they reconvene, to become actual laws. Until then they do have the power of law.

7.2. Security Sector Reform

Since the Oslo accords, with the context of violent conflict and on-going occupation ever present, security has been the defining focal point for the development of Palestinian autonomy, both for Israel as well as the Palestinians themselves. Following the establishment of the PA as the interim governing body in the West Bank and Gaza, there has been a steady development of an official security apparatus, ostensibly under Palestinian ownership.

Starting in 2005, after the chaos and destruction of the second intifada and the death of Yasser Arafat, the PA, in coordination with the US, Israel and neighbouring countries, has made security in the West Bank a priority – 'security first'. International involvement is shown for instance by the appointment of a so-called US Security Coordinator (USCC), whose office was established in order to provide the PA with advice and to oversee the training of new cohorts in the security forces. The new security-focused policies have led to a severe crackdown on political militias and cells, most notably the ones that were not affiliated to Fatah, but also on regular, i.e. non-political, crime, like theft and fraud.

Essentially, the security sector reform programme that commenced after Abbas' ascension to presidency consists of four pillars (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 20).

[38] The difference between Presidential Decrees and Decisions has until now not been explicated, and remains unclear as such.

The first pillar concerns reorganising the institutions. Because of Yasser Arafat's legacy of 'divide-and-rule', there were numerous different, competing organisations responsible for providing security to the Palestinians. In addition to their mutual competition, these organisations' mandates were rather vague, as well as overlapping, and they had to report to different authorities, although Arafat's authoritarian style of governance meant he retained overall leadership. The main problem was that there existed no legal framework with respect to the various security organisations, apart from some universal articles in the Basic Law.

Reorganisation meant that several of the different organisations were disbanded, some were merged, and accordingly their mandates became clearer. Furthermore, while under Arafat most of the PSF were directly under the President's command, those organisations dealing with internal security came under the Ministry of Interior Affairs' authority. Ultimately, three security organisations remained: Internal Security Forces (several police departments, Preventive Security, Civil Defence), National Security Forces (the NSF represents the equivalent of an army and furthermore consists of the Naval Police, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Presidential Security, and Presidential Guard) and the General Intelligence Organisation (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 20).

A second important pillar entails specifically improving the Civil Police. Mainly with the support of the European Union Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUCOPPS), a broad reform programme for the civil police was initiated. In addition to advice and funds, the police was supplied with equipment like uniforms, communication devices, power supplies and various vehicles (EUPOL COPPS 2009; Friedrich and Luethold 2007:21-22). The main aim of the EU programme was to "contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in the wider context of Security Sector Reform, including Criminal Justice." (EUPOL COPPS 2009)

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former militants is the third pillar in the security sector reform programme. In order to disband the numerous militias that prevailed during *al-falatan,* and to re-establish the PA's monopoly on the use of force, a process of DDR was initiated.

The fourth and last main pillar of the SSR process concerns the development and improvement of the legal framework with respect to security. An extensive quote from a professor at the Security Academy in Jericho, underlines the lacking clarity of the security services' mandates.

> *The Basic Law is general. It says, security agencies should do 1,2,3,4. But on the ground it was different, there was confusion about the authority of these agencies. Take for example the* mukhabarat *and Preventive Security. They are working on the same missions. And also the Military Intelligence. There was huge confusion about their roles. And this was due to a lack of supervision and clarity about whom they should report to.*[39]

An important element of the reform programme indeed entails the drafting of laws in which the tasks, responsibilities and chains of command of the various PSF are determined, which is very much related to the first pillar of the reforms. A second, important part of this pillar is the further development of the judiciary. Key elements of this development entail increasing the number of judges, improving their training by making it more consistent and coherent, as well as upgrading and expanding the infrastructure, in the form of courts and offices.

7.3. The Palestinian Security Forces (PSF)

The first official Palestinian Security Forces, operating within the Oslo framework, started in 1995 but until 2002 the only legally sanctioned organisation, the Civil Defence (Friedrich, Luethold and Milhem 2008: 25), had a rather vague and broadly defined mandate, stipulated in the second article of Civil Defence Law No. 3 of 1998. The original text reads that the Civil Defence was to perform

> *all measures necessary to protect civilians and their property, secure the safety of all types of communications, guarantee the regular functioning of public authorities, and protect public and private buildings, installations and institutions from risks of air raids and other war operations, as well as risks of natural catastrophes, fire, maritime rescue and all other risks.* (Friedrich, Luethold and Milhem 2008: 245)

The emphasis on war operations indicates that the Palestinian judicial framework of the security forces has developed, and continues to do so, in the context of the

[39] Dr. Nizam, interview, Jericho, 16 February 2010.

occupation. The very first of a more specified list of tasks and responsibilities of the Civil Defence, which is given in article six of the aforementioned law, for example, entails the organisation of alarm procedures for air raids (Friedrich, Luethold and Milhem 2008: 246).

What exacerbates this emphasis on conflict is the fact that a considerable part of the security forces personnel has served in, as well as received training from, pre-Oslo resistance movements. As Hussein (2007) writes, the "aim was to translate the achievements and experiences of the Palestinian resistance movements inside and outside Palestine into a strategy that would enable the PNA to assert control over the territory that it was designated to govern under the *Oslo Agreements.*" (2007:46, italics in original text)

Despite the context of conflict in which the mandates of the security forces are taking shape, it must be noted that, paradoxically, they are not able to actually prevent Israeli threats against Palestinians; in fact, the Oslo agreements do not allow for actions against Israel and even calls upon the PA to combat threats *against* Israel. Indeed, virtually all the work of the PSF deals with Palestinians and the threats they may present to either the survival of the PA or the security of Israel.

A first step in reorganising the security forces was undertaken by Arafat in 2002, at the height of the second intifada. Even though the violent context did not provide for ideal circumstances, and despite the Israeli crackdown on the PA and the subsequent destruction of the greater part of the relevant infrastructure, the internal security forces were placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, instead of operating under the sole authority of the President, as they did previously (Friedrich, Luethold and Milhem 2008: 25).

The decision to implement this chain of command was made by Presidential Decree, in June 2002. It was a significant policy shift for Arafat, who, until then, preferred a 'divide-and-rule' policy with regards to the security forces, maintaining a mishmash of several parallel services, with overlapping and contradictory mandates and terms of reference (Hussein 2007: 46). According to Friedrich and Luethold, he "fostered competition between [the security forces'] commanders so that they would refer to the *ra'is* [President] as the final arbiter" (2007: 19), as well as relying "on a combination of political cooptation, financial accommodation and intense micro-management to secure his rule." (2007: 19)

By ostensibly ameliorating his despotic style of rule and transferring part of his own absolute executive powers to the Prime-Minister and Ministry of Interior, and furthermore allowing for a certain degree of democratic oversight, Arafat hoped to counter domestic as well as international criticism (Khalil 2007: 33). These reforms

turned out to be much more apparent than real, however. Assessments, performed after 1995, have found that "the work of the PNA security organisations suffered from politicisation, strong personal loyalties, inflated personnel, overlap of tasks and responsibilities, a lack of inter-agency cooperation and a shortage of administrative skills." (Hussein 2007: 47)

In effect, the reforms thus rather illustrated Arafat's cunning political schemes, as he retained his ubiquitous influence behind the scenes, never actually transferring power to the newly appointed officials, specifically the Minister of Interior (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 21, Khalil 2007: 33-34). After Arafat's death, newly elected President Mahmoud Abbas pledged to swiftly undertake action to effectuate the reforms that were already introduced in the judicial framework. But Dr. Khalil Shikaki from the Palestinian Centre for Policy Survey and Research, however, claimed in 2006 that the projected reforms had, until then, not yet been seriously implemented.[40]

In the aftermath of the second intifada, and the subsequent chaotic state of affairs in the fields of politics and security, the PSF were still suffering from a lack of accountability and both the services' conduct as well as the recruitment into the services remained heavily politicised, primarily due to the competition between Hamas and Fatah.

The main reform that had been carried through entails the reorganisation of the various institutions, into a more concise constellation, with clearer and more explicit chains of command. In article three of the Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces (no.8, 2005), it is explicitly stated that the security services will comprise of (1) The National Security Forces and the Palestine National Liberation Army; (2) the Internal Security Forces; and (3) the General Intelligence. Furthermore, the article states that any forces – either current or to be established in the future – will become part of any of these three categories (Friedrich, Luethold and Milhem 2008: 182). The current structure of the Palestinian security apparatus is summarised in the following scheme.

[40] In: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2006. *Palestinian Security Sector Governance. Challenges and Prospects.* (2006). Jerusalem: PASSIA, Geneva: DCAF.
On: http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/35855/526927/file/bm_palestinian_ssg.pdf (Accessed 04 January 2012)



Illustration 4: The structure of the Palestinian security apparatus. Source: Zanotti, J. (2010) U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority. CRS Report for Congress. Washington: Congressional Research Service.

7.3.1. Internal Security Forces (Civil Police, Preventive Security, Civil Defence)

What characterises the various services of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), including their respective agencies and departments, and what they all have in common is that they are placed under the Ministry of Interior.

With approximately eight thousand uniformed officers[41], the **Civil Police**, as the PA's foremost law enforcement agency, is officially the largest security service in the West Bank. It includes several more specifically oriented divisions, such as the Traffic Police, the Anti-Drug-Department, and the Public Order Forces, amongst others. In general, i.e. covering all of its branches, the Civil Police's mandate reflects the original list of responsibilities as it was put down in the Oslo accords. It reads as follows:

- *Maintaining internal security and public order;*
- *Protecting the public and all other persons present in the areas, as well as protecting their property, and acting to provide a feeling of security, safety and stability;*

[41] The number of 8,000 is a 2011 estimate based on various sources (International Crisis Group 2010, EUPOL COPPS 2011, Friedrich and Luethold 2007) Interestingly enough, there are more than 12,000 police officers employed in Gaza, despite its smaller land area and population (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 159).

- *Adopting all measures necessary for preventing crime in accordance with the law;*
- *Protecting public installations, infrastructure and places of special importance;*
- *Preventing acts of harassment and retribution;*
- *Combating terrorism and violence, and preventing incitement to violence;*
- *Performing any other normal police functions.*[42]

Palestinian Public Order Forces at a soccer match in the Nablus sports stadium.
Photo by Martijn Dekker.

Especially owing to substantial support from the EUPOL COPPS programme, the Civil Police has quickly developed into a professional police force, most notably with respect to equipment, clothing and vehicles. Dressed in dark blue uniforms, they are popularly known as '*blues'*, and they are a familiar sight in the Palestinian streets; specifically at busy crossings and manned checkpoints at the outskirts of the major cities, which, in most cases, mark the border of the territory under their responsibility, due to Israeli imposed restrictions with regards to where PSF are allowed to operate. The **Preventive Security** is an internal intelligence organisation and is up to par with the General Intelligence service (*mukhabarat* in Arabic) where it concerns manpower.

[42] Annex I, Article 4 (1), The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995).

Its forces were called into life in 1994 by Yasser Arafat, in accordance with the security section of the Oslo Accords. With 3500 forces in the West Bank it is a sizeable security service and for quite some time it was considered to be the most powerful intelligence organisation. Its mandate overlaps considerably with that of the *mukhabarat*, under Presidential command, but the latter currently overshadows the Preventive Security, placed under the Ministry of Interior, both in manpower and efficacy.

From its instigation onwards, its foremost task was to prevent opposition against the Oslo Accords, which, in practice, meant that it were mostly militants affiliated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, vehemently opposing the peace process and the subsequent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, who were targeted by the Preventive Security forces.

The Security and Protection Department, which was also known as the 'Death Squad', was specifically notorious amongst Oslo opponents (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 160). Officially the Security and Protection Department was dismantled in 2005, but it is said to be still active (ibid.). Such rumours are difficult to confirm, especially since intelligence services often operate under a shroud of secrecy, but in the context of the on-going struggle between Fatah and Hamas, and the service's historical focus on the latter's militants, it seems likely that despite its apparent dissolution, the Security and Protection Department's intelligence and manpower capabilities are still put to use in the West Bank.

The **Civil Defence** is the collective noun for the emergency services and also includes the various regional fire departments. As already explained in the introduction, the Civil Defence's mandate is unmistakably influenced by the pervasive context of violent conflict, focused as it is on providing emergency assistance after acts of war and aggression, such as air raids.

With about a thousand personnel in the West Bank it is one of the smaller amongst the security services. Its members are, however, noticeable within Palestinian society and highly respected. According to a British consultancy firm, which provides training and strategic advice to the Civil Defence, the fire fighters and medics responded to over 24,000 incidents in 2008. Contrary to the Civil Police, the Civil Defence receives limited support from international organisations.[43]

[43] Peridot International, website, on: http://peridotinternational.net/html/casestudies.html (Accessed 8 January 2012).

7.3.2. National Security Forces (National Security Forces, Naval Police, Military Police, Military Intelligence)

The National Security Forces consist of several different services with varying tasks and responsibilities. A merger between these organisations, operating under a single military command, is planned for the future. The different organisations are discussed in further details below but first it is important to note that the National Security Forces are not only a collective noun for the various military organisations but a separate entity within those forces as well.

Dressed in traditional green or, sometimes, camouflage uniforms, and wearing Kalashnikov machine guns, the **National Security Forces** are considered to be the Palestinian army for good reason. The organisation is officially responsible for patrolling the national borders, which, in practice, means the borders of PA-governed A-areas. The NSF arose from the Palestine Liberation Army, since a considerable number of soldiers have served in the military wing of the PLO. Most of them served outside of the West Bank but were allowed to return with the signing of the Declaration of Principles and enrol in the NSF, amongst other security services. Since then, local recruits have also been added to the ranks, albeit gradually (Friedrich & Luethold 2007: 160).

The NSF receive considerable international support, of which the most significant is the programme led by the United States Security Coordinator (USSC), established in order to

> *(…) help reform, train, and equip PA security forces which had been personally beholden to Arafat and his political allies. The USSC has been charged with helping professionalize and consolidate PA forces and with coordinating their activity with Israeli officials pursuant to both sides' obligations under the 2003 'Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict'[.]* (Zanotti 2010: 1)

The status of the NSF remains rather ambiguous. According to associated laws and decrees the NSF are explicitly characterised as a military organisation but the Oslo accords do not allow for a full-fledged Palestinian army but rather a scaled up police force for keeping order within the territories. Most Palestinians do consider the NSF to be their army but in numerous conversations, I found public knowledge on their actual duties and responsibilities to be virtually non-existent, even among police and other security officers. When asked, most officials were only able to confirm that NSF were

indeed patrolling in the streets and sometimes manning checkpoints, while some acknowledged that they were "helping out the police".[44]

That the kind of assistance the NSF were providing, and under which mandate they were operating, remains unclear is not peculiar, however, since the exact mission of the NSF has not yet been unambiguously formulated and defined by appropriate legislation (Khalil 2007: 37, Friedrich, Luethold and Milhem 2008). Because the NSF are not allowed to make arrests, it can be argued that their main purpose should be characterised as a strategy of keeping the Palestinians in order through 'deterrence by presence'.

Of the other military organisations, the **Military Intelligence**, with approximately 600 agents, also deserves some special attention. It is an official branch of the NSF, currently known as the Military Intelligence Department, and although its modus operandi resembles that of the Preventive Security and General Intelligence, it does, officially, focus specifically on gathering intelligence on the external military environment (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 161). Since the status of the other military organisations remains ambiguous, however, it remains unclear what this external military environment exactly entails.

7.3.3. General Intelligence Organisation

In 2005 the General Intelligence Law No.17 was passed, detailing the rights, obligations, and inner workings of the General Intelligence (GI) service. In the second article it is stated that the GI will operate as a regular security service, subordinate to the President. Its duties, as formulated in article nine, are the following:

> *1. Take the measures necessary to prevent acts that may endanger the security and safety of Palestine and expedient measures against their perpetrators pursuant to the provisions of the law.*
> *2. Reveal external dangers which may jeopardise the Palestinian national security in the fields of espionage, collusion and sabotage, and any other acts which may threaten the unity, security, independence, and resources of the homeland.*

[44] Anonymous employee Ramallah Governorate Police Department, personal communication, Ramallah, 18 April 2010.

> *3. Jointly cooperate with similar agencies of friendly states to fight all acts which may threaten the joint peace and security or any fields of external security, upon the condition of reciprocal treatment.* (Friedrich, Luethold and Milhem 2008: 254)

Although the *mukhabarat* indeed operates across borders, working with, and from, embassies and consulates abroad, the bulk of its work is situated in the Palestinian territories themselves, both in Gaza and the West Bank. When asked, *mukhabarat* employees[45] without exception relate their work to two major dangers to Palestinian security: Hamas and the Israeli occupation, in that particular order. However, as said before, since they cannot – and are not allowed to, according to the Oslo Accords – do anything about the occupation, the focus is on internal threats.

The third point of article nine, stating the *mukhabarat*'s responsibilities, is of special interest, since it clearly contradicts, in fact even prohibits, the overt cooperation with Israeli intelligence. This subject will be elaborated more upon in the case study of Nablus.

7.3.4. Other Security Forces (Executive Force, Presidential Guard, Presidential Security)

In addition to the Internal Security Forces, the National Forces and the General Intelligence, there are other security-related organisations operating within the Palestinian Territories. Of these, the Presidential Guard and Presidential Security are, as their names imply, pre-occupied with protecting the PA president. Although not recognised as an official security organisation and most definitely not part of the Oslo framework, Executive Force, as set up by Hamas Minister Said Siam, also deserves some special attention.

The **Presidential Security** organisation is also known as **Force 17** and is responsible for the security of the President, as well as members of the PA's political elite. In addition they are tasked with protecting the PA's key infrastructural assets (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 162), which include ministries but also, for example, Yasser Arafat's tomb, located next to the PA's headquarters in Ramallah.

Although originally an elite unit of about 400 men and part of the Presidential Security entourage, the **Presidential Guard** became an autonomous organisation in

[45] Based on five interviews with *mukhabarat* employees. All requested to remain anonymous for safety reasons.

2006, mainly due to legal restrictions that prevented the US from working with Force 17, since it was considered to be a terrorist organisation (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 163). Several hundreds of Presidential Guardsmen have received training in Jordan, as part of the USSC programme.

After the installation of the new government after Hamas winning the elections in 2006, the new Minister of Interior Said Siam, intent on counter-balancing Fatah's hold on the security forces, established a new organisation called **Executive Force**. As such, it consisted of members of Hamas' Izz ad-Din al-Qassam brigades, as well as members from the Popular Resistance Committees active in Gaza. Approximately 7,000 men strong, it was set up mainly as "an instrument for establishing law and order in the Gaza Strip." (Friedrich and Luethold 2007: 162) The organisation is currently not active in the West Bank and has merged with the official police force in Gaza, as sanctioned by the Hamas leadership. One of the obstacles to reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the unification of their respective turfs, is how to merge the Gaza security forces, amongst which thousands of former Executive Force personnel, with the security forces in the West Bank, which includes many PLO-trained personnel and former al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades militants.

7.3.4. National Security Council

Although not a security organisation in itself, the National Security Council (NSC) is an important institution with respect to the organisation of the various security services and the prospected outcome of the SSR.

Established in 2003, by Yasser Arafat, it served as an instrument to implement a more unified command structure of the security forces. It was, however, much more a way of window dressing the on-going 'divide-and-rule-strategy' and countering the domestic and international criticism over the paternalistic way of controlling the security forces. Prior to 2003, there was the Higher Council of National Security but this council has not been effective and hardly convened since its establishment in 1994.

Officially, the NSC consists of the President, several government members (the Prime-Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Civil Affairs and the Minister of Finance), the National Security Adviser, and the head of the PLO Negotiations Department. The directors of the security services that are involved in particular cases, will also join meetings when the NSC convenes.

In a 2005 Presidential Decree, Mahmoud Abbas proposed the following responsibilities for the NSC.

- *Formulation of security policies and plans;*
- *Threat identification and assessment;*
- *Coordination between political authorities and security commanders;*
- *Supervision of security cooperation with external actors;*
- *Security budget approval* (Khalil 2007: 40).

Until now, mainly due to the political conflict between Fatah and Hamas and the, for as yet, undefined relation with the existing security organisations, the NSC has remained inactive, as has the parliament. However, as Khalil writes, "the NSC could prove important for Palestinian security decision-making in the future. Well-placed to coordinate the various actors, the NSC could become a sponsor and driver for SSR." (Khalil 2007: 40)

7.4. Dynamics between the actors from above

Much work had to be done to streamline the forces into a professional security apparatus with a clear and unified command structure as a result of Arafat's legacy of creating an impenetrable and opaque constellation of security organisations. Already during Arafat's presidency, for example, the Gaza and West Bank branches of the National Security Forces were merged, despite them having completely different command structures. As a result of this, considerable problems emerged, mainly due to completely different corporate cultures, with respect to regulatory procedures. Besides that, there existed considerable competition between the two internal, organisational establishments.

Such problems also characterise the other security organisations, which have been subjected to considerable internal reorganisations, mergers and splits. The current geographical, as well as political division between the West Bank and Gaza only adds to the different internal culture and structure of each organisation.

A quick glance at the tasks and responsibilities of the various, Palestinian security organisations learns that there is still considerable overlap between them. Hussein (2007) recounts,

> *[s]uch conflict constellations included Preventive Security versus General Intelligence, Preventive Security versus Special Forces, National Security Forces versus Military Intelligence, Presidential Security versus Presidential Guard, Presidential Security versus Naval Police, and Special Security versus the so-called External Security in Tunis.* (Hussein 2007: 48)

Every security organisation presided over its own communications network, recruitment procedure and each had its own command structure, which severely hampered inter-agency cooperation. Sharing information on pending cases, as well as future operations was very rare.[46]

Up to today, some security organisations interfere with the work of others. According to Id'ais (2007), "security organisations such as the Preventive Security or the Military Intelligence regularly interfere with the work of the Police (...) [and] arrest, interrogate and prosecute suspects in the absence of any legal basis." (2007: 97) As it turns out, the various organisations have even established their own prisons, which enables them to work outside the official judicial procedures and operate without having to be accountable to democratic oversight.[47]

One particularly revealing incident that illustrates the inter-organisation competition occurred in June 2010, during a major gathering of Fatah members in the city of Bethlehem. Already in the run-up to the event, the city was sprawling with security personnel from several different organisations – the different uniforms could not be counted on one hand – and checkpoints were set up within the city and along its perimeters. Since the tensions between Fatah and Hamas were still current and the memory of Hamas' violent takeover of Gaza quite vivid, no risks were taken with this event, where virtually the entire Fatah elite was present.

On the first day of the event I happened to be in Bethlehem, over for dinner with friends – Fuad and Sylvana – I stayed with in 2005. During dessert both the home phone and Sylvana's mobile suddenly started ringing almost simultaneously. As it turned out, two of Fuad and Sylvana's daughters called in to check whether their parents were both safe at home – a stereotypical example of the strong family ties – since there appeared to be a shooting incident near the PA's headquarters, close to one of the main roads that run through the city. Rumour had it that it was not an Israeli attack or a Hamas militant but an escalated argument between recruits of different security organisations.

When the dust had settled, several days later, it became public that two leading figures of the General Intelligence and National Security Forces got into a heated argument, apparently over which organisation could best protect the event

[46] Dr. Nizam, interview, Jericho, 16 February 2010.

[47] It occurred several times that a member of the security services or a friend pointed out to me that we were passing a prison. When I asked whether we could organise a visit to the building, the answer was usually that it was not possible at that particular detention centre, since it was, for example, operated by the *mukhabarat.* If I insisted, it would be possible to visit Civil Police detention centres but not those of other organisations. Employees of human rights organisations did tell me, however, that, on certain occasions, they were allowed to interview people who were detained in these prisons.

and over the inter-organisational hierarchy. During the argument one of them got hit in the face, after which things turned sour and shots were exchanged between recruits of the two organisations. In the end, nobody got hurt but the incident clearly illustrates the tensions and competition between the different organisations.

Despite the problems between overlapping mandates and internal competition, it must be said that considerable progress has been achieved where it concerns the unification of the security forces, both in terms of merging services and inter-organisational cooperation and communication. According to a spokesperson from the Ramallah Governorate Police Department "the most important progress in the police force is that we can now speak of one establishment. It works with a vision. That is so important for us. (…) We have Preventive Security, mukhabarat and we have the police. They all work with the same vision. Security is our main goal we are trying to enforce together."[48]

Another employee of the Ramallah police adds, "[w]ith the National Forces we coordinate about the barriers around the city. If we go outside the city, with permission from the Israelis, they escort us for protection. With other security forces, any information they get, they transfer it to the police directly. And we do the same, we transfer (…) to them any information that deals with their work."[49]

7.5. Popular perceptions of the PSF

The new strategy of reorganising and bolstering the PA's security apparatus has led to many positive reactions from foreign politicians, journalists and policy makers. The differences between 2005, as roughly the starting point of the current security sector reform process, and 2010 are indeed clearly noticeable, even to a foreigner, like myself. More shops have (re-)opened and they have substantially extended their opening hours; the various markets spread across the cities appear to be busier; and even after sunset streets are filled with people, amongst whom many teenagers casually strolling down the road or just hanging out. Five years ago, most parents would surely not let their children go out after dark and besides that, most of the coffee shops or amusement halls were closed anyway, so there was not much purpose in going out in the first place.

It is not without reason that, for example, a recent security operation aimed at restoring law and order in the streets of the northern West Bank city of Jenin was,

[48] Spokesperson Ramallah Governorate Police Department, interview, Ramallah18 April 2010.

[49] Anonymous employee Ramallah Governorate Police Department, personal communication, Ramallah, 18 April 2010.

without a trace of cynicism, labelled 'Smile and Hope'. The changed environment does indeed fill many Palestinians with a certain sense of hope for the future. The substantial presence of PSF in the streets, especially the uniformed services such as the Civil Police and the National Security Forces, and their success in combating crime prove that the Palestinians are capable of taking care of their own affairs and are thus moving towards managing their own state.

Young, neatly dressed policemen, patrolling in brand new cars, have become a regular sight in the streets, as well as checkpoints where driver's licenses are checked, while the bustling squares in the major city centres are being regulated by traffic police. Since the summer of 2010 the police are even checking for seatbelts, although, as I have found out in numerous conversations with agitated taxi drivers, this admittedly took many Palestinians a little getting used to.

Many Palestinians consider the improved PSF and the more stable and predictable environment to be a positive development, especially after the violent chaos of *al-falatan*. When I interviewed Palestinian human rights activist Bassem Eid, he formulated it as follows.

> *[T]he Palestinians are interested, very much interested in a calm situation right now. Because every Palestinian realises how much damage the Second Intifada caused. Not only to our property, but also to our reputation amongst the international community. And I don't believe that there is even one Palestinian who can name any success in the past nine years of the Second Intifada. Not one*.[50]

Despite the considerable progress that has been achieved with respect to the reforms in the organisations that provide human security from above, and the initial hope that prevailed after the services put an end to the internal violence during the aftermath of the second intifada, there remains an important issue that has still to be addressed in order to improve the PA security forces' legitimacy and popular support, and that is the political context. The practical consequences of the current political situation are very much intertwined.

The first part of the problem deals with the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Due to the split between the two main factions and the subsequent separation between Gaza and the West Bank, both territories are now *de facto* under one-party

[50] Bassem Eid, interview, Jerusalem, 9 July 2009.

rule. Since the split has been considerably violent, it has led to a severe crackdown on affiliates – people as well as organisations – that are linked to the other party.

The second problem is the lack of democratic oversight. Not only due to the split between the two major factions but also because many members of parliament have been arrested by Israel, the parliament on the West Bank – the PLC – has not convened in over five years. The failing parliamentary oversight has resulted in a complete lack of democratic control over the security forces, apart from the occasional reports by some civil society and human rights organisations. The forces have thus been able to violently arrest, harass, persecute and even torture political rivals with relative impunity in detention centres that are being operated by their own organisations. The various reports by organisations such as the Ramallah-based Independent Commission for Human Rights illustrate this problem.[51]

Most PA personnel that I spoke to do not readily acknowledge that this combination is detrimental to the trust in, and legitimacy of, the security forces. When I confront employees of the security forces with the fact that the West Bank is basically ruled by Fatah alone, the most common response is a reference to Gaza.

Asking security personnel whether they do not consider it a problem that there is such an emphasis on arresting Hamas-affiliated people, they practically always reply by saying that it is not up to them who to arrest and that they work for all Palestinian people, regardless of their political views. They simply do what the government – the Palestinian Authority, as the embodiment of all Palestinians – asks them to do. When I subsequently, again, confront them with the fact that the PA is not considered by many to represent all Palestinians but mainly those affiliated with Fatah, blank stares, shrugging shoulders or denials are the common denominator amongst reactions.

While the PA and its ubiquitous, improved security apparatus, is *de facto* dominated by Fatah, especially after the purging of Hamas affiliated personnel, it is often criticised by people who are not working for one of the security organisations, obviously most prominently by those who are not affiliated with Fatah. In addition, even many members from Fatah's lower ranks share these criticisms.

Between October 2008 and June 2009, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Participation (SHAMS) organised a series of forum meetings with various stakeholders

[51] Monthly as well as yearly reports can be found on the ICHR website. See: http://www.ichr.ps/en/2/5

in the Palestinian security services[52], called 'Delivering Security to the Palestinian People', and the published results clearly show a generally perceived lack of trust in the security services' work. Quotes from the output document of the forum meetings in Jenin, for example, illustrate the scepticism of the Palestinian public towards the security services' performance (DCAF 2009a). 'The situation has become very difficult after the Gaza war [and subsequent Hamas takeover]. I feel that I cannot express my opinion anymore. I am afraid to speak my mind' (Ibid.:2) 'The security forces have disappointed many people by imitating the occupier's behaviour.' (Ibid.:3) '90% of those violating the law belong to either the security services or a political faction.' (Ibid.) "The Palestinian National Authority is only guided by personal interests and does not work for the people." (Ibid.) When checked, this lack of trust was acknowledged by security personnel themselves (DCAF 2009b), although they do not consider these criticisms to be necessarily deserved.

These criticisms build upon feelings of disappointment that have been prevalent since the establishment of the PA in 1994. Palestinians grew increasingly disappointed, while

> *there is rapid movement toward a traditional kind of police state, where the state exercises its hegemony over civil society. The widespread social institutions and networks that used to underpin poor Palestinians during, and even before, the intifada have been crippled severely if not damaged completely by the PA. (...) [T]he overall social atmosphere became charged with fear and occupied by the PA apparatuses* (Hroub 2000:241-242).

A December 2010 poll[53], conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, shows that 32.7 per cent of the Palestinian public – ultimately both the recipient and, through democratic control, the overseer of security measures – considers the status of democracy and human rights under president Abu Mazen to be bad or very bad, while 29.1 per cent describes the situation as 'so so'. These are striking figures, especially after the major foreign investments – financial, as well as in training and equipment – in the PA, and particularly in its security forces.

[52] More than two hundred representatives of the security forces, other PA institutions, political factions, local authorities, civil society groups, women's organisations and journalists attended the various meetings (DCAF 2009a).

[53] Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, PSR Poll no. 38, December 2010. On: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2010/p38e.html#security (Accessed 26 June 2012).

It must be said that many do value the relative stability that has come with the increased presence of the PSF – especially those who have considerably suffered during al-falatan. In reply to my suggestion that many people are critical of the security services, Sami, the owner of a clothes shop in downtown Nablus, says,

> *People said to you they are afraid of the mukhabarat [intelligence service]? They are crazy. We need more of them. They make sure that we have security. Before this, during the intifada, everybody had guns. They were shooting each other over nothing. Now that's gone. And tell me, why are they scared? Well? It's because they want to do whatever they want. No, what we need is good security, people who work to make sure that we are safe.*[54]

But despite this positive note, a general, shared feeling of wariness of the security services can be discerned. Contrary to prevalent Western notions on state's security apparatuses, in many Arabic states, the police and army are rather seen as a major source of insecurity[55]. Indeed, many Arabic regimes apply a policy that Dr. Shikaki describes as 'more order than law'[56], a phenomenon that has been clearly demonstrated – and in fact has been contested – by the popular revolts that spring up throughout the Arab world. The question, thus, is whether the more 'predictable security environment' (Menkhaus 2003:412) will be sustainable in the long run.

Currently, in the West Bank, this question is becoming increasingly acute, since the PA seems to develop authoritarian tendencies, where, as one former security reform advisor to the PLC formulated it, the security forces, most notably the establishment, appear pre-occupied with ensuring and bolstering the PA itself, rather than actually providing security services to the Palestinian people.[57] At the core of problems relating to the development of the security apparatus, lie the diverging interests of the different parties involved in SSR, be they Palestinian or international. These interests range from the personal – which could, for example, entail the benefits with a certain position of power people have acquired – to the geopolitical – which are related to high-level US and Israeli interests in the wider region.

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[54] Sami, personal communication, Nablus, 3 March 2010

[55] Prof. Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, interview, Beit Hanina, 13 January 2009

[56] Dr. Khalil Shikaki, interview, Ramallah, 18 January 2009

[57] Khalid Ali Naseef, interview, Ramallah, 22 February 2010.

The development of an effective and accountable security apparatus has been seriously hampered by both internal and external difficulties, which paradoxically has led to a situation in which the security forces are rapidly expanding and being reinforced but the generally perceived feeling of security is considerably lagging behind.

One major contributing factor to the lack of trust in the security organisations is their overt cooperation with Israel. That the Palestinian Authority was designated to combat terrorism and attacks against Israel was already agreed upon in the Oslo Accords and reinforced in the Roadmap but never has the cooperation been so intense as it is currently.

The PA aims to present itself as being tough on terrorists and, coupled to the politicisation of the SSR, this has led to a strategy that several people I spoke to, and not only people from other political factions but from Fatah as well, have labelled as "doing Israel's dirty work." Many, however, and especially those in service of the PA, applaud the PA's strategic choices and suppression of civil unrest in the West Bank. An anonymous, Palestinian consultant to EUPOL COPPS explained the reasoning behind the PA's tactics to me, while speaking on a personal account.

> *You see it all the time, and lately more than ever: Israel is trying to provoke us, dragging us in a new cycle of violence. The IDF, the politicians with their provocative statements, and especially the settlers with their regular, violent attacks; their so-called price-tag policy.*
> *But the Palestinian Authority is very smart about this. They know that Israel is using this strategy and they are really doing their best to make sure things don't get out of hand. They keep on stressing, don't let us get provoked. They are trying to strike the right balance between feelings and actions. All the anger and frustration that is growing, especially amongst the young people, it has to be let out sometimes, of course. But it must not get out of hand. The security services are working hard to make sure that all of these negative feelings, this anger, doesn't explode. Because it will only lead to a violent reaction from the Israelis. I mean, look at Gaza.*

> *Also, the PA uses the media to broadcast this message: don't let yourself get provoked. Let's try to stay calm, because violent protests will not solve our problems.*[58]

In a conversation I had with one of the staff members of the Security Academy in Jericho, the dilemma of whether or not to struggle against the occupation, and in what ways, were further clarified.

> *[I]t was difficult from the beginning, even for Arafat himself, to struggle against the existing situation, with military means. Because there's an Oslo agreement and people here are, you know, not so backward, in terms of what you lose and what you win. If you look, for example, at the Afghanistan case, to a certain point, there people may think that they have nothing to lose; no banking system, no economy, so when you think about sanctions or punishment, it has nothing to do with what is existing here. What we have here is different from even several independent states. Make a comparison between Palestine and Somalia, for example. Even if there's occupation here. I believe that what people think [about] is how to resist, or what kind of resistance we need, how to decide our priorities, it's about deciding what strategies we need. And this is the big question mark: if we decide we will resist Israel in this way, does it benefit us or not, Taking Oslo into consideration, the terrorism thing, that Israel tries to link the Palestinians with this phenomenon?* [59]

[58] Anonymous consultant to EUPOL COPPS, personal communication, Qalqilya, 17 April 2010.

[59] Dr. Nizam, interview, Jericho, 16 February 2010.

8. Human Security from Below

8.1. A fragmented society

Especially in conflict situations, human security from below, which also includes acts that may be dubbed 'resistance', is of vital importance. When security is no longer entrusted to the sovereign power of the state's traditional institutions, or when these institutions are absent, and people are confronted by the acute threat of physical violence, they tend to, or are perhaps even forced to take matters into their own hands; non-state actors form their own security communities and reclaim or challenge the state's monopoly of force, or serve as a substitute in case state institutions are absent completely, and try to improve their own security.

The word 'entrusted' in the second sentence of this introduction is of special significance, since trust plays a vital role in feeling secure. It can be argued that the strong individualism that characterises most Western societies lies at the heart of an increased sense of insecurity amongst their respective populations, despite crime figures going down almost without exception. The context of actual violent conflict will often compel people to work together with people they do trust and form a community, with the shared goal of survival.

Especially in the case of the Palestinians, human security from below is of vital importance, since social and political organisation has for a long time been organised on the village or clan level due to the lack of national institutions. Security communities are thus the main societal ordering mechanism.

The political and social fragmentation of the Arab society and the lack of emerging national institutions were definitely a major disadvantage for the Arabs when facing the Jews during the run-up to the 1948 war. The Arab resistance activities against the Jewish military actions, which started from March 1948, were village oriented. There is no historical evidence of Arab villages joining forces in order confront the Jews, which enabled the well-organised main Jewish agency of armed forces, the Haganah, to overrun the villages one by one.

The well-coordinated push by the Jewish forces and the subsequent founding of the state of Israel compelled the Palestinian Arab population to either resettle in cities or overcrowded refugee camps – which are sometimes situated in the middle of cities, have eventually merged with them, or more or less became villages themselves. Some Palestinians had to move to rather primitive substance-based villages in rural areas when their old villages were uprooted. Resembling traditional Arab village life, a

typical marginalised village was rather small and evolved around family hierarchies, usually consisting of one family or clan.

Small and unregulated, these marginalised villages were located outside municipal and village boundaries. Because of their spontaneous character, many of them did not receive basic services at all, not even water, and dozens of them still do not receive these services today. Currently, in cooperation with foreign NGOs, the PA is trying to improve the living circumstances in these villages but they are often confronted with strict Israeli policies that forbid the establishment of infrastructure such as power supplies or sewer systems. There are even cases in which solar panels were removed.

Yayyous is an example of such a marginalised village. Situated south of Hebron, close to the town of Yatta, the original village does not exist anymore after being destroyed by the Israeli army but the villagers have remained. After their houses had been destroyed several times, the inhabitants are now living in makeshift shelters, most of which are tents and caves. Since Israel has declared the surrounding area to be a national park, the Israeli military authorities prohibits the inhabitants from building any substantial housing units. The several attempts to build something that resembles a house, have been unsuccessful, since the IDF closely monitors any building activities

Makeshift house in the village of Yayyous. Photo by Martijn Dekker

and immediately destroys anything that is considered to be more than a temporary shelter. The Yayyous villagers saw themselves forced to adapt to the harsh living conditions, in order to keep living on the lands that have been family property for centuries.[60]

Other geographical remnants of the 1948 war that are still visible today are the refugee camps. The fighting and ethnic cleansing that took place prior, during and after the Israeli declaration of independence, which is why the Palestinians refer to the Israeli independence as *Nabka* or 'the catastrophe', led to hundreds of thousands of refugees, of which the West Bank had its fair share with an influx of thousands of them. Until today there remain several refugee camps in the territory, of which the largest – like Balata and Dheisheh – comprise of up to 25 thousand people. The consequences of the influx of refugees and the Jordan annexation considerably changed societal dynamics, for example where it concerns tensions between the original inhabitants – the *muwatinun* – and the new refugees – the *laji'un*. The social and cultural differences between these two groups are still discernible today.

The refugees, who were mostly from the coastal areas around Jaffa and Haifa, arrived in the West Bank in a state of despair. In search for as much stability and security they could find, communities remained together when they resettled in the refugee camps. As Morris notes, "[e]ach village tended to act as a collective and to act alone. (...) Flight, like resistance, come 1948, usually occurred *en masse*." (1989: 9-10) This must also be interpreted in the sense that social life in the Arab rural society had by and large functioned on the level of villages. Most of the villages were "socially and politically self-centred and self-contained; economically they were largely self-sufficient." (Morris 1989: 9)

Because of the segregation and autonomy of the different communities and in some cases due to considerable rivalry between them, they remained separate entities. Neighbourhoods and quarters in the refugee camps to a large extent tended to resemble the previous structures of the villages from where people had fled, with hardly any intermixing between them. The heritage of traditional village life remains present to a considerable extent. Up to today young children, when asked, unhesitatingly say they are from the town or village their forefathers were forced to abandon. When I, for example, attended an English course in refugee camp 'Askar, a twenty year old participant wanted to show me an article about what he referred to as his home town, after which he presented me with a short history of Haifa. Although

[60] Based on personal observations, as well as conversations and two interviews with Yayyous inhabitants.

the student had not once visited that Israeli city in his life, his longing to go there – to go home – was evident.

Despite the almost literal transfer of complete communities, however, the internal social relations changed considerably. Having lost their house and practically everything they owned, most of the refugee communities became heavily dependent on a newly established humanitarian aid organization that was especially set up in order to assist the Palestinian refugees – the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Roy 1995, Morris 1989, UNRWA website 2011). Although Roy (2001) claims that the social framework was literally transplanted from the original villages, with the *mukhtar* (community leader) still in charge, other authors note that the large-scale loss of property and the subsequent indiscriminate humanitarian aid supplied by the UNRWA had a considerable impact on the prevalent power relations (ICG 2007, Morris 1989).

Rural Arab villages usually consisted of about two or three *hamulas* (clans), and the rudimentary political organisation was mostly based on wealth. "Clan power was largely determined by property holding (land)." (Morris 1989: 9) In the new situation, however, a certain equality was more or less enforced upon the refugee communities. While the *mukhtars'* former social standing had carefully been constructed around their prosperity and central place in the familiar environment of their local communities, they lost a significant part of their primacy and authority after their flight, specifically when resettling in the camps. This became increasingly clear when a new generation, disgruntled with their squalid living conditions and unfamiliar with the social hierarchy of traditional village life, grew up in the camps.

With the old pecking order being challenged, other social structures emerged, political affiliation being prominent among them (ICG 2007:1, Roy 1995). As such, political affiliation became a vital aspect of daily life in the West Bank, specifically in the refugee camps, intersecting with clan and other affiliations. Still today, political factions play a significantly more important role in the refugee camps, which are still run by UNRWA, than they do in the cities.

The Jordan annexation of the West Bank after the 1948 war and the ensuing Israeli occupation that commenced in 1967, suppressed the development of national Palestinian institutions, although the awareness of being a nation did develop, with the PLO being the Palestinians' main representative body. That social and political organisation mainly took place on the village level was indeed reinforced by the Jordanians and Israelis and although there is now the Palestinian Authority, due to the current, geographical fragmentation of the West Bank, these forms of localised autonomy in the form of security communities remain important up to today.

The Palestinian case shows that the local community sense in many instances prevails over the nationally imagined community. The relatively late development of a national identity, which, for a considerable part, developed in opposition to the Jewish national identity forged by the Zionist project, is a partial explanation. The main obstacle to the primacy of the Palestinian nation, that is, in relation to the local community sense, is the PA's lack of performance legitimacy. Since the PA is not able to provide its citizens with security, actual as well as perceived, due to the occupation and its own internal difficulties, many Palestinians are compelled to have more trust in the capabilities of their own local arrangements that have been in place for generations.

Below I will elaborate on the two major institutions providing the Palestinians on the West Bank with human security from below – political factions and clans – by embedding them in two case studies.

9. The security fabric: ‘From above’ meets ‘from below’

9.1 Introduction

In this chapter the dynamics between the agents from above and below will be illustrated with two case studies; Hebron and Nablus. By describing the security fabric in these two parts of the West Bank, the power relations between the different agents should become clear and, subsequently, the way they influence the ways these agents provide human security.

Obviously, the dynamics between the two levels do not take place in a vacuum. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the various restraints it places on, for example, freedom of movement, are of vital importance. It is therefore that both the human and non-human – i.e. checkpoints, closures et cetera – influences of Israeli nature will also be thoroughly discussed in this chapter.

There are various reasons for choosing Hebron and Nablus as the two case studies for this research. The first and foremost reason for making use of case studies in general is the ethnographic detail they add to an otherwise somewhat detached political analysis. In my opinion, the numerous quotes of those involved, as well as a number of my own experiences, both illustrate and substantiate the findings.

The second reason for choosing these two cities is that they are the biggest in the West Bank and due to their size they offer the widest possible array of security-related issues. It may be argued that, because of their very size and intricate dynamics, they are not representative of the West Bank as a whole and that is why I also included the surrounding, more rural oriented areas south of Hebron and the refugee camp ‘Askar, adjacent to Nablus.

The third and last reason for these two cases is that they are quite different amongst themselves. Hebron has a large number of sizeable and rooted families and therefore a pervasive clan culture, including a strong network of informal justice representatives. Nablus, on the contrary, is a much more politicised environment, which can especially be seen in the two sizeable refugee camps along the city limits. It is therefore that the two short ethnographies have somewhat different features and emphases.

9.2. Case Study 1 – Hebron and the Southern Hebron Hills

Situated approximately 30 kilometres south of Jerusalem, Hebron is the largest city in the West Bank. With about 180 thousand inhabitants[61] it is a bustling city teeming with life, where the main streets are lined with shops of all sorts. The city has 6 hospitals and 2 universities – Hebron University and the Palestine Polytechnic University – and there are many thousands of private owned businesses, the majority of which belong to the wholesale, retail, trade, repairs and manufacturing sectors. The Hebron governorate, of which Hebron city is the district capital, is both in population and actual size the largest in the West Bank, with almost 600 thousand inhabitants and a land area of more than a thousand square kilometres. Besides the city of Hebron, there are the larger population centres Yatta, ad-Dhahiriya, Dura, and Halhoul – with 45, 30, 22, and 22 thousand inhabitants, respectively – about twenty smaller towns, two UNRWA refugee camps – Fawwar and al-Aroub – and more than a hundred villages.

The city is known for its grapes and figs production and is famous throughout the West Bank and beyond for its Hebron glass and ceramics. It is also home to one of the biggest dairy factories in the Palestinian Territories, al-Junaidi, and the sole remaining factory in the Palestinian Territories that produces *kuffiyehs*, the traditional Palestinian headdress made famous by Yasser Arafat, is owned by the Hebronite Arbawi family and located just outside of the city. Due to its size, Hebron is an obvious economic hub in the region but trade and doing business also seem culturally ingrained in the genes of Hebronites.

According to a popular urban legend, a high-ranking official of the Chinese Ministry of Trade once asked an aide to arrange a trip to the country of Hebron, while its name showed up so many times in statistics on foreign trade that the visit of a Chinese government representative would certainly be well-deserved. It remains rather doubtful whether this event truly occurred, especially since trade remains limited due to Israeli restrictions, but it shows the Hebronites' pride in being the economic heart of the West Bank. In fact, a shopkeeper once jokingly predicted to me that Hebron was sure to become the capital of a future Palestinian state and on another occasion a governorate official remarked that Palestine had in fact three capitals; Ramallah, because the Palestinian Authority resides there; Nablus, as the city

[61] Population figures are based on the last official census throughout the Palestinian Territories, as conducted in 2007 by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS).

where the bulk of manufactured goods and agriculture comes from; and Hebron, as the trade hub of the West Bank.[62]

Over the course of history Hebron has seen numerous violent takeovers, during for instance the quick spread of Islam in the 7th century, the Christian Crusades, and the rise of the Ottoman Empire. Under Ottoman rule, Hebron was a mixed city of Muslim and Jewish families. Although there sometimes were certain periods of relative acquiesce, there have always existed tensions between the Jewish and Arab populations in the city. At the beginning of the 20th century, coinciding with a large influx of Zionist Jews from Europe, Palestinian Arab hostility towards the Jewish population of Hebron increased.

The ongoing tensions culminated in the 1929 Hebron Massacre, in which 67 Jews were killed in pogrom-style riots. In 1936, the British Mandate government, which was established in 1917, decided to evacuate the Jewish population from Hebron. For several decades there was no Jewish presence in the city, until in 1968, following the 1967 Six Day War and the subsequent Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Jews started to resettle in the city. Since then, the tensions between Jews and Arabs have not ceased to exist, with a perpetual series of attacks to and fro. The incident that stands out as the most violent in the last five decades occurred in 1994, when Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein opened fire during morning prayers at the Ibrahimi Mosque, which is known as the Tomb of the Patriarchs, killing 29 Palestinians.

Since 1994 and increasingly since the start of the second Intifada the face of Hebron has drastically changed and, subsequently, so did the social and economic make-up of the city. Immediately after the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre, a harsh curfew was imposed on the Palestinian Hebronites, in order to curb their movement and so prevent retaliations from taking place. Following the curfew, the Israeli army began to implement a policy of separating Palestinians and Israeli Jews. Introduced in the area around the Tomb of the Patriarchs, this policy was gradually expanded to include other areas in the old city of Hebron. The practical consequence of this separation policy was that roadblocks were installed, fences were erected, limited re-occurring curfews were imposed, Palestinian shopkeepers were forced to close their shops; everything aimed at keeping the interaction between Jews and Palestinians to a minimum.

In 1997, Israel and the PLO signed the so-called Hebron Agreement, after which the city was divided into H1, controlled by the Palestinian Authority, and H2, which remained under Israeli military control. Since then, the part of the city that has been most dramatically affected by the Hebron Agreement and the violence that

[62] It is, however, obvious that the official was talking about the current situation, since Jerusalem remains the aspired capital of the future Palestinian state.

occurred most prominently during the second intifada is H2, which by and large comprises of the old city of Hebron – hitherto the cultural and commercial heart of the city. The area houses around 30 thousand Palestinians and 500 Jewish settlers, and between 500 and 1000 Israeli soldiers who are stationed there to protect the settlers.

The separation strategy imposed by the Israeli army most notably had drastic consequences for the owners of shops and local business situated in H2. Jamal Zuher Maraga, a souvenir shopkeeper, describes the situation:

> *"It's terrible. There's absolutely no business any more. You know what I sold today? Two* kuffiyehs*. That's 50 shekel [approximately €10]. It's nothing! I've got some friends [at international organisations like TIPH and CPT] who sometimes bring foreign visitors to my shop but these people are usually not interested in buying. I just sit here all day, doing nothing. I remember the old days. Everybody was up at 5 in the morning and there were dozens of trucks waiting, it was crazy, people from all over the West Bank were buying all their stuff here, transported it to Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin even, so they could it sell it there. We were the* souq *of the whole West Bank. (…)*
> *And look around you, what do you see now? Closed shops. It's difficult to describe the huge difference, you cannot even imagine it."*

9.2.1. Two security fabrics

Since the implementation of what was agreed upon in the Oslo accords and the Hebron Agreement, the territory in and around the city of Hebron has transformed into an intricate complex of A, B, and C areas. These administrative divisions, because of which the responsibility for providing security in the different areas is divided between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities, have far-reaching consequences for the composition of the security fabric. Indeed, the geographical divisions in and around the city have led to the emergence of very different security fabrics. What they have in common is that they are characterised by fragmented sovereignty, albeit with different effects, which will be considered in the concluding remarks of each discussion.

9.2.2. H2, the Southern Hebron Hills and other B/C areas

If we solely look at the Palestinian actors, the security fabric of the C areas surrounding the city resembles that of a failed state.



Illustration 5: Security fabric of Hebron H2, the Southern Hebron Hills and other B/C areas.

There are hardly any official PA agents (i.e. security forces) operating in the area, which leads to a strong emphasis on non-state security structures. In H2, political affiliation plays a modest role in providing people with a sense of security. Although Hebron is considered to be a stronghold of Hamas, affiliation with this faction will definitely not improve one's security, since the PA continues to clamp down on members and shares information about them with the Israeli forces controlling H2, and the latter also regularly undertake operations against (suspected) Hamas militants.

In this sense, affiliation with Fatah, and being open about it, can indeed add to one's security. This is different in the B and C areas south of Hebron, where political affiliation hardly plays a role.

In addition to political factions, there is a number of NGOs active in the Israeli controlled areas. Through monitoring and reporting human rights violations, by Israeli forces as well as PA personnel, they aim to prevent incidents from happening, and in that way improve the security of the people living in these areas. Since it is difficult for such NGOs to work in B and C areas, their focus is mostly on PA-related violations in A areas. Another type of NGO aims to assist marginalised communities in the Southern Hebron Hills to improve basic services such as water supply and electricity. In addition, they regularly visit these villages and report on rights violations by the IDF or settler violence, to let the latter two know they are being watched. I have indeed witnessed settlers refrain from harassing Palestinian farmers at the very last moment, when they noticed the NGO monitoring group, especially when foreigners were present.

By far the most important security communities in B and C areas are families and clans, especially compared to the central and northern parts of the West Bank. According to Haj Zuher Maraga, this has a historical explanation, related to population movements in the region.

> *Hebron has well-known families and they are connected. Because Ramallah is a mixed place, they do not come from rooted families. It has people who are from everywhere, from cities all over the West Bank. In Bethlehem it's the same thing, it's a mixture of people from different places. So they don't have a strong family connection. But in Hebron, you are speaking about old families; there are no other new families here.*[63]

Tribalism has been, and to a considerable extent still is, one of the most important forms of social organisation throughout the Middle East. According to some the Muslim world comprises of the "most powerfully tribal societies on earth." (Fukuyama 2011: 192) Palestinian society is certainly no exception to this rule; clan and family ties have played a vital role for hundreds of years and, despite a vacillating level of influence over the years, most notably due to the emergence of more centralised forms of power, still remain to do so today. The new mayor of Jerusalem, for example,

[63] Haj Zuher Maraga, interview, Hebron, 12 July 2009.

just weeks after his installation, invited all the notable family and clan elders from the city of Jerusalem, and a delegation of several religious leaders, in order to earn their support for implementing new policies, aimed at improving living conditions in East Jerusalem.

There are several concepts used to describe such forms of social organisation based on kinship, and they are often used interchangeably. The most common terms are 'clans' and 'tribes' and, essentially, both refer to a community of people who often share a common ancestor, and which is typically characterised as being egalitarian and classless, even though families often have a certain hierarchy with, at the very least, a clan elder. There are several types of kinship, which are classified by, for example, whether descent is based on the father's or mother's bloodline, or how the conventional custom of exogamy – which forces people to marry and procreate outside the own tribe – is being interpreted by the tribe. Palestinian clans are patrimonial, meaning that descent is based on the father's bloodline.

Sometimes a distinction between clans and tribes is made, based on the size of the community, where clans are usually smaller units, constituting a larger, overarching tribe, logically based on an even earlier common ancestor. Usually, however, in describing the segmentation of tribes into smaller sub-lineages, the separate elements as well as the top-level kinship relation are referred to, simply, as tribes. I will, however, use the word clan to refer to kinship communities that transcend the nuclear family, because the Palestinians I interviewed all used this terminology.

Probably the most famous description of clan systems is that of the Sudanese Nuer, as written by the influential anthropologist Evans-Pritchard (1940). According to him, clans are made up of different segments, which in turn constitute smaller segments, and so on. As Hamzeh Natsheh, a Hebronite friend of mine, clarified, "there are groups of Natsheh families. Let me explain. It's Natsheh family, but they have a small title (…) Our part of the family is called Abu Khalil. And others, from the same Natsheh family, they have Natsheh in their ID, but they are related to Tamimi-Natsheh. So it's a small name (sub name) for a group within the family. Every group has his *mukhtar*."[64]

The lowest-level clan lineages, based on a rather recent, common ancestor, comprise of nuclear families and village communities and it is at this level that most daily-life activities take places. The various segments, which thus share an earlier ancestor, do occasionally unite but this occurs only when the group is confronted by a

[64] Hamzeh Natsheh, interview, Hebron, 14 June 2009.

common enemy, usually in the form of another clan, which may well be from the same top-level tribe or from a wholly other clan altogether. This process, as Fukuyama aptly observes, is very well summarised in the Arab proverb "Me against my brother, me and my brother against my cousin, me and my cousin against the stranger." (Fukuyama 2011: 58)

Clans improve social cohesion and they contribute to an enhanced feeling of security, while they serve as a stabilising mechanism: being a member of a certain clan means that members from other clans are unlikely to do you harm, while such an act of aggression is bound to lead to retaliation. In other words, with the social institution of the 'blood-feud', clans simultaneously contribute to a safer and more stable environment, and less inter-clan tensions, through establishing an atmosphere of mutual concern of violence.[65] This rather stable culture of mutual deterrence between these security communities thus paradoxically leads to a certain anxiety as well as a feeling of security.

"The balanced opposition of political segments is," according to Evans-Pritchard, "largely maintained by the institution of the feud which permits a state of latent hostility between local communities, but allows also their fusion in a larger group (...)The feud, including the role played in it by the chief, is thus a mechanism by which the political structure maintains itself[.]" (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 78)

A tribal judge recalls a recent blood feud that occurred in Hebron:

> *There was a fight between them and seven people got killed. Somebody got killed and then someone from the other family, etc. We have something here in the Arab world, which is called revenge. If someone kills your father, you have to prepare yourself to kill the person who killed him. People believe in some kind of 'man by a man' system. "You kill someone from our family, we kill someone from yours."*[66]

According to many, most notably Westerners, the social institution of the blood feud is considered to be an anachronism from pre-state times. Historically, clannism has for long time been considered a compulsory stage in the development from bands – that is, hunter and gatherer societies – to modern states but the Darwinian element implicit in this normative interpretation of social evolution has been discredited by most

[65] Prof. Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, personal communication, 13 January 2009.

[66] Haj Ali Ashur Abu Zneineh, interview, Hebron, 26 July 2009.

contemporary social scientists, in the sense that one form of social or political organisation is not considered necessarily more advanced or modern than the other. That there is a clear link between clans and states remains obvious, however.

The intricate and often strenuous power relations between tribes and clans on the one hand and states on the other, is often described as a zero-sum game. In his history of the emergence of political order, Fukuyama describes a process in which tribal societies gradually evolved into modern states, in the Weberian sense, implicitly saying that the two types of political organisation – tribes and states with impersonal, bureaucratic institutions – cannot coexist without conflict. In fact, the process of "political decay", by which he means the demise of states or empires, is invariably, albeit partially, caused by a re-emergence of kinship-based sentiments and patrimonial forms of rule (Fukuyama 2011).

The zero-sum explanation of tribe-state relations can indeed be observed in numerous cases throughout history, as Fukuyama demonstrates in his book (2011), but it is often described from a rather state-centric perspective. That is, since states have become the pre-dominant and most commonly form of social organisation, countervailing forces such as tribalism are interpreted as not only an exception to the rule but a negative phenomenon as well.

In war situations or in the case of state failure, tribalism may, however, be the most obvious option – just like nationalism or ethnocentrism – when people are looking for a form of security that was hitherto provided in the form of a state-owned monopoly on coercion. It is for this reason that especially in the aforementioned situations of violent conflict, the balance of the zero-sum game between state and tribes tips towards the latter as the principal form of social organisation. Indeed, when a strong central government is lacking, families and clans often start to play a more important role, notably where it concerns the provision of physical security. This was, for example, the case after the outbreak of the second, or Al-Aqsa, intifada. According to clan elder Abdul Wahab Ghait, the system of clans and families served as a

> *[f]ull alternative for the police before the PA [was established], in the first intifada. It was also an alternative for the PA between 2000 and 2007, during which there was a very weak authority because of the Israeli invasion of Hebron. It was fully an alternative for the authority. During these two periods, the network, the cells of the families in Hebron was much, much stronger than the PA*

itself, in solving the problems and so on. Because there were very strong connections.[67]

Although Israel is no longer continuously present in H1 – the biggest part of Hebron – it still effectively controls more than half of the West Bank and, as such, has drastically influenced its social and geographical makeup. When, again, looking at the security fabric of the B and C areas and zooming out in order to include the Israeli influence, this becomes abundantly clear.



Illustration 6: Security fabric of Hebron H2, the Southern Hebron Hills and other B/C areas, including the IDF.

The Israeli arrow represents an array of various factors present in the West Bank, constituting two distinct categories; state and non-statutory. The official, statutory

[67] Abdul Wahab Ghait, interview, Hebron, 19 July 2009.

forces consist of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), Border Police, and regular or civil police. Although often armed as well, the Israeli settlers in the West Bank are not part of the security forces and thus represent the non-statutory actors. Besides these human agents, the infrastructure that comes with the occupation is also of vital importance; guarded settlements, roadblocks, fences, walls, and both permanent as well as ad-hoc (or flying) checkpoints.

The length of the top arrow illustrates the considerable influence the Israeli agents have on Palestinian human security in the West Bank. In the following paragraphs this influence will be discussed, distinguishing between the direct Israeli influence on Palestinian civilians and the influence that is exerted through their curbing the possibilities of the PSF to provide security.

9.2.2.1. Direct influence

The most visible Israeli influence on Palestinian daily life are the various restrictions on movement. Not only between the West Bank and Israel or Jordan but most notably within the West Bank itself.

An intricate network of checkpoints, roadblocks, closures, fences and walls, severely limits the Palestinians in their daily life activities. In addition, several roads and highways are restricted for Palestinians, and only accessible for Israelis. The most notorious example of such Israeli-only roads is probably Shuhada Street in downtown Hebron. Formerly the main road through the city, and as such the main artery of the commercial centre, it is now completely closed for Palestinians, which means, in some cases, that Palestinians living in the street have to enter their houses through an entry in the roof, while their front door opens to the restricted area.

The Palestinians living in the area surrounding Shuhada street are subjected to harsh security measures, meant to protect the approximately five hundred Jewish settlers living there. Curfews are regularly imposed, people are randomly checked and a trip to PA-controlled H1 means a thorough checking procedure at either one of the two main checkpoints – one at the end of Shuhada street and one adjacent to the Ibrahimi mosque. Although officially for security reasons, this checking procedure often involves a considerable amount of intimidation and humiliating requests, as I have witnessed numerous times.

Since the PSF are not allowed to operate in the area, the Palestinians living in H2 are not only required to rely on the Israeli forces for their security, they are also subjected to the whims of the settlers, who often display aggressive and intimidating behaviour towards the Palestinian inhabitants. Even as a foreigner I have experienced

this, being spat upon and called a “Nazi pig” by young settler boys, who saw me talk to some Palestinian friends.

The IDF in and around H2 have only the task to protect the settlers and although the Israeli Border Police are officially also obliged to provide security to the Palestinian population, experience learns that the settlers are the main priority of all the Israeli forces stationed in the area. It has occurred numerous times that Israeli forces will only intervene in an incident between a settler and a Palestinian, when the latter proposes a danger, even when responding to a provocation or an act of violence. In practice this means that when a settler attacks a Palestinian, the Border Police or IDF will often only intervene when the Palestinian reacts. Again, I have witnessed such incidents on several occasions.

The Israeli human rights organisation Breaking the Silence has collected hundreds of reports and testimonies of human rights violations by Israeli security personnel,

Watch tower in Shuhada Street, in the H2 part of Hebron. Photo by Martijn Dekker

ranging from intimidation and harassment to outright physical abuse and killings. The reasoning or motivations behind such acts are not to be discussed here but it is obvious that the often haphazard way of dealing with the Palestinians, are a major source of unpredictability and insecurity. A major, recurring source of friction are the weekly tours through the Old City, in which groups ranging from about twenty to one

hundred Jews from all over the world are given a guided tour, focussing on the Jewish history of Hebron. Guarded by many IDF soldiers, the group is led through the Palestinian part of the Old City, where they are continuously being followed and monitored by foreign NGO-workers and small packs of Palestinian youngsters who are trying to irritate both the group members and the soldiers by shouting and, sometimes, throwing pebbles and rocks. Already hours before the start of the tour the atmosphere in the Old City is rife with increasing tension.

Group of orthodox Jews taking the Hebron tour, guarded by Israeli Defence Forces. Photo by Martijn Dekker

Since the tour unequivocally makes clear why the IDF try to keep interaction between Jews and Palestinians to a minimum, the question remains why an exception is being made for this particular, recurring event. In any case, it shows the asymmetrical power relations; the Palestinians living in H2 cannot rely on the PSF to provide security and are subjected to the whims of the settlers and members of the tour, while the latter two groups are protected by heavily armed IDF.

9.2.2.2. Indirect influence – The Israeli forces and the PSF

Although the Palestinian police and security services are not allowed to operate in B and C areas, the Israeli police is not overly concerned with crime that is not related to Israeli-Palestinian interaction. A policeman from Hebron recounted a story about a major conflict between two clans in a C area, in which several got killed. Since the Palestinian police forces were not allowed to intervene, they asked the Israeli border police to act and stop the blood feud but they refused to do so. Indeed, the Israeli forces will usually not intervene as long as the conflict does not endanger any of the Israeli citizens in the area.

Israeli controlled H2, which can be compared to a C area, has become a refuge for people who have committed crimes in H1 and, because of that, are sought by the Palestinian police. In an interview with another police officer, Muhammad, working at the Hebron police department, this state of affairs is confirmed.

> Muhammad: *We can go into many areas here in Hebron, many villages, to arrest somebody who's above the law. But there are some areas where we can't go because there is a settlement.*
> Martijn: *So in H2...*
> Muhammad: *...the Old City, yeah.*
> Martijn: *So is there more crime in H2?*
> Muhammad: *Yeah, the problem is, when any person makes a problem, a murder case for example, he flees to the Old City, because it's under Israeli control. So we can't arrest him. And we ask them [the Israeli authorities] to coordinate with us, to arrest him, but they don't agree.*[68]

"It's dangerous to be here after dark," says Ali, working in a small cafeteria in the old city in H2, "there's bad people living here. It's all thieves, smugglers, murderers even. You should really not come over here at night." Responding to the question whether the Israeli police forces do anything to make it safer, Ali says,

> *As if they care. Of course, if I'd beat up a settler, they would be there immediately. But about us they don't care. Many times they don't even come if we call them. Or they come way too late. You know, I think*

[68] Muhammad (Hebron Police), interview, Hebron, 4 July 2009.

> *they are doing it on purpose. Trying to make life as miserable as possible for us living in H2. They don't want us here. The more of us leave, to H1 or elsewhere, the better it is for the Jews. So they can occupy another building. It's all part of their strategy."*[69]

While the Palestinian police are thus officially not allowed to operate in B and C areas, crime figures in the Israeli-controlled areas are prone to be higher, according to every police man I spoke to. The police do try to maintain a basic rule of law in these territories by coordinating with the Israeli authorities but this does not work very effectively.

When an emergency call comes in, the policeman has to request permission at the District Coordination Liaison Office (DCO or sometimes DCL) to enter the B- or C-area while officially on duty. The Israeli authorities are however reluctant and do not always give permission. What is more, if permission is granted, it often comes after several hours, when the problem might have escalated or when evidence at scene of the crime has already been tampered with.

The spokesperson of the Ramallah Governorate Police Centre illustrates this situation: "[t]here is a quarrel in a village, about ten kilometres from Ramallah, we have to wait 3 or 4 hours to get permission to go there and the situation will be finished."[70] His colleague adds,

> *another example, when we have a report that there are drugs that are going from Ramallah to another village, in a C-area, of course we want to go there as fast as we can to catch them. But we can't do this because of the permission we must have from the Israeli police.*[71]

That permission is granted rather arbitrarily adds to the difficult situation. As the Nablus Police Commander puts it,

> *[i]t all depends on how the Israelis feel. Sometimes 'yes', sometimes 'no', sometimes delay. (…) Sometimes there is*

[69] Ali, personal communication, Hebron, 2 July 2009.

[70] Spokesperson Ramallah Governorate Police Department, interview, Ramallah 18 April 2010.

[71] Press officer Ramallah Governorate Police Department, interview, Ramallah 18 April 2010.

> *no agreement or coordination and sometimes there is a considerable delay. Sometimes, if we want to go to a village at 8 o' clock and we call the DCO, they tell us not to go until 8 in the evening.*[72]

The Ramallah Police spokesperson aptly summarises the problem as follows. "You know, the police has to work fast. And move fast. But in our situation that is impossible."[73] It therefore occasionally happens that police officers, immediately after a problem is reported, head over to the scene without awaiting Israeli permission. The policemen do this on their own account, knowing that when they are caught by the IDF they will be arrested.

Such a furtive way of operating severely limits the capacities of the policemen. Besides their usually being unarmed and not wearing a uniform, since this is officially not allowed outside A-areas, this routine does not allow for actual arrests. It is therefore that approximately ninety[74] per cent of the arrests are made when suspects, later on, enter A territory, where the PA police does have authority and is allowed to work.

According to Mahmoud[75], a Palestinian police officer in Hebron, the police also works in the B and C areas without consulting the Israeli authorities at all. Dressed in civilian clothes they respond to emergency calls and sometimes are even unofficially stationed at the municipality or the village council in order to directly act when needed.

It remains, however, extremely difficult to work in the Israeli controlled areas, as the following account by the Nablus Police Commander illustrates.

> *[E]ven if we want to go there in civilian clothes, without arms and uniforms, the Israeli party tell us not to go anywhere, despite us working as civilians. But some of the criminals we have to capture as a civilian. Because they are a danger and also because they are always moving from one place to another. So, in such cases we have to act as civilians. And of course we experience difficulties. But, we do our best to prevent crime. Even in B and C areas.*

[72] Commander Nablus Governorate Police Department, interview, Nablus, 27 April 2010.

[73] Spokesperson Ramallah Governorate Police Department, interview, Ramallah 18 April 2010.

[74] Deputy commander of Hebron Governorate Police Department, interview, Hebron 23 June 2009.

[75] Mahmoud (pseudonym), personal communication, Hebron, 15 June 2009.

> *However, as you know, C areas are the most difficult, since they are under full control of the Israelis. So in most cases we are not at all allowed to go there. There are some villages very close to settlements and if a crime happens there, we can definitely not go there freely. If we call the DCO, they always delay us and often prohibit us going there at all.*[76]

When asked whether policemen operating in this civil mode enjoy authority, Mahmoud says that this is certainly the case in the many towns and villages surrounding the city. In most cases the policemen operate in villages or areas where they originate. Within H2, the Israeli controlled C-area in Hebron, this is however not the case. The sheer number of Israeli soldiers and policemen present in this area makes it extremely difficult for the Palestinian officers to do their work, despite their being allowed by the Israeli authorities to have a small office in the area, where they can deal with minor cases.

According to a report of Israeli human rights organisation B'tselem, the "primary reason for the curfew [and other restrictions] was to enable Jewish settlers in the heart of the city to carry out their daily routine and to safeguard the security forces protecting them." (2007:18) The army claims, however, that curfews are "intended, among other reasons, to protect the Palestinians themselves," (Ibid.), but the Palestinians living in H2 rightfully claim that their security has deteriorated substantially over the last two decades.

Several shopkeepers in the Old City have complained to the PA, asking for protection against the criminals who can act with relative impunity. Most of the crime is attributed to two big clans, according to one shopkeeper.

> *It's all these young guys from the same two families. You've seen them running around, harassing people, especially foreigners. And they steal stuff from us, like we don't have problems already. They irritate everybody and make people feel unsafe. We lose income because of them. The* sulta *[PA] should do something about it and we've asked for support time and again. We all know where they live but we can't really do anything about them ourselves.*

[76] Commander Nablus Governorate Police Department, interview, Nablus, 27 April 2010.

> *This destroyed house around the corner here, you've seen it? [Foreigners are invited to take a tour through the house, after which they are asked to support the family by buying DVDs and Palestinian paraphernalia.] They claim settlers set it on fire but rumour has it that they did it themselves. They threw in a Molotov cocktail and simply blamed the settlers. But they don't fool us, because we know whom we're dealing with. They're a bunch of thugs, criminals.*[77]

On one occasion I met the PA Minister of Tourism, who was visiting the shopkeepers in the Old City, and when I asked her about the problems she pledged that the PA had made security in H2 a priority, in order to increase the number of foreign tourists. According to the Minister, there were talks with the local DCO and the IDF about establishing a civil patrol, which was to be stationed in the Old City. Only two days before I left Hebron, the first patrols were doing their rounds in the Old City. A group of five young men, not dressed in uniforms but with resembling black outfits, walked through the Old City, keeping an eye out for, what one shopkeeper dubbed, 'unaccepted behaviour'. Interestingly enough, the majority of the civil guards were from one particular, influential clan – the Qawasmis – not coincidentally the very same clan of the Fatah politician who proposed the plan of the patrols.

Although the civil guards were welcomed by most of the shopkeepers in the Old City, there was also a sense of uncertainty about the Qawasmis dominating the makeup of the patrols. In a society where equilibrium between the various clans is of vital importance, a disproportionate power position for one single clan is considered to be a threat to stability and security.

9.2.2.3. The PSF and the clans

In areas where the PA is not allowed to operate and non-statutory actors, cooperating in security communities, come to be more important, it becomes especially problematic when the internal corrective mechanisms within one or more clans do not function well. Some of the more powerful clans were indeed a threat to public order, because their search for their own narrow, community interests could not be kept in check through a balance of power. Several of them had formed their own militias with

[77] Fadi (pseudonym), personal communication, Hebron 17 July 2009.

their leaders as local warlords. In a 2007 report, the International Crisis Group writes about these processes in Gaza:

> *The symbiotic relationship between clans and rival movements (Fatah, Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees) escalated conflict among the latter by adding the dimension of family vendetta. In the final years of Fatah's rule and during the turbulent national unity government from March to June 2007, such clans established near autonomous zones with their own militias and informal justice and welfare systems – a process facilitated by Israel's unilateral withdrawal.* (ICG 2007:i)

The prevalence of non-state communities in the form of clans and political factions, and their respective interests, led to fierce competition, causing widespread chaos and considerably undermining the Palestinian establishment's attempts to rally the Palestinians around a shared vision. It is therefore that, mirroring the PA's efforts on restoring its monopoly on the means of coercion, Hamas embarked on a harsh campaign against the clans' power positions, immediately after its rise to power in 2007.

The interesting paradox of Hamas' crackdown on the clans is that tight-knit clan relations are a mirror image of the more traditional Islamic values Hamas adheres to. This relatedness between Islam and tribal tradition is underscored by prominent *islah* man[78] Haj Zuher Maraga:

> *The importance of the families has to do with the connections. And the connection comes from Islam. The family is the one who forbids their sons or their grandsons to do bad things against others. Like attacking others, or going beyond the borders in which they are supposed to be. This is the importance of the families.*
> *And the girl or the woman are not allowed to be free like [the men and boys] are. The women have a reputation, families have reputations. And these strong reputations are very important. It does not mean that they need to be*

[78] The word 'islah' stems from the same root as the word 'sulha' and can roughly be translated as mediation or reconciliation.

> *controlled, but there are some kinds of ethics they should follow.*[79]

However, the prominence of the families and the coupled, more conservative outlook on society that prevails in the southern West Bank is not uncontested. As one friend formulated it,

> *[i]n Hebron, you know... Maybe you can hear some jokes about Hebron, about how they, in the past, had a hard mind. (…) But here...just try to ask, try to ask for help. People here are used to help. This is what I hear, what I feel. They take more care of each other, while in the other cities they take more care of themselves and don't care to help. This is the families.*
> *But you know, maybe this is a little bit...I don't accept this, but in the family, the women don't have the same... (silence, says Arabic word)...you know, the women in Hebron, it's just different from other cities. It's related to Islam[.]*[80]

Many people, especially among the younger generations, are indeed quite critical of the clans' grip on society. Since more than half of the student population in the West Bank is female, and women increasingly enjoy higher education, tensions between ambition and tradition become visible. The social control within society remains quite pervasive, however. It sometimes seems that everybody knows each other, which leads to many twenty and thirty year olds feeling confined. Whatever you do, every act that is slightly out of the ordinary will eventually be reported to someone higher up the clan hierarchy. Several friends confessed to feeling like they are kept on a leash.

Since quite explicit music videos, especially from Lebanon, can be seen everywhere, and social media like Facebook are popular and widespread, the longing to escape from the strict social control becomes all the more acute.

Even as a foreigner, I have experienced the ubiquitous presence of the families. After befriending several young people, I became affiliated with their respective families, which apparently implied that they felt the obligation to take care of me. In practice this meant that, on several occasions, I was confronted with the fact

[79] Haj Zuher Maraga, interview, Hebron, 12 July 2009.

[80] Anonymous, personal communication, Hebron, 16 June 2009.

that I visited a certain part of town that was considered unsafe, and told that I was to call someone from the family to accompany me. Although flattered at first, I eventually started to feel confined as well, feeling spied upon.

I remember vividly how a thirty year old friend, who was living with his parents in an uptown neighbourhood of Nablus, was told to be home at ten PM. Hanging out with his foreign friends, not wanting to be regarded as a child, he decided to disregard his parents' rule. Exactly five minutes after ten his mother called him on his mobile phone to check where he was and the following hour, she literally called him every ten minutes. Seeing him feeling somewhat ashamed, I asked him about the tight social control and whether he could explain how this came about.

> *First, it has to do with culture. We are a modern family, my father travelled; worked in Qatar and Egypt. But still, they care very much about tradition. They don't want the family or other families talking about us, about me; that I'm a wild boy, going out every night, partying. I mean, in the end they want me to get married to a nice girl, so they care very much about my reputation. Even though, to be honest, I don't really care about these things. The second important reason is the occupation, of course. We know that something can happen, always. I may get shot or arrested. My mother just wants to make sure that I'm safe, that nothing has happened to me. She's just looking out for me. And I know, it sounds a little bit stupid now, because it looks very safe now and quiet. But this is occupation, we always feel insecure. This is [my parents'] way of feeling better. Feeling more secure. I mean, if I got arrested there is nothing they can do about it, but it makes them feel like they're in control, you know?*[81]

[81] Muhammad, personal communication, 'Askar, 24 March 2010.

On several occasions I have seen how respected elders exert their influence and how they often proved to be very effective in, for example, deescalating a tense situation. In March 2009 I was present at a dramatic scene in the small village of at-Tur, located on the Mount of Olives in East Jerusalem. I was staying at Ibrahim's, an old Palestinian friend, and over dinner he told me that his nephew Khaled's house was scheduled to be demolished the following day, because no building permit was granted.

The following morning I went to the site, where I was welcomed by dozens of people who were living in the neighbourhood, as well as a handful of foreigners who were working for an NGO and wanted to document the house demolition.

An hour later, police cars and army trucks started to arrive and about a hundred soldiers and policemen positioned themselves around the house and in the narrow streets, keeping bystanders from the immediate vicinity of the house. Then the bulldozer arrived and after about twenty minutes all that remained of the house was an enormous pile of rubble.



Young mother standing between the ruins of her house in at-Tur. Photo by Martijn Dekker

During the demolition process, tensions started to rise as several women started yelling and weeping, and young kids from all over the village started gathering, carrying Palestinian flags and shouting provocative chants against the Israeli security forces. Some young boys were already gathering rocks, preparing for 'battle'. It was then when I noticed my friend Ibrahim, who, in his seventies, was a much respected man, approach the commanding officer of the Israeli forces. He briefly talked to the man, pointed to the children and, after seemingly having reached a mutual agreement, walked over to the kids. Unknowing of what was exactly going on, I waited until the operation was finished.

A bulldozer demolishing a house in at-Tur, while Israeli security forces stand guard.
Photo by Martijn Dekker

Immediately after the bulldozer pulled up and started to leave the scene, the situation appeared to run out of hand. As the soldiers were leaving the scene, the kids spread out and started to through rocks and pebbles at them. As soon as this happened, Ibrahim started shouting and after several seconds the kids stopped throwing and ran away with their flags waving. All the while, the Israeli security forces were visibly tensed, ready to take action, but they did not respond to the thrown rocks.

As the kids ran away, I saw the Israeli officer nodding to Ibrahim, after which the Israeli security forces gathered and left the scene, together with the jeeps and the bulldozer. Although the atmosphere was still very tense, and the young family were grieving over the loss of their house, I was glad that the situation did not escalate completely and had not become even worse, with casualties or arrests.

Afterwards, I asked Ibrahim what had taken place between him and the Israeli commanding officer. He told me,

> *I went to him and explained the situation. I said, please, it's already terrible that the house is destroyed but let's make sure things don't run out of hand completely. There's a lot of kids around and they are sure to do something but please try to remain calm. I will make sure that the kids are kept in check so if you tell your men to stand down also, and be patient, we can make sure that people don't get hurt, OK?*[82]

Ibrahim is fluent in Hebrew, and his reputation is also well-known among Israelis, so the officer agreed and indeed made sure that the security forces did not immediately respond to the kids' provocations. That the situation ultimately did not run out of hand was due to the strict control the officer and Ibrahim had over the armed forces and the neighbourhood's children, respectively.

9.2.2.4. The PSF and informal justice

Throughout the Arab world, ethics and traditions, of which respect for your elders is but one example, play an important role in society, and in many regions they are enforced by what is referred to as informal justice (Birzeit 2007). Especially tribal justice has always been an effective way of solving problems in these close-knit

[82] Ibrahim Abu al-Hawa, personal communication, Jerusalem, 8 February 2009.

societies, which is why *legal pluralism* (Berman 2007, Galanter 1981, Tamanha 2000), where varying forms of justice complement each other, is of special significance in the Arab World. Although such forms of justice developed in times prior to the emergence of modern states, in many authoritarian states in the Arab world, they still provide a legitimate alternative for the official security forces and the judiciary, who are often mistrusted by a considerable part of the population, as the widespread protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and other Arab countries show.

Since the Palestinians, until quite recently, have not had their own centralised state apparatus, and were therefore lacking formal, judicial institutions, they are used to solving conflicts through informal mechanisms. Informal justice thus also plays an important role in the Palestinian Territories, perhaps even more than in other Arab states.

The informal forms of justice revolve around two institutions; *sulha* and *'urf*. Although they share a considerable number of characteristics and are both based on Islamic and Arabic as well as Bedouin traditions, they do differ in practice. When I asked clan elders to describe the difference, they provided varying answers but the main distinction deals with the way a solution is reached. *'Urf,* or tribal law, will lead to a verdict, while the process of *sulha* is aimed at finding the middle ground in a conflict between two parties, culminating in a mediated compromise.

> *Conflict resolution takes place when there's a conflict between or within families but ['*urf*] means applying the law. (…) Applying the law means that you are referred to someone wise, who studies the case, comes with a decision and then works like a kind of referee. A sort of court decision but based on holy books, the* Quran*.*
> *(…)*
> *['*Urf*], applying the law the way I do, means that the two people who are fighting, they choose the jury. It's not the government that decides. This is called arbitrary law.*
> *These two people who come to me for a decision, they provide me with all the necessary documents, papers, and so on. Then they have two options. Either they choose the* sulha *or family system, which is based on the system of 'family wise men' or you choose for solving it through* ['urf]

> *law. I work with the law system, as a judge. People can choose me to rule over their cases.*[83]

'Urf rulings are based on local customs and traditions, which is why it is inextricably linked to clan structures. Verdicts by *'urf* judges must however always be compliant with the Islamic law, as it was formulated in the Quran. In effect, *'urf* can be compared to common or arbitrary law, since the verdict is given at the judge's discretion and not necessary compliant with national laws. Makdisi (1999) even claims that common law is based on the principles of Islamic law.

Sulha is also rooted in community traditions but, contrary to *'urf* rulings, is much more focused on compromise and de-escalation. According to Haj Zuher Maraga,

> *[a]ll the problems in the world can be solved by* sulha*.* Sulha *can provide a solution for any problem between two human beings. Like problems about money, problems with robberies, problems about women, problems that deal with behaviour that goes against local ethics, problems with accidents. Any kind of problem that happens between two people.*[84]

Islah men, who oversee the mediation in *sulha* processes, play a major role in maintaining social order. As Abdul Wahab Ghait, one of the more influential clan elders, explains,

> *[m]y role as a conflict resolution man, as a "wise man", the head or* mukhtar *of the family, is to avoid any direct conflict with any other family. So my role is, how to stop this from the first minute. But also, the role of the family is to provide any form of protection, any possible method. So if any other form didn't work or in case there is a direct fight, the role of the family is to provide security to its members, with any method that they can use.*
> *But normally, as a conflict resolution man, my role is to go to the fight from the first minute and say, let's stop the*

[83] Haj Ali Ashur Abu Zneineh, interview, Hebron, 26 July 2009.

[84] Haj Zuher Maraga, interview, Hebron, 12 July 2009.

fight and sit down to discuss. So this is normally what happens. My role, not only for my own family but all those in Hebron, is to prevent this kind of direct fight. To not have any of the two families involved injured. [85]

In absence of state-organised forms of justice, informal justice thus plays an important role in maintaining a societal equilibrium through mediating in conflicts that might otherwise escalate into violent feuds. Also in PA-controlled areas, however, such mechanisms remain of importance, which will be discussed in the following section.

85 Abdul Wahab Ghait, interview, Hebron, 19 July 2009.

9.2.3. Hebron area A

In contrast to the B and C areas, a graphical representation of the security fabric of area A, the PA-controlled part of the city, seems to resemble that of a modern state, with a centralised security apparatus to maintain security.



Illustration 7: The security fabric of Hebron A-areas.

Despite the problems concerning authority and responsibility issues, the Palestinian police force was, for a long time, also not equipped very well, although compared to ten years ago, the situation has improved considerably. Most of the police and security personnel wear uniforms and drive clearly marked, often new vehicles. The police have long suffered from a lack of basic tools to analyse crime scenes, such as tools to register fingerprints, but the EU has recently supplied such advanced equipment through their EU-COPPS programme. In addition, in 2010, an advanced, Canadian-sponsored lab for criminal investigations has opened in Ramallah.

Although not as prominent as in the Israeli controlled areas, the traditional clan structures are of significance in A areas as well. Due to the earlier deficiencies they had to cope with, Palestinian security personnel have come to rely much more on information coming from the various, informal security communities within society. In order to do so, they have co-opted the traditional security structures and cooperate closely with clans and families. Such lines of communications can be used very efficiently, as a spokesperson of the Ramallah Governorate Police Department told me. "We don't have any crime labs but there's not a crime that's not solved. (…) With the cooperation of the people. Sometimes, someone is killed or his house was robbed. One call and we know who did it, we get the information."[86]

The close cooperation between families and security services does however show the ambiguities of the security fabric in Palestinian society, notably where it concerns the dynamics between the traditional and modern structures. The following example aptly illustrates these tensions.

Khalid, a policeman[87] from a small village south of Hebron, recalls the story of a case of theft at the office of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Some time ago a representative of TIPH reported that several thousands of shekels had been stolen from their office. The police contacted their informants in different clans and within twenty-four hours the perpetrator was caught. With a sense of pride, the policeman recalls that the day after the arrest, the representative from TIPH came to the police office. When he looked around the office and saw nothing but desks and some cupboards, the representative reportedly asked, "You don't have any equipment. Where are the fingerprint scanners, the DNA analysis machines, the computers networks? How did you manage to solve this case so quickly?"

Then, with a sense of disappointment, the policeman recalls that, instead of letting the police and the Palestinian justice system handle the case, the TIPH team decided not to press any charges and deal directly with the family of the culprit. The

[86] Spokesperson Ramallah Governorate Police Department, interview, Ramallah 18 April 2010.

[87] Khalid (pseudonym), police officer, interview, Hebron, 4 July 2009

clash between traditional and modern, and between informal and formal, is clear. Although the disappointment of the policeman is understandable, it is interesting to see that he and his colleagues utilised the informal clan system to solve the crime but preferred not to let that same system take care of the consequences itself. The TIPH, on the other hand, relied on the formal system of security institutions to track down the thief but subsequently decided to solve the case in an informal way by dealing with the family and letting them decide on the punishment of the perpetrator.

There are numerous examples of such clashes between the human security providers from above and below, in which the tensions between the rather recently established PA-institutions and the traditional clan structures become apparent, according to Khalid.

The clan structures not only serve as a vital source of information for the police. According to Haj Ali Ashur Abuzneineh, a so-called *islah* man and sharia' judge, the police also cooperate with representatives of the informal justice system. Such, mutually agreed upon cooperation occurs in two different forms; one related to mediation through *sulha* and one deals with informal justice through *'urf*. The former is mostly complementary to judicial rulings and crime-solving procedures, while the latter is a full-fledged alternative for the judiciary's work.

According to Haj Ali Ashur Abu Zneineh, the PA's courts sometimes refer cases to him, as a sharia' judge. After he has given his verdict, this is put on paper and sent to the court, which then formalises the decision. Abu Zneineh claims that he works much more efficient as well as faster than the official courts. That the PA's courts cooperate with sharia' judges is simply common-sense to him, since official law should reflect the cultural heritage of the Palestinians, *'urf* represent an obvious element of it.

The *sulha* committees, on the other hand, usually complement official court decisions. Again, according to Haj Ali Ashur,

> *[t]here's a difference between the role of the police and the role of the* islah *committee. The role of the police is to impose the law, the rule of law. The role of the committees is to provide conflict resolution between families. Even the police go the* islah *committees when they have to solve problems. This is something very traditional. People have to do it. Even if the police is investigating a case, they immediately refer people to the* islah *committee to have the problem solved.*[88]

[88] Haj Ali Ashur Abu Zneineh, interview, Hebron, 26 July 2009.

According to several *islah* men, the police indeed often cooperate with them, especially when it concerns a conflict between *hamulahs*. The killing of one clan member might spark a blood feud and even though the perpetrators can be arrested, the only way to really stop the violence of attacks and retaliations is the mediation of a *sulha* process of reconciliation. Most of the times a considerable amount of money has to be paid to the clan of which the first person was killed. The reputation of the *islah* man and his standing in society ensures that the involved clans adhere to the outcome of the *sulha* process and refrain from further violence. Haj Ali Ashur recalls a recent case, in which one killing resulted in a blood feud between two families in Hebron.

> *So this problem was very big and only the* islah *committee, which was me and Haj Zuher and some others, could solve it. (…) The police were involved and they consulted the* islah *committee to solve it. Because this is a blood feud between families. Even if the police catch the killer, you'll still find people who want revenge. This is a fight between families not just between me and you. Even if you arrest ten people, there are still ten people outside who can and want to fight. People like me, we'll find a solution.* [89]

In some cases, people decide to bypass the police and formal judiciary completely, even in big cases. A member of an influential family[90] recalls a recent heavy traffic accident in which six of his family members got killed by a reckless driver. An *islah* man was consulted and after an intensive reconciliation process that took several weeks, the family 'forgave'[91] the driver and no charges were pressed. The police were solely involved to take care of the formal process; removing the destroyed vehicles and registering the accident.

Some policemen consider informal justice to be a valuable addition to the formal judiciary, most notably in smaller problems within families. "[S]ometimes there is a problem [between] the man and his wife and it's not good to go to the police, to have the wife make a case against her husband. Sometimes they solve this internally, at home. That's no problem. [W]hen a problem happens between two brothers, and

[89] Haj Ali Ashur Abu Zneineh, interview, Hebron, 26 July 2009.

[90] Ali (pseudonym), personal communication, Hebron, 19 July 2009.

[91] It must be noted that this forgiveness involved the exchange of a considerable amount of money, as is often the case in *sulha* processes.

one of them goes to the police, then it may become a bigger problem. The family solves it."[92]

Human security from above and from below can go hand in hand, as the aforementioned example, in which the escalation of domestic conflict is prevented, shows. But there remain tensions, especially where it concerns authority. Power structures that have taken a firm place in Palestinian society are difficult to dismantle, while its leaders are not eager to give up their primacy and are convinced of their importance for their respective communities. There are several reasons for this.

First, there is the issue of effectiveness. Even though the police are becoming increasingly effective, the Palestinian judiciary system is still underdeveloped. Seeing how effective (and fast) the informal judges and mediators operate, people continue to make use of them, which continuously reinforces their position in their respective communities.

On the other hand, the PSF themselves are very keen on maintaining their position as the sole enforces of law and order (upholding their monopoly on the use of force), and from time to time speak harshly about prevalent forms of informal justice. Officially, the police is against the informal way of solving crimes. "People who go to [sharia' courts] are foolish," as an employee in the office of the brigade colonel of the Hebron police formulated it. In effect, negative comments about such rooted and much respected traditions only add to the latter's credibility, since they come from a source that is not that trustworthy itself.

The second reason for the clans' reluctance to secede power to formalised top-down security structures is credibility. Although the Civil Police enjoys a quite good reputation, the other official PA security forces are widely mistrusted, contrary to the family-based security structures and informal justice that have played a major role in the local Arab societies since hundreds of years, and have continued to do so during the Ottoman times, and the British, Egyptian, Jordanian and Israeli occupation of these territories. They enjoy the credibility that new, national institutions do not, especially while these institutions are being developed under international pressure and with the help of foreign states. Besides that, the concept of national institutions is new to most Palestinians, while security has always been locally oriented and related to family and political factions, as was already illustrated previously in the socio-historical context.

Several men from the *islah* committees expressed distrust in the authorities, especially where it concerns security within the community. In fact, some even claim that the mere presence of central authority leads to a deterioration of trust within

[92] Muhammed, police officer, interview, Hebron, 4 July 2009

smaller communities and, as such, to corruption, alienation and a break-down of social structures. One of the most respected *rajul islah,* Haj Zuher Maraga, explains:

> *The presence of the leadership, the* sulta *[PA], is what makes people really bad. In my belief, when you have law, when you have control, when you have authority, when you have all of this, it does not help. It helps more when you have honesty among people, when you have reconciliation, the respect for the* sulha *committee. When a* sulha *committee comes and says, you stole this from a shop and you have to give back the money, or you will be fined or your family will be fined, this creates honesty between people.*[93]

The prominent position of clan elders and the sulha committees they comprise is indeed of vital importance, since the fines Haj Zuher Maraga speaks of are based on common law and thus cannot be enforced by the state's security and judicial apparatus. The efficacy of a sulha committee is in effect directly linked to its social standing and its ability to exert social pressure on those who are obliged to pay a fine. As my friend Hamzeh Natsheh remarked, "the mukhtars of, for example, the Natshehs sometimes have more control over the people than the police."[94]
Based on their social standing, the clan elders also act as intermediaries when a conflict between the PA security forces and civilians arises. Abdul, a prominent clan elder of the Ghait family, says,

> *[w]e, as the* sulha *committee, have gone many times to the PA (…) We are not only solving normal problems, but in case we find that the PA made any mistake, we go directly, and we say "you made a mistake, and we would like you to commit that you made a mistake, and say that you won't do it again". This does not mean that we have any power over the authority but it means we are also working closely to what human rights organisations are doing; watching the PA, and mentioning when they did something wrong.*

[93] Haj Zuher Maraga, interview, Hebron, 12 July 2009.

[94] Hamzeh Natsheh, interview, Hebron, 14 June 2009.

> *One of our roles, also, is when the authority made any mistake or did something against the law, to influence public opinion on these issues. So with the very strong family system that we have, we can spread information easily and raise public awareness. This is the power that we have.*[95]

In addition to the clans keeping an eye on the PA's work, there is also a number of NGOs, mainly human rights organisations, working in the A areas. By regularly checking in the prisons of the various security forces, filing complaints when they register rights violations, and by providing legal aid to people who have been mistreated by the PA, they are playing an increasingly important role in providing a sense of security to people, especially to those who feel threatened because of their political background.

9.2.3.1. Direct Israeli influence on Palestinians in A areas

Even in A areas the consequences of the Israeli occupation are permanently noticeable. Although the Israeli forces are barely seen here, they do regularly enter the city to arrest suspects, mostly by night. It is, however, the less evident administrative and bureaucratic measures that have the biggest influence on Palestinians living in H1.

An incident I experienced in July 2009, together with Tareq, a friend from Hebron, illustrates the non-stop Israeli control over Palestinians, even though it is often not visible at first sight. As a regional director of a World Bank sponsored development project, Tareq was invited to attend a conference in Washington, some five months later.

For most Palestinians it is not easy to go abroad. In contrast to Israelis, Palestinians are obliged to obtain a travel visa for many countries, amongst which the US and The Netherlands. For Tareq the first problem arose even before requesting a visa, since the US consulate is located in East-Jerusalem, which Tareq can only enter after having obtained Israeli permission. Unfortunately for Tareq, his requests were denied two times for security reasons, which were not further specified. Since Tareq has never been arrested and has not been involved with direct actions against Israel, he was surprised by the denial but, determined to at least go to Jerusalem and file the request for a visa, contacted an Israeli human rights organisation to mediate.

A week later, the necessary permission to visit Jerusalem – for one day only – arrived, and Tareq was ultimately able to go to the US consulate, in order to collect the

[95] Abdul Wahab Ghait, interview, Hebron, 19 July 2009.

visa request forms. In order to fill in the forms, Tareq had to rely on a friend who was fluent in Hebrew, since the papers were drawn up in that language.

The second step was handing in the papers at the nearest Israeli police station, since an obligatory appendix to the request form was a security clearance report by the Israeli intelligence. Indeed, in order to travel abroad, Palestinians are obliged to obtain Israeli security clearance. The first attempt to hand in the papers at the police station, which was located on the outskirts of Hebron, adjacent to H2 area, failed, since such requests were apparently not taken in on Sunday. The long wait outside the heavily guarded police office got me quite heated but Tareq merely shrugged his shoulders, saying that Palestinians were used to this kind of treatment. A day later, on Monday, I again accompanied Tareq to the police station, and after waiting for an hour outside the police station – our only means of communicating with the officers inside being the intercom attached to the fence – we were told to come back next week, since such request forms were only taken in on Sundays. This time around, even Tareq got irritated over the Kafkaesque treatment.

Qalandia, the biggest checkpoint in the Westbank, between Jerusalem and Ramallah. Photo by Martijn Dekker

A week later, when Tareq was finally allowed to hand in the request forms, a period of anxiously awaiting permission commenced. The final result of the investigations would, however, not be disclosed to Tareq in person but directly sent to the US consulate. In case of a negative outcome, Tareq would thus not know the reasoning behind it.

On the surface, Tareq appeared casual about the whole procedure, but after some probing he admitted to feeling quite anxious. That, in order to leave the territory where he lived, he had to request permission at an invisible authority that ruled harshly but with considerable arbitrariness, gave him an ever-present sense of insecurity. The dependency on unsympathetic, occupying forces, who not only decided over his very movements but could also come and arrest him at will led to a severe lack of control over his life, both apparent and real.[96]

9.2.3.2. Indirect influence – Israel and the PSF

Although officially designated as PA-controlled areas, the IDF do regularly operate within the A areas. The hierarchical structure in which the IDF prevail over the Palestinian police is clearly visible. While Palestinian policemen have to request permission to operate outside of their own jurisdiction, practically every day, the Israeli army enters A-areas in order to arrest wanted Palestinians, without having to ask for permission. When an IDF arrest operation is imminent, the Palestinian police are notified, after which they have to retreat – armed Palestinians, which includes police forces, are not allowed on the streets when the IDF is operating in the area.

The Commander of the Nablus Police department explains the situation, which is most definitely not typical for his city alone but can be observed in Hebron, too, as well as in other A areas throughout the West Bank:

> *We also can't do our job in the streets. Because we have to withdraw all of our people from the streets when they [the Israelis] are coming and entering (…) In the Falatan they came several times a day. But now, they let us work freely until midnight, from the early morning to midnight. After that time, we withdraw our patrols from the street.*
> *Sometimes [they come] 4, 5 times a week, sometimes each day, and sometimes they let us work until the early morning for 2 or 3 days.*
> *They mostly come after midnight but if they have any suspect that is wanted and they know he is in Nablus, they will also enter any time during the day. But they always inform us through the DCO that they are entering.*

[96] What must be added to this story is that, in the end, the clearance for Tareq's visa did come through. However, rather ironically, two months after the conference in Washington took place.

> Martijn: *And you then have to withdraw the forces from all of the city?*
> Commander: *During midnight throughout the city, yes. But for the rest of it, it depends on the Israelis. Sometimes they say we just have to withdraw the patrols from the old city and sometimes we are allowed to work in the east or in the west and we are told "Don't go here and don't go there and work only in some specific areas."*[97]

This "game of cat and mouse"[98], as Shehdeh, security consultant to the Palestinian police, calls it, severely undermines the authority of the police officers. "They are running away from the Israeli soldiers and a little while later they [the Palestinian police] are supposed to arrest me? That doesn't work,"[99] says my friend Tareq.

9.2.4. Conclusions

How, then, can we summarise the ethnographic descriptions of the Hebron security fabrics? First, it is important to note that there are major differences between the A and B/C areas in and around the city. The near absence of Israeli forces in H1, the PA-controlled part of the city, has allowed for a provisional equilibrium between the various actors. Especially between the clans and informal law networks on the one hand and the Civil Police on the other, there has emerged a certain balance of power, where cooperation mostly prevails over competition.

However, as the graphical representation of the A-area security fabric shows, the other PSF, mainly the Preventive Security and General Intelligence, have a considerable influence on security although they are not part of the balance. Even though their presence is, obviously, much less visible than that of the uniformed police officers, their influence is palpable. In particular people who are affiliated with political factions other than Fatah constantly fear being arrested and even Fatah members themselves admit that the political arrests are a shame and detrimental to Palestinian unity and therefore security.

That the IDF regularly operate within the boundaries of H1 undermines the legitimacy of all the PSF. Their influence is less tangible but since they set the boundaries of the area where the PSF are allowed to operate and require the absence

[97] Commander Nablus Governorate Police Department, interview, Nablus, 27 April 2010.

[98] Shehdeh, interview, Hebron, 15 June 2009

[99] Tareq Al-Tamimi, interview, Hebron, 15 June 2009

of the PSF even in those A-areas when an Israeli operation is underway, trust in the ability and capacity of Palestinian security personnel is drastically undercut.

The fact that the PSF are only occasionally allowed to work in certain B and C areas, and in some not at all, logically undermines their effectiveness. This is however not solely due to the merely logistic limitations but part of this ineffectiveness is related to the lack of legitimacy that is also present in A-areas and is based on the perception of inadequacy.

The security communities, on the other hand, which derive their legitimacy from long-held traditions, have a considerable influence on the security fabric in the B and C areas. As expected, there exists a causal relationship between the influence of clans and the strength of the state's security apparatus. Indeed, as several clan elders suggested, in absence of a central security apparatus, the clans will jump in to provide alternative forms of security and try to maintain stability within society by, amongst other things, preserving social acquiescence and justice.

9.3. Case Study 2 - Nablus and refugee camp 'Askar

9.3.1. Introduction

With 140 thousand inhabitants, the city of Nablus is the second biggest city in the West Bank. The city is known for its fertile surroundings and, as such, is the main provider of agricultural produce in the West Bank. In addition, the city has numerous smaller factories, of which those producing soap and sweets are best known. Kunafeh – melted goat's cheese covered with an orange, sugary substance and syrup – is famous throughout the whole Arab world and has given Nablus its well-earned reputation of sweets capital of Palestine; everywhere in the West Bank, from Hebron to Jenin, you can find sweets shops called 'Nablus sweets'.

Nablus is situated in the vicinity of several sizeable settlements. The main checkpoint before you enter the city – called Huwwara – simultaneously is a major crossing of roads that are solely for settlers, connecting the various settlements directly to Tel Aviv and other major cities within Israel proper.

When driving north, from Ramallah to Nablus, many hilltops along the way are the location of either a full-blown settlement village or a smaller outpost – sometimes no more than a few scattered trailers. In fact, Mount Gerizim, one the two mountains that dominate the Nablusian landscape, is the home of a Samaritan community, which is continuously guarded by the IDF. Often, at night, searchlights from the army base on top of Mount Gerizim pierce the Nablusian darkness, moving eerily over the city. Often these spotlights were the harbinger of an Israeli military operation in the area, as several people from refugee camps 'Askar and Balata told me. Although the number of actual military operations has somewhat decreased over the last few years, the search lights continue to cause anxiety among the refugee communities.

The period of lawlessness that characterised the last years of the al-Aqsa intifada, dubbed al-Falatan, was severely felt in Nablus. With two sizeable refugee camps adjacent to the city, a highly politicised environment, an enormous amount of available firearms and other weapons, and the PA security forces in hiding, the situation completely derailed, with numerous gangs roaming the streets, daily fire fights and continuous clashes between groups of young, armed men.

When I visited the city in 2005, my friends in the city only allowed me to visit if I would be able to leave before sunset, since the nights were the scene of heavy fighting between militants and the Israeli army and between militant groups themselves. The consequences of this period – in the form of bullet holes and heavily

damaged buildings – can still be seen in the Old City. Though less visible, the psychological wounds also run deep; many Nablusians use al-Falatan as their point-of-reference when talking about security or the influence of the PSF.

A vegetable merchant at the main Old City market told me,

> *[i]t is much better now than, say, 5 years ago. You know, when there was Falatan? Sure, there's a lot of police everywhere and it's not like they can always be trusted but still…now we can go out and do groceries, even at night, without constantly being afraid of running into a gun fight. Or being robbed by some thug. No, I really prefer this situation.*[100]

9.3.2. Political Factions and non-statutory armed groups

In popular perceptions, political factions are, understandably, often considered to be encapsulated in the framework of state institutions and, thus, human security from above. In many instances this may indeed be a valid argument but since the act of governing is but one of the many functions of political parties they must also be analysed beyond their evident role in government and parliament.

Since I will discuss the societal role of security communities that revolve around political affiliation, I will consider these factions' armed factions, which operate outside of the official framework of PA institutions[101], to be non-statutory actors and, thus, human security from below.

The political landscape of the Palestinian Territories is an almost incomprehensible collection of different factions, offshoots and sub-factions, with different perspectives on how society should be organised but clustered around a single, unifying goal: ending the occupation.

This politicisation, and more specifically the emergence of so many different factions, revolves around resistance and is a direct result of three major developments; the influx of Jewish newcomers, prior to the 1948 war, the war itself and its aftermath, and the occupation that followed the 1967 war. Except Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, all factions are members of the PLO.

[100] Iyad (pseudonym), personal communication, Nablus, 22 March, 2010.

[101] Even though the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades are officially disbanded – i.e. incorporated in the PSF or not active anymore – I will also discuss them.

In general, three ideological strands can be distinguished, of which only the first two are represented in the PLO. These ideologies are: *Socialist* – Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian People's Party, Palestinian Democratic Union; *secular (social-democratic)* – Fatah, the Third Way; and *Islamist* – Hamas, Islamic Jihad.

"Everything is politics. We eat and drink and politics," says Saed, a psychologist who was born in a small village adjacent to Qalqilya but has been living in Nablus for years and is working for the World Bank. Mahmoud, born and raised in Nablus, adds, "You know, when I was a student I applied for a job at the newly opened casino in Jericho. But most of the people there were from Fatah. So when they found out I was from the PFLP, I didn't get the job. And later on, I applied at the bakery of the restaurant, I was turned down again. Everything is politics around here."

"When I was young, I wanted to know everything. It was crazy! I was watching the news, listening to the radio and reading a newspaper at the same time,"[102] The interest in politics already starts at a young age. Prominent Fatah member Dr. Abu Zaida says that even when you ask young children, "to what party do you belong? They will tell you: 'I support Hamas' or 'I support Fatah.' Four, five years old!"[103] Indeed, from early on, children are constantly confronted with news and politics. Abu Zaida continues,

> *it's because of the families. They are listening and watching the news five, six hours a day. (...) Take for instance my kids. I have four, two boys, two girls. When they are getting up in the morning. The first thing that they hear or see, is their dad listening or watching the news. In Hebrew, English, in Arabic. And if anybody comes to our house, friends or neighbours, we are always talking about politics. So they grow up listening to, and becoming involved in the whole situation*.[104]

It is thus obvious that the choice for a specific political faction is strongly influenced by the prevailing political ideas of the family. However, the political fragmentation of Palestinian society runs deep, with fierce competition between the various security communities, which also intersect families. "You see divisions on the level of clans, of

[102] Ibrahim Abu Al-Hawa, personal communication, Jerusalem, 11 February 2009.

[103] Dr. Sufian Abu Zaida, interview, Ramallah, 1 February 2009.

[104] Dr. Sufian Abu Zaida, interview, Ramallah, 1 February 2009.

families, sometimes even between husband and wife."[105] Such rifts are mostly due to the fact that, in Palestinian society, politics have come to encompass much more than just the factions' ideologies. "[R]ather, it assumes a deeply personal, almost primordial dimension that moulds individual philosophy and shapes individual action in a profoundly intimate way." (Roy 1995:21)

Despite this deeper philosophical dimension and the pressures of family members, the initial choice for one faction or the other is often based on rather pragmatic considerations. One's vision on society and issues regarding social justice play an important role but for many the opportunity of direct action against the occupation proved pivotal. When looking at the Palestinian nationalist movements that emerged during the twentieth century, one can indeed see that their political convictions reflect this twofold character. Their programmes evolved mainly around two elements: "first, resistance to occupation (first British, then Israeli), pure and simple; and second, as manifestations of ideologies dominant in the Middle East region at the time." (Hroub 2000:6)

This last element is clearly demonstrated by the popularity of socialism in the 1960s and '70s and the subsequent rise of leftist factions like Fatah, PFLP, DFLP and the Communist Party, while the regional surge in Islamism from the late 1970s onwards, can explain the rise of movements like Islamic Jihad and, later on, Hamas, which started as a local offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.

As said before, however, despite the influence of regional trends, the struggle against the Israeli occupation, and specifically the strategy to be adopted, remained the decisive factor in deciding which party to support. As Fatah prominent Abu Zaida relates, "during the 1970s there weren't a lot of political activities (...) it was only armed struggle. So I became a member of Fatah to fight the occupation."[106]

Another Fatah member phrased it like this, "I am a Muslim, yes, and I respected the work and the beliefs of the Muslim Brotherhood. But when I was young, I wanted to really fight against the occupiers. The most active party was Fatah, that was clear. They were really doing something (...) So my choice was made. Now I'm older and reasonable and much more pragmatic. Actually, you could say that I changed my tactics together with Fatah." [107]

Despite the ubiquity of politics, the younger generations, mostly those under thirty, are less involved in political factions. Mostly due to the lack of success in reaching their main goal – ending the occupation, which is the very reason for the

[105] Anonymous Fatah member, personal communication, Jerusalem, 13 January 2009.

[106] Dr. Sufian Abu Zaida, interview, Ramallah, 1 February 2009.

[107] Anonymous Fatah member, personal communication, Jerusalem, 4 February 2009.

establishment of most political factions, as can be deduced from their names – the existing political movements and parties have lost considerable appeal and, as such, have lost significance as security communities. Another major contributing factor to this apparent decreased popularity of political factions is their strict hierarchy, based on seniority, that is firmly kept in place by their respective establishments.

In Hebron I spoke to Munir, a young man in his early twenties, who was just released from an Israeli prison the day before, after being held in administrative detention for more than a year. It was suspected that his father's involvement with Hamas was the primary reason for Munir's arrest. When I asked him whether he was also involved with Hamas or any other political faction he replied,

> *[w]e, as young guys, what can we do? It's not like they ever listen to us. The older guys, you know, even when they're in prison, like my dad, they have more power than we have. They decide. Someday we can take over and maybe things will change then but as long as these fathers and grandfathers are running stuff, we don't stand a chance.*[108]

Yasir, who just turned thirty, remembered attending a locally organised Fatah conference where he wanted to join a discussion about traffic safety:

> *It was stupid, shameful even. I put up my hand for a long time and finally, after all of the older leaders got to make their point, I was given the opportunity to say something. But not even one minute after I started they just cut me off and went on with their own business. It's probably because I also criticised their inaction. They didn't want to hear anything I had to say. And the problem is, they are in the position to ignore me. If they don't want to listen, then they just don't.*[109]

This 'culture of (dis)respect' is not confined to the political arena but runs through society in general. When I attended classes at universities, for example, I noticed how most professors or lecturers did not allow for any critical question to be asked. Nor did

[108] Munir, personal communication, Hebron, 2 July 2009.

[109] Yasir (former Fatah member), personal communication, Nablus, 3 March 2010.

they foster any discussion; the professors talked and the students listened or took notes.

Despite the declining interest in political factions, however, in the context of occupation, many things, which at first sight seem quite mundane, become political. I remember being told once that even the very act of having children is an act of resistance since it shows the occupier that the Palestinians are still alive and cannot be removed from the face of the earth. Although this is an extreme example, it shows that it is sometimes difficult to discern between the actual role of politics, and political factions, and the politicised nature of daily life. A comment from Amjad, community worker from refugee camp 'Askar, illustrates that many activities take place in the context of a political party, even though the activity itself does not concern politics. When I asked him whether political factions play a role in providing security, in this case specifically in solving conflicts between people or families from the camp, he responded positively but later added,

> *I'm not really speaking of "political politics". We have problems, sometimes. But I mean that when there's problems between two families or two people, the political parties can sometimes solve it. Not with politics but with what we call a sulha [reconciliation] committee.*[110]

There is a striking similarity between what Amjad considers to be a political process and what people in Hebron described as mostly clan business. It is highly likely that this parallel illustrates the hierarchical organisation of Palestinian society. Respected elders, whether they operate within a political or clan context, play a vital role in maintaining stability within and between their communities by mediating in conflicts and suppressing deviant behaviour that challenges social order; the earlier described example of the house demolition in at-Tur is a vivid example of this.

As argued above, the politically oriented security communities were a vital vehicle for resisting the occupation, especially the armed militant groups that were affiliated with the factions. The military capabilities of the political factions were not only utilised against the occupying forces, however. Also within Palestinian society, the non-statutory armed groups proved to be influential. Simultaneously they were a source of security as well as a major threat to it.

[110] Amjad Rfaie, interview, Nablus, 17 April 2010.

During the height of the al-Aqsa intifada, when the Israeli army re-occupied most of the West Bank, the traditional hierarchical structures were destabilised and turned out to be unable to keep young men in check. With an abundance of weapons available, small groups of armed militants continuously fought with each other and even minor arguments could turn into violent clashes. The affiliations of these groups were not confined to political factions but also took place in the context of clans.

When groups undertook organised, armed actions against Israel, however, this was almost without exception, taking place in the context of political factions. Below I will elaborate on the most important political factions and the militant groups that are affiliated with them, after which I will discuss their influence on the security fabric.

9.3.2.1 Fatah

Although there is no consensus about the precise date, the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine, (Harakat at-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini) known under the acronym Fatah, was most probably founded somewhere in the late 1950s in Kuwait. Its leader, Yasser Arafat, later on went to become the head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation – the umbrella organisation of Palestinian resistance movements and factions – and, as such, became the most prominent and well-known figurehead of the Palestinians. Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize (1994), as well as being branded a terrorist, Arafat and his legacy remain of vital importance until today.

The fact that Fatah was founded in Kuwait by Palestinian refugees is of special significance, since the movement's leaders have for a long time been recruited amongst refugees from both the 1948 and 1967 wars. This still rings true today, since, in contrast to the younger leaders from the refugee camps and cities in the West Bank, who are now in their forties and took the lead in the first intifada, most of Fatah's elite resided as well as studied abroad, only to have come back in the Palestinian Territories after 1993. Prime examples are President Mahmoud Abbas, former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, Minister Ahmed Qurei' and, of course, Yasser Arafat himself.

It is for this reason that the widespread dissatisfaction over the Palestinian leaders and their ostensive inability to end the Israeli occupation, is also within Fatah itself, in the sense that a clear generational division runs through the party's ranks.[111] Although the differing opinions do not fully mirror this generational rift, it appears that the younger generation at the very least wishes to alter the policies dealing with

[111] Based on several conversations with Fatah members who are considered to be the party's 'young, next-generation leaders'.

Israeli-Palestinian relations, and asks for much more decisive action concerning the current internal, political stalemate.

Important elements in Fatah's strategy vis-à-vis the occupation are direct negotiations and an on-going dialogue with Israel. In December 1988, Yasser Arafat publicly renounced terrorism against Israel, earning recognition as well as criticism from both the international community as well as the Palestinians themselves. It was an important step towards the negotiations leading to the Oslo accords but, in effect, PLO sponsored violence against Israel has continued ever since, most notably by the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the Tanzim, both affiliated with Fatah.

Contrary to Hamas, Fatah cannot build on an extensive network of charitable societies and other social grassroots organisations and, as such, is less rooted within Palestinian society. Its popularity, throughout the Palestinian Territories but especially in the West Bank, can however be attributed to two major factors. The first is that Fatah is widely considered to be the first and foremost amongst resistance movements against the Israeli occupation. As a Fatah member from refugee camp 'Askar put it,

> *I won't forget that Fatah fired the first bullet at the Israelis. Fatah founded the Palestinian revolution. Fatah and Abu Ammar [Yasser Arafat's* nom de guerre*] put Palestine on the map of the international community. This is Fatah. I never forget that the people from Fatah cleaned the streets in the 1980s [during the intifada] and after. All of this makes me believe in Fatah.*[112]

The second explanation deals with the political philosophy of Fatah. The two most prominent political traditions in Palestine, and throughout the Arab world for that matter, are Islamism and Socialism. Since Palestinian society, according to most commentators, is not considered to be as religious as the surrounding Arab countries, it is therefore that basically every secular political faction in the Palestinian political landscape can be characterised as left-wing, Fatah being most prominent among them. "Hamas doesn't account for 70% of the society. They took 70% in the parliament. But they are not this popular. Never. When you separate religion from politics, I mean, we are a Labour society. We are not an Islamic country. People will not all vote for Hamas, never,"[113] said one Fatah member.

[112] Anonymous Fatah member, personal communication, Nablus, 17 April 2010.

[113] Anonymous Fatah member, personal communication, Nablus, 17 April 2010.

That Fatah, quite to the surprise of many, lost the 2006 elections to Hamas, can partly be explained by the rigid ideological image of Hamas and their relentless struggle against Israel but most people agree on the fact that a vote for Hamas often also implied a punishment of Fatah. Other parties attracted votes due to the mistrust in Fatah, as well. Amer, a young physician from a newer suburb of Nablus, told me, "I was a member of PFLP and this time [2006] I voted for the Communists. But actually I'm a Fatah person. In fact we are all Fatah, since they basically represent everything we as Palestinians stand for. They embody Palestine. But people punished them. For being corrupt, for being old, for not listening to the people anymore."[114]

That Fatah has seemingly proved to be unable to end the occupation is part of this story but the blatant corruption of the party's elite is the most likely explanation for the widespread discontentment. Mistrust in the political establishment is rampant throughout the Palestinian Territories, and, to rephrase the words of Amer, being the "embodiment of Palestinian politics", Fatah took the brunt of this. The image of politicians being self-enriching opportunists is quite pervasive. Amer, again, explains:

> *You know, people working in the government, ministers, PLC members, they should be working for the people. But here, they're working mostly for themselves. Did you know that if you've worked as a minister, you keep that salary for the rest of your life? That's about 10 thousand shekels each month. I mean, just work as a minister for a couple of months and you're settled. You have a house, your car, you can study something, you're fine. That's why ministers so often change.*[115]

A friend of Amer, university teacher Bashir, adds,

> *[t]axes are crazy. You know, there's about 600 percent taxes on a pack of cigarettes. If you want to buy a car here, it's twice the price of a car in Jerusalem. I don't understand it. Before the PA, Israel asked 145 shekel for entrance to Jordan. Then the PA came, and they just took over this procedure. They asked exactly the same price. Why? (...) It's the biggest problem here. We have a low income but*

[114] Amer, personal communication, Nablus, 4 April 2010.

[115] Amer, personal communication, Nablus, 4 April 2010.

very high prices. And I think people will one day react against it. You know, like a revolution.[116]

After the hostilities in Gaza and Hamas´ subsequent takeover of the territory, Fatah quickly reacted by securing their grip over the PA and the West Bank by mass arrests of Hamas affiliated militants and politicians, and purging Hamas personnel from government institutions.

The international community readily supported Fatah´s hold over the West Bank, since they were seen as the more pragmatic party in the Palestinian political arena, with whom they could do business. As a consequence of this widely supported one-party rule, the security forces were flooded by large numbers of Fatah members, among them many former militants of the Fatah-affiliated al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.

9.3.2.2. al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades

Many consider Fatah to be the reasonable 'partner for peace', especially in contrast with ideologically strict Hamas, but it was the military wing of Fatah – the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades – which took a leading role in the violence against Israel during the second intifada.

Being founded by Fatah members in a refugee camp adjacent to Nablus, the Brigades were most active in the northern West Bank. In contrast to the Islamic ideology most of the other militant groups adhere to, the Brigades' ideology revolves around Palestinian nationalism, in line with Fatah. That is not to say, however, that they do not occasionally utilise religious symbolism (Najib and Friedrich 2007).

Despite being loyal to Fatah, the Brigades operated in relative independence from the political establishment, as a loose network of autonomous cells. At the height of the second intifada, from 2002 onwards, these cells were heavily targeted by the IDF, which led them to go into hiding and since Fatah was not willing to substantially and regularly support them, they were forced to find other ways to support themselves, amongst which were various criminal activities.

In their search for power and funding, the militant cells regularly clashed with each other, which caused an increased loss of support amongst the general population, their image shifting from resistance fighters to mere criminals. Especially in a city like Nablus, the armed gangs were in constant competition with each other, not

[116] Bashir, personal communication, Nablus, 4 April 2010.

only between the cells of one faction themselves but also between offshoots of the different militant factions, amongst which Hamas.

In the wake of the second intifada, the PA, with international backing, had to deal with the militants-turned-criminals, in order to improve internal security and restore the monopoly on the use of force. After a comprehensive DDR-program (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation), a considerable part of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were added to the file and rank of the Palestinian security services, particularly to the Civil Police.

Many former militants do not consider their enrolment in the PSF to be a major change. As Aziz, an employee of the Preventive Security who used to be a fighter in the Brigades, put it,

> *We are basically doing the same thing: protecting the Palestinian people.*
> Martijn: *'Yeah but there is a difference, because now it seems as if your main enemy is Hamas. I mean, you can't do anything against the Israelis, like protecting villages against settlers or something like that.*
> Aziz: *Yes, that's true. But we need a strong state. We are much more united now, you see? If we are one people, we are much stronger. And if we are strong, Israel has to really deal with us. It's a different strategy but we still want the same: a strong Palestine without occupation. But we see now that shooting rockets at the Israelis does not benefit our cause. We are not yet strong enough. At least, at the moment. But in the future, who knows?*[117]

The following section will deal more specifically with what many amongst the PSF consider to be the biggest threat to Palestinian security: Hamas. Subsequently I will discuss Hamas' main armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

[117] Aziz (pseudonym), personal communication, refugee camp 'Askar, 3 April, 2010.

9.3.2.3. Hamas

After years of being involved in grassroots social and educational activities, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to become more involved in direct action against the occupation. While the nationalist movements belonging to the PLO, of which Fatah was the most prominent, relied on guerrilla resistance, the Muslim Brotherhood had a different approach to mobilising the Palestinian masses, which was to gradually shape a new generation ready to struggle. The Brotherhood's religious and social thought indeed emphasized the priority of social development as a necessary stage in the path of political change (Hroub 2000). "The credo of the [Brotherhood] was that the sickness of Palestinian society was such that it needed to be cured before it was fit to resist, and that there was no better medicine than a return to Islam." (Tamimi 2007: 35-36)

However, the Brotherhood's Palestinian leaders increasingly became aware of the need for direct resistance. In other words, they sought to reap the benefits from the time and work they invested in order to prepare their envisioned new generation of youngsters inspired by Islam. A second reason for the projected mobilisation of the Brotherhood's followers was that the resistance activities and rising popularity of Islamic Jihad, led by former Brother Fathi Shikaki, seemed to become a dangerous form of competition (Tamimi 2007: 43-44).

The mounting tensions in the Occupied Territories in late 1987 provided the Brotherhood with the opportunity to establish a new organisation, aptly called the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. The idea to create a new organisation, separate from the Brotherhood, came from Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who later on became the well-known spiritual leader of the movement (Ahmad 1994:19). On the 9th of December, what later on became known as the day the intifada started, the first communique of Hamas was written by Yassin himself, Abdul Aziz Al-Rantisi, Salah Shehadeh, Muhammad Sham'ah, Isa al-Nashshar, Abdel Fattah Dukhan and Ibrahim al-Yazuri – who thus became the founders of Hamas (Hroub 2000:39, Tamimi 2007: 10). The new organisation quickly became an actor of major importance throughout the territories, most notably in Gaza, where it was founded, and with its deeply rooted presence in Palestinian society, Hamas would continue to expand its influence in the years to come. It was also from that moment onwards, that Israel started to see Hamas as a veritable security threat, in contrast to the previous period in which Hamas' charitable work was rather considered to be a more or less safe alternative to Fatah's more hard-line resistance tactics.

Although over the years the behaviour of Hamas has increasingly become more pragmatic, parallel to their gaining experience in the political arena, for a long time their conduct leaned heavily on principles and morality. Despite their opposition

to the Oslo agreements and enduring conflict with the PLO, Hamas for a long time considered the PA and its developing security apparatus as Palestinian brothers instead of competitors in rule over Gaza (Hroub 2000: 55-56).

Indeed, for a long time, Hamas maintained that it would not forcefully struggle the PA. In a November 1997 issue of London based newspaper *Filastin Al-Muslima,* Hamas' spiritual leader Sheikh Yassin is quoted, saying "We never shall clash with the authority, even if they torture us, even if they shut down our institutions, arrest us, even if they kill us. I uphold the principle embodied in the word of God, 'If you reach your hand out to kill me, I shall not reach out my hand to kill you, for I fear God, the Lord of the universe.'" (Quoted in Hroub 2000: 67)

In the wake of the won elections in 2006, and even more so after the failure of the unity government in 2007, Hamas showed they had learned from their previous tendency to let idealistic considerations prevail, however. They adopted a strategy in which they attacked Fatah and the PA's security apparatus heads-on, both politically as well as with military might.

After being victorious in the 2006 general elections Hamas very quickly traded places with Fatah, in the sense that they accepted their new role of being the leading political faction in the Occupied Territories with an unprecedented eagerness and robustness. When the national unity government failed in June 2007, Hamas fiercely cracked down on any form of opposition in Gaza. As one Palestinian scholar notes, while Hamas was claiming to restore law and order in Gaza, in reality its conduct was mostly characterised by a pursuit of order rather than law.[118]

Due to the absence of one clear political leader – most notably since the killing of founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin – Hamas has a considerably inclusive decision making process. When Yassin was still alive and considered to be the movement's spiritual leader, he himself has uttered in several statements that Hamas would adhere to the will of the majority of the population. The respect for democratic values has been underlined in many other interviews with, and statements by Hamas leaders. It must be noted that the current situation in Gaza is most certainly not in accordance with these democratic principles.

From the onset Hamas aimed for the creation of an Islamic state in Palestine – whether this was the historical interpretation of a Palestine between the Mediterranean and the river Jordan, or the more pragmatic solution of an interim state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank – but if the majority of the Palestinian people would vote against the Islamic character, Hamas would respect their opinion. Indeed,

[118] Dr. Shikaki, personal communication, Ramallah, 18 January 2009.

according to, for example, Dr. Aziz Dweik, a prominent Hamas politician in the West Bank, Hamas has often called for referendums and claims the movement respects the general will of the people.[119]

Despite this seemingly consultative decision making process among the movement's leadership, there remain clear tensions between the leaders who work from the Occupied Territories and those residing abroad, most notably in Damascus. In contrast to many other factions and, the PLO for a long time, Hamas' foreign leadership did however not impose its opinions but the leaders on the ground were very much involved. The division between both leaderships gains prominence most notably when the movement is under pressure. This was for instance clearly visible during the early 2009 Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip, when Hamas leaders in Gaza, confronted with heavy losses and the severe scale of destruction, were willing to negotiate a ceasefire early on, while Damascus based leader Khaled Mesha'al remained an aggressive stance until the very end, vowing that Hamas would continue to fight the Israeli presence. In these instances it indeed proved that the more pragmatic attitude was represented by the leaders in the Territories and the more ideologically motivated stance by the Politburo leaders abroad.

Despite the incredibly fierce attack on Hamas that Israel undertook in December 2008 and January 2009, it was already clear from the start that Hamas would perhaps be weakened, but not defeated, since it is deeply rooted in Palestinian society.

By violently taking over in Gaza, Hamas seems to have overstretched its hand, however. Recent polls show that its popularity is dwindling, mostly due to the harsh enforcement of Islamic laws by Hamas' ubiquitous security forces. As Ali Abu Shahla, an entrepreneur from Gaza, said, "They consider themselves a government. But nobody is recognising them, except their supporters. Me, as a Palestinian, I know that it is the responsibility of our President, according to our Basic Law, which is equal to a constitution...when the president deposed the government, there was no government anymore. But they still consider themselves a government."[120]

In addition, after rising to power, Hamas is showing the same paternalistic tendencies of which Fatah is so often accused. Ali Abu Shahla, again: "And even through the days of the war, Hamas began to confiscate some humanitarian aid. You heard what's happened with UNRWA. This aid, they got it and they gave it to their supporters, activists and supporters of Hamas. They didn't give it to others." [121]

[119] Dr. Aziz Dweik, interview, Hebron, 11 July 2009.

[120] Ali Abu Shahla, interview, Jerusalem, 17 February 2009.

[121] Ali Abu Shahla, interview, Jerusalem, 17 February 2009.

The idea that Hamas has lost part of its credibility and respectable image after the conflict with Fatah intensified is also widespread throughout the West Bank and not only amongst Fatah supporters. An anonymous employee of a large international NGO and former PFLP member recounts, "Well [speaking very softly], you know, I'm not religious. I don't pray, I don't fast. But you know, I think that Hamas is a little bit better than the rest. It's their religion that influences their social attitude, their behaviour. But their problem is that they are only supporting Hamas people. They only work for their own people. And that's wrong."[122]

In the West Bank, Hamas is considerably less rooted. Most affiliates, whether regular low-ranking members or prominent politicians, tend to keep a low profile following the PA's crackdown on the movement. Although there are still Hamas militants living in the West Bank, there are currently no active cells, according to *mukhabarat* personnel. In contrast to their omnipresence in Gaza, the military might of Hamas' forces in the West Bank has thus basically ceased to exist. These military capabilities had started to develop in earnest after the formation of Hamas' armed wing, with which the following section will deal.

9.3.2.4. Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

The military brigades of Hamas were formed in 1991, four years after the founding of Hamas itself, in December 1987, during the early days of the first Intifada. Like the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the Qassam Brigades were not established by the political establishment but were the result of a bottom-up process in which young activists decided to take up their weapons and form militant cells.

The main ideology of the Qassam Brigades mirrors that of Hamas, focussing on Islamic traditions. As Najib and Friedrich (2007), however, also argue, nationalist aspirations constitute an equally important part of the Brigades' struggle.

Following the short civil war in Gaza and Hamas' subsequent takeover of that territory, every person or organisation affiliated with the Islamist faction was considered to be a threat to national (PA) security. As such, the Qassam Brigades were the most prominent target in a decisive campaign against Hamas and were severely persecuted by the PA's security forces.

[122] Anonymous employee of a large international NGO and former PFLP member, personal communication, Nablus, 13 February 2010.

In several interviews[123] with security personnel from the General Intelligence and Preventive Security, Hamas, and more specifically its militant cells, were considered to be the biggest threat to Palestinian security. That they are considered more dangerous than the Israeli occupation is rather revealing. Indeed, on several occasions the PSF have carried out security operations with the help of Israeli intelligence on the location and identity of Hamas affiliated militants.[124]

Currently, there are most probably no longer any Qassam Brigades cells active in the West Bank. According to Preventive Security officers there are surely still militants present in the region but they are not active for the moment, since the risk of persecution has become too high.

The harsh treatment of Hamas affiliated people has been criticised extensively by both Palestinian and foreign human rights organisations. Stories about disproportionate violence during security operations, torture in prisons, and extra-judicial killings are common. The standpoint of PA officials towards these stories is ambiguous. Most officials do acknowledge that several of these stories and reports are true but they are hesitant in condemning them and usually refer to the Hamas take-over of Gaza as a way of emphasising the need for decisive action.[125]

Although I have tried extensively, I have not been able to speak to Hamas militants. Several Hamas politicians I talked to confirmed their knowledge of the whereabouts of former Brigades members but refused to bring me in contact with them, fearing for their own position as well as the well-being of the former militants.

9.3.3. Non-statutory armed groups and the PSF

The relationship between the PSF and the non-statutory armed groups cannot be described by a single explanation. Instead, the DDR-process that was part of the security sector reform programme, can be split and categorised in three different strategies towards dealing with these groups; re-integration, disarmament and demobilisation, and persecution.

[123] Based on several (unrecorded) interviews and conversations with Mukhabarat employees, in Nablus, Hebron, Qalqilya and Ramallah, and on interviews with Preventive Security employees in Nablus, 'Askar and Hebron.

[124] Anonymous employee of Mukhabarat, interview, Hebron, July 2009.

[125] Anonymous employee of Mukhabarat, interview, Qalqilya, April 2010.

- Re-integration;

In 2007, a deal between Israel and PA was announced, in which it was agreed upon that a considerable part of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades militants were given amnesty if they handed in their weapons. Israel no longer sought to arrest and prosecute these militants and the PA left them alone after they signed a contract in which they promised to withhold from actions against Israel. In addition, the PA provided many of them with positions within the PSF.

As a young man from the refugee camp 'Askar, adjacent to Nablus, said, "It's the same guys who walk around the streets with their guns, showing off their power. The only difference is the two stripes on their shoulders."[126] And in a similar vein, a friend from Qalqilya remarked to me that nothing had changed, really, because a criminal wearing a uniform is still a criminal. When I asked Palestinian human rights activist Bassem Eid about the DDR-process, he replied,

> *All of these al-Aqsa Brigades people were wanted by the Israelis, but they were going to join the [Palestinian] security services. And Israel agreed on that. Now, how are these people going to be kept in order? I'm not sure, because I consider these people to be thugs. They are thugs, gangsters.*[127]

- Disarmament and demobilisation;

In order to neutralise the non-statutory armed groups and reclaim the monopoly on the use of force, the PA initiated a pervasive disarmament programme; an approach that has been used in various other conflicts, with varying success.

In general, the main argument for disarming, demobilising and reintegrating non-statutory combatants is to provide them with an alternative for their 'occupation' during the war, ensuring that they will not return to banditry or mobilise their own armed group, thereby posing a new security threat (Last 1999).

In the Palestinian case, people were asked to hand in their weapons, often in turn for rehabilitation, and in addition many weapons were confiscated during raids and routine checks. As a result, the number of available weapons within society, as well as the number of people who are trained and willing to use them, has decreased considerably.

[126] Sab, personal communication, 'Askar, 22 March, 2010.

[127] Bassem Eid, interview, Jerusalem, 9 July 2009.

- Persecution;

In the context of the power struggle between Fatah and Hamas, however, the DDR-programme seemed to serve other, more politically oriented goals, which can be directly linked to the phenomenon of fragmented sovereignty. In fact, the whole approach to dealing with the non-statutory armed groups can be considered part of a political manoeuvre on the part of Fatah, to consolidate its hold over the West Bank, rather than it being part of the overall security sector reform process (ICG 2010: 6). It was a deliberate attempt by Fatah to monopolise the national identity, while basically placing those affiliated to Hamas outside of society.

Besides purging Hamas members from practically all PA institutions, the Hamas affiliated military cells were violently dismantled and their members were arrested in massive numbers, rather than them being reintegrated.

By cracking down on Hamas, the PA was evidently working in cooperation with, and under the auspices of, Israel. However, with respect to non-political crime, Israel is much less willing to cooperate, as the following example will illustrate.

9.3.4. Israeli enforced boundaries

An illustrative event occurred when I was at the police headquarters in Nablus to interview the commander[128]. After waiting for about fifteen minutes, being told that the commander was very busy with an emergency case, I was called up to conduct the interview under the provision that if something urgent happened, the appointment would have to be rescheduled.

When I entered the office, the commander was seated behind an enormous wooden desk, holding two phones, each to one ear, talking very fast into both. He pulled up an eyebrow to acknowledge my presence and then continued shouting commands in order to solve what apparently was the crisis at hand. After witnessing this scene for about two minutes, the commander put down both phones, sighed deeply, and addressing no one in particular, asked, “Why can’t we just do our work?” Before someone could answer the question, the commander started explaining the reason behind his frustration.

Apparently, a man was murdered in the city and despite a quick reaction of the police forces, the suspect was able to flee the scene and go into hiding in a nearby B area, just outside the city. Since the police were officially not allowed to enter the area where the suspect was hiding, the officer in charge requested permission at the local District Coordination Office to start a brief operation and organise the arrest.

[128] The interview took place on 27 April 2010.

The officer was told to wait for permission and, reluctantly did so. However, despite several follow-ups, the permission to enter the B areas was only given after approximately twenty-four hours. It then turned out that the suspect had fled again and was now hiding in close proximity to an Israeli settlement. When the officer, again, filed a request to start the arrest operation, he was told that permission would not be granted this time, since it was too close to the settlement and would thus be a security risk to the settlers.

The odd situation thus occurred that the police tracked down a suspected killer, knew exactly where he was hiding but was not allowed to make an arrest, since the presence of armed Palestinians in the vicinity of an Israeli settlement would be a potential security risk.

As it turned out, the Police Commander was talking to the DCO on one phone and the officer on site on the other, trying to mediate and arrange for solution. Apparently, as his flushed face and agitated facial expressions underscored, to no avail.

9.3.5. Conclusions

The most important aspects of the ethnographic analysis of the security fabric in and around Nablus are the following. Similar to the situation in Hebron, the differences between the A and B/C areas in and around the city are considerable.

After the chaotic and violent period of al-falatan, in which non-statutory actors caused major insecurity, order and stability have more or less returned to the Nablusian streets. The militant factions that were part of the various security communities have either laid down their weapons, been arrested or joined the ranks of Palestinian security personnel. Also in Nablus a provisional equilibrium between the various actors has emerged. However, due to the co-optation of mainly al-Aqsa militants, the security forces have to deal with more feelings of distrust than their counterparts in the Hebron region.

IDF operations within the city's limits are more frequent than in Hebron but, at the same time, more predictable, since they usually take place at night. This predictability, however, does have the downside that those people who wish to make use of the temporary, nightly absence of PSF, can commit crimes with relative impunity, since the chances of being caught are slim.

As in most Arab societies, clan traditions continue to be of importance but the clans' role as security community is noticeably less than in Hebron. This is mostly due to the rootedness of Hebronite families, in contrast with the many, relative newcomers in Nablus, which has seen an enormous influx of refugee from nearby Tel Aviv and Haifa.

Especially in refugee camps, clan traditions have come to play an even less important role, due to the uprooting of families in the wake of the 1948 and 1967 wars and an enforced egalitarianism, exacerbated by UNRWA aid, that caused clan elders to lose the status that was coupled to their wealth.

Other non-statutory actors, in particular political factions, gained importance, especially since their popularity is directly linked to their struggle against the occupation. Although they also cause insecurity, due to their mutual and often violent competition, they are the most visible protectors of the Palestinian people, especially in absence of a national army.

Since "everything is politics", the various factions play an import role in maintaining order and stability, quite like the clan system in Hebron works to create a certain equilibrium. Due to the unequal treatment of the different factions, tensions remain, although they no longer lead to unpredictable outbursts of violence, due to the disarmament of most militant cells, and re-integrations of others.

Part 4 – Conclusions

10. Research question revisited

"Everyone's got their own split factions
Every pawn will pay its price
I've been digging out in all directions
I'll see you through to the afterlife

What is your weapon of choice,
What's your weapon of choice?
There is no weapon to free us all
What is your weapon of choice,
What's your weapon of choice?
There is no weapon to free us all

I won't waste it, I won't waste it,
I won't waste my love on a nation
I won't waste it, I won't waste it,
I won't waste my love on a nation"

- Black Rebel Motorcycle Club[129]

In the introduction of this study I explained my intention to analyse the development of the Palestinian Authority in the broadly accepted framework of the two-state solution. Although this development of an ostensibly autonomous Palestinian state should be applauded, since it appears to be the effectuation of Palestinian self-determination, I aimed to critically investigate how the on-going Israeli occupation influences this process, in particular the consequences on the human security of the Palestinians in the West Bank. How does the PA's rapidly developing security apparatus, under Israeli supervision, relate to more traditional structures that have been prevalent within, and typical of, Palestinian Arab society for so long, and the security communities that are part and parcel to them?

Under the leadership of prime-minister Salam Fayyad, who received his education at US universities, and assisted by the international community, the Palestinians are rapidly developing the institutions needed for their own independent state. Although Fayyad's work has received praise from international actors, the development of the Palestinian state is not an easy task. The question remains

[129] Excerpt from the song '*Weapon of Choice*', as performed by Black Rebel Motorcycle Club, written by Been, R.L. and P.B. Hayes. Los Angeles: Chrysalis Music Group, Warner/Chappell Music Inc.

whether building a viable and autonomous state in the context of a belligerent occupation is not a hazardous undertaking.

For me, one particular interview with a high-ranking officer from the *mukhabarat* clearly illustrates the ambiguities that characterise the current state-building process in the West Bank. A friend from Nablus took me to the city of Qalqilya, where his brother Amad lived and worked. Since Amad was paralysed from the waist down, after being seriously injured in a friendly-fire incident, he worked from a bed in his living room, with two phones at his side, gathering intelligence from his extensive network of informants.

Our conversation started with a lot of boasting about Amad's relations with foreign intelligence services, amongst whom the Germans, who actually offered to pay for a risky back operation in Germany but after this introduction he started talking about his actual work. Amongst the things he told me, there were two specific things that struck me as rather revealing.

When I asked him what he considered to be the biggest threat to Palestinian security, he unequivocally answered with one single word: "Hamas". When I subsequently asked him if he not considered this to be problematic, since Hamas represents at least one third of the Palestinians and in fact won the last parliamentary elections, he simply referred to Gaza. Suppressing Hamas thus was a main priority of the PSF, the *mukhabarat* in particular.

Later on we got to talk about Jewish settlers, living in the numerous settlements surrounding Qalqilya. When I asked whether there were a lot of incidents in which settlers attacked Palestinians, he replied positively. I continued by asking if the *mukhabarat* were able to do anything about it. At first, he raised his eyebrows in amazement, and then started laughing out loud, as if I had asked the most stupid question he had ever heard. "Of course not. Like we can arrest a settler."

"But shouldn't that be your first priority? Protect Palestinians from Israeli attacks?" I countered. "Sure, we'd love to protect our people from all that but the situation unfortunately is like this, right now. We must now focus on internal threats, get our own things straight, then we can focus on the occupation. For now, the Israelis even help us in our job, so things are getting better." Not wanting to spoil the conversation, I did not voice the first thought that came to my mind: "Do the Israelis actually help you do your job or is it rather the other way around?"

At the moment, many Palestinians do not consider the PA to be beneficial to their security. The lack of legitimacy the PA is suffering from has external as well as internal causes. Below I will summarise these causes, based on everything I have written above.

10.1. The Human Security debate

On the 4th of June, UN Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro gave a short introductory speech at the plenary meeting on *human security*, in New York. I could not have asked for a better introduction to present the argument for my specific interpretation of this concept, which is why I have inserted a lengthy quote from her introduction.

> *Today, we carry forward years of discussion on human security. But let us remember that human security is more than an abstract concept. For a hungry family, human security means dinner on the table. For a refugee, human security is shelter and a safe haven from the storms of conflict or disaster. For a woman caught in conflict, human security is protection from harm. For a child living in poverty, human security is the chance to go to school.*
>
> *This concept goes beyond threats to physical safety. People around the world suffer abiding fears and anxiety because they lack enough food, a place to live, a job, health care, education and the freedom to live in dignity.*
>
> *Human security calls for people-centred, holistic actions that help governments and communities to strengthen early warning about looming crises, identify the causes of insecurity and take steps to close policy gaps.*[130]

My first and obvious question to Ms. Migiro would be how she envisions holistic policies and actions that tackle educational, medical, gender, and poverty issues. I consider the formulation of such policies to be impossible and would argue that comprehensive measures do not exist. That is not to say that, for example, violence against women and education are not inter-related and cannot be combined in a single policy but how this exactly relates to, for example, emergency shelters remains unclear.

An exploration of the various UN-related websites further elucidates the ambiguities that surround this holistic interpretation of *human security*. Every single subject that is mentioned above can also be found under the headings of either *human*

[130] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/dsgsm620.doc.htm (Accessed 23 July 2012).

development or *human rights.* It leads me to rephrase a question I posed in my theoretical framework: what does *human security* have to offer when there are already broadly accepted and widely used concepts available? That Ms. Migiro later on in her speech refers to both the Millennium Development Goals and the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, makes this ambiguity all the more clear.

Human security has become a buzz word in its own right, and with this very vague and all-encompassing interpretation, Ms. Migiro does exactly the opposite of what she alleges in her speech: making it an abstract concept. The abstractness is further exacerbated by a statement of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. During a General Assembly debate on *human security* he said, "The concept of human security (...) underpins the work of the UN, which seeks to help war-torn societies rebuild; to prevent and respond to natural disasters; and to bolster health care and education."

Only when we try to define a more specific conceptualisation of *human security* can we begin to appreciate its added value. A closer look at the shared website of the UN departments dealing with security and conflict underlines my call for a rather narrow interpretation of *human security.* The introduction on the website of the Department of Political Affairs, dealing with peacemaking and preventive action activities, reads: "By taking action at an early stage, the United Nations and its partners can prevent disputes and crises from escalating into larger and costlier tragedies for nations, peoples, regions and the world."[131]

The focus on such collective entities like nations, peoples, and regions pointedly illustrates what I consider to be a serious lack. State-centric, collective ways of providing security are surely not always ineffective, in many countries they are the only means and quite successful, at that – but to improve their efficacy and legitimacy, and so their sustainability, such initiatives should always be in line with local actions.

Therefore I propose to interpret *human security as* freedom from individually experienced fear, specifically applied in the context of violent conflict, in which human-caused violence is the primary source of insecurity. This conception illustrates the pivotal merit of *human security*, namely as an individualist approach to understanding what security means and how it can best be improved. The main difference with prevailing interpretations of *human security* is that my approach acknowledges the agency of individuals and local communities in war-torn areas. Operations aimed at improving *human security* that are devised on a national or international level will not

[131] http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/ (Accessed 23 July 2012).

take place in a vacuum, since the local population is not waiting idly for foreign assistance. The key issue of how to effectively provide *human security* to people in need is therefore to harmonise *human security from above* and *from below*.

This specific take on *human security* has its consequences for my analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The individualist or bottom-up approach of looking at security issues asks for a different way of looking at what is taking place on the ground. Instead of solely looking how traditional security providers, be it the state or a coalition of UN-member states, can alleviate insecurity, one must also take into account what is already taking place; look at what people themselves are already doing to improve their own security.

Describing the *security fabric,* which entails an overview of the various actors involved in providing security, how they interact with each other, and their respective actions, affiliations and work areas, is a useful method to analyse the situation on the ground. I would argue that the *security fabric* contains vital information for assessing what kind of foreign assistance is needed, to whom it should be provided and, in fact, whether assistance is required at all. The interactions and the power relations between the various actors are particularly important to take into account and this may well imply that, as an outsider, you have to choose sides when trying to alleviate the insecurity of people in need.

Below I will therefore assess the Palestinian state-building project, within the framework of the two-state solution, by illustrating the local context in which this rather top-down process is taking place. I am well aware that it is a rather negative assessment, even though I fully support the two-state solution if the outcome will be two viable, autonomous and democratic states, living in peach with each other.

In the following chapter I will first recapitulate and discuss the internal, societal dynamics that shape the state-building process, and subsequently I will take into account the detrimental effects of the Israeli occupation on this process. My assessment is based on the previous analysis of the *security fabric* in the West Bank, as presented in the two case studies of Hebron and Nablus. In addition I will make some remarks about the geo-political context in which all of this is taking place and conclude by illustrating the broader implications of my conceptualisation of human security with two brief case studies – Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11. Conclusions

11.1. Internal dynamics

11.1.1. Lacking infrastructure

Despite the Palestinian as well as international efforts, the Palestinian Authority is still suffering from a lack of suitable infrastructure, both in physical and institutional terms.

The Civil Police has particularly benefited of international aid from the EU-sponsored EUPOL COPPS program but the public image of new cars and uniforms is for as yet not quite matched by the much needed infrastructure behind the scenes, such as well-equipped offices, crime labs and communications technology.

The US and EU have supplied the PSF with advanced communication technology but my observations taught me that coordination between security personnel still by and large takes place via mobile phones and not a separate communications network for the PSF, which adds to the already existing problems of inter-agency coordination and information-sharing between the various PSF. Steps have been taken to improve this aspect and a shared intelligence office has been established in Ramallah but the one single coordinating institution specifically established for the unification of the PSF, the National Security Council, has not convened in years due to the political stalemate that also undermines the functioning of the parliament, and remains a paper exercise for the time being.

Although the Palestinian parliament has not been called together for several years, this is mainly due to political tensions between the two biggest factions and not because of fundamental institutional shortcomings. The judiciary, as one of the other three branches that constitute the *trias politica*, is suffering from considerable (infra)structural deficiencies. There are not enough court houses and offices and the severe politicisation of society, and the sensitivities that come with it, add to the already difficult context of occupation in which the judiciary has to operate. What is more, the present number of judges is not nearly enough to handle all of the incoming cases, which causes a considerable delay in court decisions.

The courts can also not work effectively due to the fact that the judicial framework is still developing, and for now quite underdeveloped, while, as said above, the main legislative institution, the Palestinian Legislative Council, has not convened for years. In effect, courts thus have to work with a considerable number of presidential decrees, instead of officially approved and formalised laws, which does not contribute to their trustworthiness.

11.1.2. Lacking performance-based legitimacy

The latter example of the judiciary's inefficacy is but one factor that adds to the PA's lacking legitimacy that is widespread throughout the West Bank. There are other factors that add to this problem, such as the political conflicts and the prevalence of deep-rooted social traditions that will be dealt with below, but an important cause is the perceived impotence of the PA's institutions that, at the very least, made Palestinians cautious of putting too must trust in their interim state apparatus.

Since the PA is not allowed to operate in large parts of the West Bank, most people living in these areas do not consider the PA to be their representative and, thus, feel forced to fend for themselves and take their own measures within traditional security communities; since the PSF can seldom come in the B and C areas, let alone protect the Palestinians from Israeli soldiers and settlers, they remain a rather distant entity.

Even within PA-governed A areas the PSF cannot live up to people's expectations. Many of the newly recruited personnel are still relatively young and do not have the required experience to operate effectively nor do they exude the subtle authority that is needed to uphold the image of a trustworthy security apparatus that knows what it is doing. Many people complain about the rude behaviour of young police officers and stories about the National Security Forces standing guard without even having ammunition in their kalashnikovs add to the wariness and aloofness with which the Palestinians regard the PSF.

I remember attending a soccer match between the teams of refugee camp 'Askar and the Jerusalemite neighbourhood of Silwan, and after the former lost after playing quite badly, tensions amongst the fans become palpable. Riot police, or Public Order Forces as they are officially called, quickly entered the stadium in full gear, wearing shields and batons. When after a heated argument some blows were exchanged between two fans, one of the policemen reacted by severely beating up a young boy, not much older than 14, who was standing next to the two adversaries. The whole crowd from 'Askar yelled in unison, angry at the policeman, who himself was also still very young, after which the commander intervened, nipping a violent escalation of the argument in the bud. When, afterwards, I talked to some of the fans, they all blamed the incident to the age of the policeman in case, saying that many of the PSF are not experienced enough to really know how to respond to incidents and interact with the people in a proper and respectful way. One person argued that these young police officers are only trained to chase, arrest and beat up people.

That the PSF, the Civil Police in particular, have been quite successful in dealing with crime, despite the criticisms, can for a considerable part be ascribed to

their cooperation with the traditional clan networks and rooted informal justice system. The police readily acknowledge the fact that their work is made easier because of the ways in which Palestinian society functions. This makes one wonder whether the success is, thus, unknowingly attributed to non-statutory security communities and traditions, instead of it adding to the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the PSF.

The widespread corruption amongst the political establishment is also detrimental to people's trust in the authorities. Despite a high rate of unemployment and often squalid living conditions, especially in the refugee camps, the Palestinian elite is becoming richer and richer, while simultaneously sharing the important public functions amongst themselves. At least, this is the widespread conviction among many Palestinians. Several people I talked to described the PA as being pre-occupied with its own survival, bolstering and enriching itself, rather than taking care of the people it is supposed to represent and take care of.

11.1.3. Prevalence of traditional social institutions

That the PA suffers from a legitimacy problem not only stems from its impotency towards struggling against the occupation nor from its overt cooperation with the occupier. There are also causes within Palestinian society that can be traced back to times prior to the establishment of the state of Israel.

Since there has never been an actual Palestinian state in the sense of a centralised government and security apparatus with a monopoly on coercion, political life has always been characterised by *fragmented sovereignty,* revolving around security communities, comprised of non-statutory actors, based on regional and clan affiliation, and mostly taking place on the village level. That Jewish militias proved able to run over the Arab villages in the months and weeks before the actual 1948 war, was also due to this very localised level of social and political organisation, because of which there was no supra-village cooperation.

Although Palestinian nationalism has emerged, arguably as a reaction to Zionism, and has come to present a strong unifying potential employed by all political factions, be they leftist or Islamist, trust in national institutions remains lagging behind. During the Jordan annexation, as well as under Israeli occupation, this *fragmented sovereignty* has remained intact in the West Bank, both due to foreign interests in a divide-and-rule policy and because of the obvious appeal of traditional practice. Since Palestinian nationalism has only quite recently been coupled to actual institutions, with the establishment of the interim PA government in the mid-1990s, wariness of a centralised state is often linked to foreign occupying powers. In addition, localised politics has become culturally ingrained into the Palestinian (Arab) habitus.

Local practices of informal law, such as *sulha* and *'urf*, have always played an important role in Palestinian Arab society, and with the prevailing lack of trust in the national institutions, they continue to do so. Many Palestinians prefer going to local clan elders to have their disagreements and conflicts solved. Also, especially in Hebron, where clan traditions are of major importance, these clan elders are able to maintain a strong grip on their respective communities, enforcing a considerable stability and social order. Although blood feuds can be the cause of very violent clashes between clans, they simultaneously enforce a balance of power in which people will think twice before acting against someone from another clan.

This balance of power has also for a long time been characteristic for the relationship between the various political factions. With the rise of Palestinian nationalism and a severe politicisation of society, two major political factions emerged – Fatah and Hamas –overshadowing the various smaller factions. In the wake of Hamas winning the national elections in 2006 a major conflict between Hamas and Fatah has erupted, leading to dozens of casualties and an enduring status-quo in which reconciliation seems very difficult.

11.1.4. Political strife – Fatah versus Hamas

Both Gaza and the West Bank, which together are envisioned as the future Palestine state, are ruled by rather authoritarian leaderships that are in competition with each other. Since they constitute security communities themselves, they operated within the traditional logic of the zero-sum game that characterises the relations between the various communities, and tried to bolster their acquired political power by severely cracking down on other political and clan-based security communities. Having become the main community and, as such, can be considered *human security from above*, the two regimes have each damaged the legitimacy of their rule. It follows that a viable Palestinian state, and a state that does not pose a threat to surrounding states, without legitimacy stemming from Palestinian society at large, can currently only exist as an authoritarian regime, where one *security community* dominates the others.

For a considerable time Hamas has refrained from actively competing with Fatah, rather considering the latter's members to be brothers. Following Fatah's more pragmatic course and willingness to negotiate with Israel, Hamas, however, felt the need to take the lead in armed resistance activities. A Hamas-initiated[132] string of suicide bombings and armed attacks on both Israeli soldiers and civilians in the wake of

[132] Although Hamas initiated this campaign of suicide bombings, other factions, amongst which were also Fatah-affiliated groups, got involved at a later stage, as well.

the Oslo peace processes proved to be the harbinger of an increasingly tense relationship between the two Palestinian factions; a relationship that has only deteriorated over the years.

In foreign media Hamas and Fatah are often represented as religious fundamentalists and secular moderates, respectively, but this simplification does in no way do justice to the various political and religious beliefs that prevail within these movements. Fatah has repeatedly employed religious symbolism in their public statements, for example, and there have been outspoken members amongst Hamas who are more than willing to forego the historical Islamic claim on Palestine and accept a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders. That the Hamas leadership in Gaza has overtly agreed upon an armistice with Israel is a clear indicator of its pragmatism and, furthermore, it were the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Fatah's armed wing, that carried out most armed attacks, including suicide bombings, against Israeli targets during the second intifada, thereby provoking destructive Israeli military incursions in the West Bank.

Since the factions' viewpoints do not differ all that much and, according to most Palestinians, could be reconciled with relative ease, it appears that the fierce competition between them is based on a veritable power struggle rather than on a clash between essential belief systems. Indeed, in the spring of 2011, another agreement between Fatah and Hamas was announced.

After multiple rounds of negotiations, with the help of Egyptian brokers, a deal was signed, in which the two parties announced the formation of a unity government and parliamentary elections in 2012. In light of everything written above, this agreement may sound like a major step forwards but its effects on the PA's legitimacy are not clear yet and a considerable number of questions remains unanswered. Not surprisingly, one of the major obstacles to the success of the agreement is the unification of the security forces. Both Fatah and Hamas head their own well-trained, heavily armed security apparatus, and it was only four years ago, following the collapse of the unity government, that both were caught up in violent hostilities in which dozens lost their lives. In addition, at the time of writing, unification is still indiscernible, since there have not been any actual attempts to form a unity government, political arrests in both Gaza and the West Bank are still rife, and until now the PLC has not yet convened. In short, much progress in the political sphere has not been achieved, thus far.

11.2. External influences

The development of Palestinian national institutions does not take place in a vacuum, nor does the struggle between Fatah and Hamas. Below the two most important external influences will be discussed, first focussing on the Israeli influence and subsequently taking into account some geo-political considerations that are of importance for the on-going and future dynamics in the Palestinian Territories.

11.2.1. Israeli omnipresence

The perceived impotency of the PA is evidently exacerbated by the Israeli-imposed restrictions. That the PSF are not allowed to work freely in more than half of the West Bank's territory is but one of the many obstacles. Although cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians has improved over the last years, and the latter are occasionally allowed to work in hitherto restricted areas, the process of coordinating access to B and, sometimes, C areas is so time-consuming that the efficacy of the PSF is largely nullified. The remaining checkpoints between the different A areas add to this problem.

The prevailing asymmetrical power-relations are, however, the biggest problem the PA is faced with. A strict hierarchy is continuously being reinforced and it cannot be challenged by the occupied, the Palestinians, since their autonomy is only granted to them and can be revoked at any given moment if occupier Israel so wishes. A clear example is the decision to postpone the transfer of taxes that Israel collects on behalf of the PA, after Hamas and Fatah announced steps to form a unity government. In addition to these political considerations, the continuing Israeli incursions in PA-governed A areas, because of which the PSF repeatedly have to pull back from certain neighbourhoods, unmistakably demonstrate to the Palestinians that their own security forces always have to comply with Israel's demands.

Paradoxically, this demonstrable powerlessness strengthens the image of the PA as a rather authoritarian regime. The PSF are not able nor allowed to protect the Palestinians from foreign threats and this leads to the evident observation that the ever-growing security staff can only be employed internally in the enclaves the PA presides over, and that the improved firepower and capabilities can only be directed inwards, at the Palestinians themselves.

When looking at the precarious relationship between the PA and Palestinian society at large, it is clear that this hierarchy in which the PA remains subordinate to Israel, makes the bolstering of the PSF, as the supposed provider of security to the

Palestinians, under Israeli supervision, a hazardous undertaking; an occupational hazard, indeed.

From an Israeli perspective the current course of action is quite commonsensical. What is in fact happening is that Israel has partly outsourced its own security to the Palestinian security forces, by stimulating them to clamp down on those people who wish to undertake action against Israel. That being said, however, Israel, with its military might, remains present throughout the West Bank as well as along its borders, to step in when it is deemed necessary and, as such, they thus remain in charge.

11.2.2. Geo-politics

Although it seems an obvious point to make, building up a state in the context of an occupation is extremely difficult, especially when the continuous expansion of settlements demonstrates that this concerns a *belligerent occupation*. It is hardly imaginable that the future Palestinian state will be viable when the interests and security of the Palestinian people are not firmly put in first place but will always come second after those of other states, most notably Israel. Even though the EU and US are unanimous in their intent to support the Palestinians in building up their own viable state, geo-political considerations concerning regional stability and security, as well as historical pledges to stand by Israel, seem to prevail over the legitimacy of, and popular support for the developing Palestinian state institutions.

But with the various popular revolts springing up in other Middle-Eastern countries, aimed at removing the different authoritarian regimes that had been able to rule for so long, partly because of Western support for the very same reasons mentioned above – Egypt, which under Mubarak's oppressive regime received hundreds of millions of dollars in military support from the US, being the prime example – the question arises why this course of action is not being reconsidered.

Despite the ostensible agreement between Fatah and Hamas, in which they decided to bury the hatchet and form an interim unity government, international anxiety, namely from Israel, immediately put this deal under pressure. It does not seem likely that it will signal an end to the political division between the West Bank and Gaza. One simply has to look at the geographical split between the two territories to understand that it most definitely will not end the *fragmented sovereignty*. Also, while most Western countries consider Hamas to be a terrorist organisation and therefore do not wish to negotiate or even talk with its representatives, a new Palestinian government will run the risk of isolating itself, making it even harder to

further develop the much-needed state institutions and earn popular legitimacy, based on good performance.

One aspect that appears to add to the ambiguous international attitude towards dealing with the Israel-Palestinian conflict – and one that has not been discussed yet – has to do with the global War on Terror, of which the fight against Islamic terrorism is the most important exponent. Although this religious framing is most certainly of importance, a close examination of the separate treatment of the Fatah-led PA-government in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaza learns that territorial, state-centric considerations also play a vital role, however. The Jewish settlements in occupied territories, although often considered part of the Greater Israel that God once promised to the Jews, are arguably much more intended as outposts to improve the possibilities of protecting Israel's own and desired borders, and a way of securing more land and resources. While all of the settlements in Gaza were removed in 2005, in what was called the 'disengagement', settlements in the West Bank continue to be expanded. The border with Jordan, and thus the rest of the Middle East, as well as the abundant water resources present in the West Bank, suggest much more pragmatic motivations than religion alone. In fact, the Israeli government even uses settlement expansion as a way of 'punishing' the PA for not adhering to Israeli demands.[133] Indeed, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is most certainly not a religious conflict.

International condemnations of the settlement expansion are abundant but actual steps to halt this process have not yet been undertaken. Although Arab states continue to verbally attack Israel, they do not possess the economic, the military, nor the political means to challenge Western support. This enduring status quo in international relations reinforces the already asymmetric power relations between Israel and the Palestinians. The occupying state cannot only act with relative impunity, it receives more support, in various forms, than do the Palestinians – the underlying party in this asymmetric conflict. This imbalanced approach also does not help the latter in overcoming their internal divisions. The initial Palestinian joy over the anticipated political unity, and long awaited end of political violence and arbitrary arrests, should thus not be overestimated. For the time being, what is aspired to be Palestine one day, remains two completely separate entities, in political, economic, social and geographical terms.

[133] This way of 'punishing' the Palestinians happened for instance after the Palestinians sought membership of Unesco. See: 'Palestinians punished by Israel for joining Unesco'. In: The Independent, 2 November 2011. On: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/palestinians-punished-by-israel-for-joining-unesco-6255856.html (Accessed 26 August 2012).

Both president Mahmoud Abbas and prime-minister Salam Fayyad remained true to themselves and in 2011 requested the United Nations General Assembly to recognise the Palestinian state as an official UN member. Because of a US veto it has not led to the actual establishment of Palestine as an official state and the latest member of the United Nations. Besides this disappointment, it remains the question what UN recognition will change on the ground. As long as the occupation persists, and geo-political interests continue to be the first priority of the international community, an inclusive, sovereign and viable Palestinian state, with a legitimate government that earns the trust and support of a unified Palestinian people, seems nowhere in sight.

11.3. Broader implications

This study is a critical analysis of security in the West Bank, in which attention is paid to human security from below, in particular. In order to illustrate the broader implications of assessing conflict situations and wars from this specific perspective, I have selected two other recent wars and will apply the conceptual approach that is presented earlier. Essentially, it means looking at the actions of, and interaction between, the *two* levels of human security actors – from above and below – and entails a specific focus on the role of human security from below initiatives.

11.3.1. Iraq

The seemingly chaotic violence that erupted in post-Saddam Iraq in 2004, approximately one year after the US-led invasion, is a clear example of how the actions of local individuals and communities – *human security from below* – can drastically influence the overall security situation. Since the hundreds of thousands of foreign troops were not able to quell the on-going cycle of violence, it illustrates how the agency of individuals in war situations must not be underestimated and should therefore be the point of departure for security analyses.

Despite the numerous clashes between Iraqi 'insurgents' and foreign forces, in some parts of Iraq, security communities – mostly tribes and clans – evidently also cooperated with US and UK troops – the representatives of human security from above – in a shared effort to fight against a common enemy: al-Qaeda – indeed, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." (Dekker & Faber 2009) It is, however, not only opportunism that leads to (temporary) cooperation. Sometimes the dramatic consequences of war have caused such a changed reality on the ground, that competition, or even

resistance, has become futile, since the interests of all those involved no longer differ much from each other, which results in a certain stability.

In his book "The Sheriff of Ramadi" (2008), former Navy SEAL Dick Couch writes about the cooperation between US soldiers and local forces, and how this proved vital in the fight against al-Qaeda in the Anbar province. It was only after the mutual recognition of having a common enemy that an alliance was forged between the SEAL's commander and a security community, in the form of local tribe leader Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha – who is the 'sheriff' in this story. When they started fighting side by side al-Qaeda could be defeated. On their own, both the locally stationed US contingent and the so-called Awakening Councils controlled by the sheikh could probably not have changed the situation on the ground in such a significant way but their interaction created momentum for change and turned out to be the decisive factor in 'stabilising' the situation in Iraq for the time being.

Indeed, the sizeable increase in US army manpower stationed in Iraq, the famous US "Surge", which was considered a human security operation by initiator General Petraeus, was not only relatively successful in bringing more security because of the increase in manpower. Said to have become inspired by the events in Ramadi, Petraeus also took the lead in one other decisive development, strongly encouraging improved interaction with local security initiatives. "We got down at the people level and are staying,"[134] Petraeus said in an 2007 interview. "Once the people know we are going to be around, then all kinds of things start to happen."[135]

Another reason for the relative calm in the wake of the Surge is related to the changed composition of cities and regions. Although Petraeus indicated that many locals in different neighbourhoods in Baghdad were increasingly helpful in gathering intelligence, it should be emphasised that most of these neighbourhoods had already been ethnically cleansed to a considerable extent (Cockburn 2006, Kukis 2006, Parker and Hamdani 2006). As it thus turned out, with most of the conflicts within neighbourhoods already fought, the aims and aspirations of both the human security providers from above and those from below did not differ that much anymore, since the quarters had already been cleansed from internal enemies and were thus considered relatively stable and secure. In other words, as soon as the actors from both levels agreed upon what should be done to maintain security, the foreign troops found their short-term strategy of bringing stability successful; the absence of violence

[134] *NYPost, 20 March 2007.* On: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/why_it_working_AmCGSLY7bSnolGv84xcyWI (Accessed 24 July 2012).

[135] Ibid.

was the first priority, even if mono-ethnic neighbourhoods, in which *security communities* became entrenched in *security zones*, were far from an ideal situation, since it will be extremely difficult for original inhabitants to return to their homes.

Another telling example of this observation is related by Gian P. Gentile, a lieutenant colonel in the US army, and commanding officer of a reconnaissance squadron in Ameriyah, a neighbourhood that has seen a lot of violence. Gentile writes that he was ordered to pacify the neighbourhood in 2006 (Gentile 2007). Operation Together Forward II, as the operation was coined, was geared towards providing human security, and to put an end to the on-going cycle of violence, in order for the Iraqi government to be able to develop its own capabilities to deal with the situation.

The first task for Gentile was to clamp down on militants that were operating, as well as hiding, in the area. When, after a considerable time, it indeed became quiet and stable in the neighbourhood and the number of killings decreased, Gentile found out that it was not only his patrols that were making the situation more secure. The number murdered Shi'ites mostly decreased dramatically because there were hardly any Shi'ites left in the neighbourhood. Also in this case the a *security community* managed to establish its own *security zone* and the Sunnis that remained were as keen on maintaining stability as the US troops were, so there was no longer reason for resistance; the initiatives of the actors from below themselves had gruesomely but decisively changed the situation in the neighbourhood in what can be referred to as a zero sum game.

11.3.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina

In December 1995, three years after a bloody war broke out in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a peace agreement was signed in the US city of Dayton. Although the Dayton agreement seemingly reflects the post-war realities on the ground and the ambitions of sub-state security communities by confirming the existence of three separate nations in the country – Bosniaks (or Bosnian Muslims), Serbs and Croats – the question was how to take into account the fact that these communities are not spread evenly over the Bosnian territory and certainly not neatly within clearly distinguishable borders. Indeed, nowadays ethnicity plays an essential role in all decision making processes, even on the municipal level.

Despite the vicious ethnic cleansing campaign the Bosnian Serbs initiated to get rid of Bosniaks living in Eastern Bosnia, what is now called Republika Srpska, there are still several dozens of mostly Bosniak villages situated in the region, of which many still bear the scars of the war – Srebrenica being the infamous worst case, after a genocide took place there in July 1995, in which more than eight thousand men and

boys from the town and surrounding villages lost their lives. That this genocide took place despite the presence of a battalion of Dutch UN troops, is a tragic illustration of a mismatch between *human security from above* and *below,* despite a tacit agreement between Dutchbat and the local militias about a prospective form of cooperation.

The shared characteristic of the majority of Srebrenica's inhabitants, in 1995, was that they were Muslim, which was also the very reason why they were attacked by the Bosnian Serb army. The Bosniak security community's members, in particular their militias, were temporarily successful in defending areas under their control but in 1993 they were seriously threatened with annihilation. The Bosnian national government decided to rebrand the various militias as an official division of the national army but this turned out to be a failed attempt at providing human security from above (Dekker & Faber 2009). The locals and their militias were mostly left on their own to fend for themselves.

At the end of February 1993 the Bosnian Serb forces were still closing in on the city and despite emergency aid droppings, the situation in the enclave was deteriorating. On the 11th of March a small UN-convoy managed to reach Srebrenica with General Philippe Morillon, then commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), amongst them, in order to inspect the developing humanitarian disaster in the enclave. The local Bosniaks themselves, who felt they would soon fall prey to the Bosnian Serb troops, as well as feeling abandoned by their own government and the international community at large, then forced the United Nations to protect them against the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosniak population basically took Morillon hostage and pressured him to promise the gathered crowd of refugees: "From now on you are under protection of the international community." (Ibid.)

The UN then effectuated the self-established *security zone*, by creating a so-called *safe area*, with borders marked by UN observation posts. When subsequently three Dutch battalions took their turn in the safe area from January 1994 until July 1995, succeeding a Canadian unit, the refugee community hoped the Dutch would stay put and protect the people, since the safe area, at the request of both the Serbs and the UN, was largely demilitarised and the local militias, led by Naser Oric, would be unable to fight off the Bosnian Serbs by themselves (Ibid.).

A month after already having conquered one of the Dutch battalion's observation posts, on the 3rd of June 1995, the Serbs launched a full-on attack against the enclave. The Bosniak fighters tried to fight back but the Dutch troops refrained from engaging in a battle with the Serbs. When Serbian general Mladic entered Srebrenica on the 11th of July the UN safe area had officially come to an end. In the following days, the Serb troops, actively assisted by the Dutch troops, started

deporting the thousands of refugees that were huddled together in and around the Dutchbat compound in Potocari (Faber 2002). Before deporting them, however, the Serb troops separated the men and boys from the women and young children. The latter two were by and large transported to a location close to Bosniak-controlled territory but virtually all of the men and boys were taken to various locations in the vicinity of Srebrenica, executed on the spot, and dumped in mass graves.

The 'UN safe areas' that were established in Bosnia Herzegovina to protect the Bosniak population from the Bosnian Serbs, shows the precarious relationship between *human security from above* – Dutchbat – and *from below*, and how the negligence of the latter can have horrendous consequences. Ultimately, insufficiently equipped, mandated and motivated UN troops – and thus inadequate provision of human security from above – combined with the substantial disarmament of local fighters, which took away the already small number of Bosniak militias' ability to provide human security from below, turned out disastrous for thousands of men and boys. Moreover, the only safe place in Potocari was the UN-compound. During the war all parties, including the Serbs, considered these compounds sanctuaries. In the end, however, the Dutch themselves assisted the Serbs with the deportation of the Muslims, in particular by ordering the Muslim men and boys to leave the UN-compound and handing them over to the Serbs.

11.3.3. Concluding remarks

The aforementioned cases clearly show the advantage of having hindsight. It must therefore be emphasised that making a thorough analysis of the situation on the ground while the conflict is still raging remains an arduous task. Still, I believe that these examples of particular incidents in Iraq and Bosnia, respectively, and this dissertation in general, illustrate that *human security from below*, the agency of the people who are subjected to war situations, is not only an important element of an analysis of the security situation but should in fact be the point of departure.

In Iraq it was clear that the foreign troops were most definitely not the only actors in control, shaping the circumstances. At the very least their influence was overestimated and when violence eventually decreased in certain areas, this was often due to the fact that most of the struggles between the competing security communities had already been fought, which had let to the emergence of *security zones*. However gruesome the consequences may have been, the various communities had accomplished a certain sense of *human security from below*, indeed by cleansing their respective *security zones* from those who did not fit in the *security community.* That the US troops eventually managed to pacify hitherto volatile areas and provide

human security from above by maintaining a stable and non-violent status quo was thus mostly possible because actors from below had already acted decisively.

In Srebrenica the influence of the foreign troops was crucial, since they were supposed to protect a vulnerable group of people who were threatened with annihilation. By partly demilitarising the enclave – as was agreed in an official treaty between the Bosniak general Halilovic and the Serb general Mladic, in the presence of UNPROFOR – the Dutch troops did not deny the local Bosniak fighters to defend themselves and their community completely – small weapons were not confiscated – but obviously the Bosniaks were outmanned and outgunned by the Bosnian Serb troops that were closing in on the enclave.

From the moment that Srebrenica was declared a "safe area" and *human security from below* was evidently not a viable option since the local fighters were unable to maintain this status themselves – nor were they asked to, in fact – providing *human security from above* should have become the main priority of the Dutch battalion, either alone or in unison with the poorly armed Bosniak fighters. In case of a Serb attack on the enclave – which would be a violation of agreements and UN resolutions – the required security operation could, however, only have worked when either the promise of providing security was matched with the proper means, or – in case this was not realized – by allowing the refugees, and in particular the Muslim men and boys as the most vulnerable group, on the UN-compound, which was their last resort, and ultimately also letting them stay there. Neither of these options was considered and this refusal to provide human security from above provided the Serbian regular and irregular fighters with the opportunity to commit genocide.

In the previous chapters it has become clear that also in the West Bank there is a mismatch between human security from above and below. Although the Palestinian actors – both the PA and the non-statutory actors – have found ways to cooperate with each other, the increasing authoritarianism of the PA and, especially, the latter's overt cooperation with the Israeli occupier, is leading to a growing gap between the institutionally embedded security forces and Palestinian society in general. By serving Israeli interests, the PSF are neglecting their first and foremost priority: providing security to the people they are supposed to serve – the Palestinians. It does not seem likely that human security initiatives from below will cease to exist, since Palestinians remain sceptical of the PA's ability to provide security from above. The PA's monopoly on the use of force will thus remain under pressure, or even actively challenged in the future, as long as it is not deemed legitimate by the Palestinians. Traditional social institutions and *security communities,* such as clans and

political factions, and informal law practices will therefore continue to play an important role in Palestinian society for the time being.

In war situations, security is the main priority. Ultimately, if security is accomplished, it does not matter whether it came from above or from below, whether it is provided by a state or by your own *security community*. It is therefore that both possibilities, the initiatives on both levels – *from above* and *from below* – must always be taken into consideration and they must be complementary in order to effectively provide *human security*.

List of recorded interviews

- Abdul Wahab Ghait, clan elder. Hebron, 19 July 2009.
- Ali Abu Shahla, business man from Gaza. Jerusalem, 17 February 2009.
- Amjad Rfaie, young Fatah leader and director of various NGOs based in refugee camp 'Askar. Nablus, 17 April 2010.
- Bassem Eid, human rights activist and journalist. Jerusalem, 9 July 2009.
- Commander Nablus Governorate Police Department, Nablus, 27 April 2010.
- Deputy commander of Hebron Governorate Police Department, Hebron 23 June 2009.
- Dr. Aziz Dweik, speaker of parliament (PLC), notable Hamas member. Hebron, 11 July 2009.
- Dr. Nizam, lecturer at Jericho Security Academy. Jericho, 16 February 2010.
- Dr. Sahar al-Qawasmi, member of parliament (PLC) for Fatah. Hebron, 20 July 2009.
- Dr. Sufian Abu Zaida, former Fatah leader. Ramallah, 1 February 2009.
- General Director Hebron Governorate. Hebron, 13 July.
- Haj Ali Ashur Abu Zneineh, clan elder. Hebron, 26 July 2009.
- Haj Zuher Maraga, clan elder. Hebron, 12 July 2009.
- Hamzeh Natsheh, representative of largest ceramic and glass manufacturer in Hebron. Hebron, 15 June 2009.
- 'Isa, employee of human rights organisation B'tselem. Hebron, 9 July 2009.
- Islam Khaild Al-Tamimi, employee of human rights organisation (PICCR). Hebron, 9 July 2009.
- Joharra Baker, employee of Palestinian 'think tank' Miftah. Ramallah, 3 August 2009.
- Khalid Ali Naseef, former security advisor to the PA. Ramallah, 22 February 2010.
- Maryam Saleh, member of parliament (PLC) for Hamas. Ramallah, 26 July 2009.
- Muhammad, police officer. Hebron, 4 July 2009.
- Press officer Ramallah Governorate Police Department, Ramallah 18 April 2010.

- Prof. Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, general director of al-Quds University. Beit Hanina, 13 January 2009
- Spokesperson Ramallah Governorate Police Department. Ramallah, 18 April 2010.
- Tareq al-Tamimi, consultant to the World Bank. Hebron, 2 February 2010.
- Wasam Ahmad, employee of human rights organisation al-Haq. Hebron, 23 July 2009.

List of abbreviations

CPT:	Christian Peacemaker Teams
DCO:	District Coordination Office
DDR:	Disarmament, De-mobilisation and Rehabilitation
DoP:	Declaration of Principles
EUPOL:	European Union Police Mission
COPPS:	Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
IDF:	Israeli Defence Forces
NSC:	National Security Council
NSF:	National Security Forces
PA:	Palestinian Authority
PLC:	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO:	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA:	Palestinian National Authority (=PA)
PSF:	Palestinian Security Forces
R2P:	Responsibility to Protect
SSR:	Security Sector Reform
TIPH:	Temporary International Presence in Hebron
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR:	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA:	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNPROFOR:	United Nations Protection Force
UNRWA:	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USSC:	United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority

Glossary of Arabic terms

Falatan:	Refers to a period of time between 2003 and 2005, when militias caused grave insecurity in the West Bank and crime figures soared. Literally means: lawlessness
Fatah:	Acronym for Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine. (Literally also: opening)
Hamas:	Acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement. (Literally also: zeal)
Hamulah:	(Extended) family
Intifada:	Shaking off, uprising
Islah:	The traditions on which *sulha* is based
Kunafeh:	Sweet snack with goat's cheese, sugar, honey and semolina. Typical for the city of Nablus
Mukhabarat:	General Intelligence
Mukhtar:	Clan elder, usually the person between a certain clan and the authorities
Ra'is:	President
Rajul islah:	Man who applies *islah* and leads the *sulha* process
Sharia':	Islamic law
Sulha:	Ceremonial process of mediation/reconciliation to solve conflicts and arguments
Sulta:	Palestinian Authority
Shurta:	Police
'Urf:	Form of common or arbitrary law, based on Islamic and Arabic (tribal) traditions

Summary

Palestinians living in the West Bank consider themselves to be living under a double-barrelled occupation: on the one hand there are the Israeli military forces, who remain omnipresent throughout the West Bank, and on the other there is the PA, which has become increasingly authoritarian over the years, actively suppressing political opposition as well as cooperating with the Israeli authorities. Since 2005, which roughly marks the end of the al-Aqsa intifada, the PA did bring considerable stability to the West Bank, putting an end to the prolonged period of lawlessness and gang wars but trust in the authorities has remained low. Although most people praise the tough crackdown on local militias, the *mukhabarat* – the intelligence service – has now become a major source of insecurity, especially for those who support other political factions than *Fatah,* which is the dominant party in the PA.

This study is an investigation of the ways in which security is provided and perceived in such an intricate situation. I aimed to investigate whether *an analysis of the security fabric in the West Bank would provide valuable insights in the characteristics of the various actors who try to provide human security, in what ways they do this, how they interact, and how the context of the Israeli occupation influences the dynamics between them.*

The so-called *security fabric* is a new concept that describes the interactions between actors who provide human security from above and below, respectively. During approximately one year of doing fieldwork in the West Bank, I have analysed the security fabric of this particular region, describing the dynamics between, on the one hand, the rapidly developing Palestinian Authority (PA) – most notably the security forces – and, on the other hand, social institutions – like political movements and the clan system – that were pivotal in providing human security prior to the establishment of the PA and to a large extent still are of vital importance to people. The analysis entails a specific focus on the context of the Israeli occupation, since it considerably influences and shapes the on-going interaction between the various actors involved.

I propose to interpret *human security as* freedom from individually experienced fear, specifically applied in the context of violent conflict, in which human-caused violence is the primary source of insecurity. This conception illustrates the pivotal merit of *human security*, namely as an individualist approach to understanding what security means and how it can best be improved. The main difference with prevailing interpretations of *human security* is that my approach acknowledges the agency of individuals and local communities in war-torn areas. Operations aimed at

improving *human security* that are devised on a national or international level will not take place in a vacuum, since the local population is not waiting idly for foreign assistance. The key issue of how to effectively provide *human security* to people in need is therefore to harmonise *human security from above* and *from below*.

This specific take on *human security* has its consequences for my analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The individualist or bottom-up approach of looking at security issues asks for a different way of looking at what is taking place on the ground. Instead of solely looking how traditional security providers, be it the state or a coalition of UN-member states, can alleviate insecurity, one must also take into account what is already taking place; look at what people themselves are already doing to improve their own security.

In the framework of the two-state solution, international actors are providing considerable aid and assistance to develop Palestinian state institutions, specifically with regards to the security organisations. In the wake of the second or al-Aqsa intifada, this state-building project seriously commenced but until now, approximately seven years later, the PA's legitimacy does not match its institutional development. The most important reasons are:

Infrastructural problems; despite the Palestinian as well as international efforts, the Palestinian Authority is still suffering from a lack of suitable infrastructure, both in physical and institutional terms.

Lacking performance-based legitimacy; since the PA is not allowed to operate in large parts of the West Bank, most people living in these areas do not consider the PA to be their representative and, thus, feel forced to fend for themselves and organise their own security measures; since the PSF can seldom come in the B and C areas, let alone protect the Palestinians from Israeli soldiers and settlers, they remain a rather distant entity. Also within PA-governed A areas the PSF cannot live up to people's expectations. In addition the widespread corruption amongst the political establishment is detrimental to people's trust in the authorities.

Prevalence of traditional social institutions; that the PA suffers from a legitimacy problem not only stems from its impotency towards struggling against the occupation nor from its overt cooperation with the occupier. There are also causes within Palestinian society that can be traced back to times prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. Since there has never been an actual Palestinian state in the sense of a centralised government and security apparatus with a monopoly on coercion, political life has always revolved around non-statutory actors, based on regional and clan affiliation, mostly taking place on the village level.

Political strife; both Gaza and the West Bank, which together are envisioned as the future Palestine state, are ruled by rather authoritarian leaderships that are in competition with each other. By severely cracking down on political and clan-based security structures – security initiatives from below – the two regimes have each damaged the legitimacy of their rule. It follows that a viable Palestinian state, and a state that does not pose a threat to surrounding states, without legitimacy stemming from Palestinian society at large, can currently only exist as an authoritarian regime.

Israeli omnipresence; the perceived impotency of the PA is evidently exacerbated by the Israeli-imposed restrictions. That the PSF are not allowed to work freely in more than half of the West Bank's territory is but one of the many obstacles. Although cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians has improved over the last years, and the latter are occasionally allowed to work in hitherto restricted areas, the process of coordinating access to B and, sometimes, C areas is so time-consuming that the efficacy of the PSF is largely nullified. The checkpoints between the different A areas add to this problem.

Geo-political influences; it is hardly imaginable that the future Palestinian state will be viable when the interests and security of the Palestinian people are not firmly put in first place but will always come second after those of other states, most notably Israel. Even though the EU and US are unanimous in their intent to support the Palestinians in building up their own viable state, geo-political considerations concerning regional stability and security, as well as historical pledges to stand by Israel, seem to prevail over the legitimacy of, and popular support for the developing Palestinian state institutions.

Dutch summary

Bezettingsresultaat

Het bieden van menselijke veiligheid in de Palestijnse West Bank in de context van de Israëlische bezetting

Dit proefschrift is een studie over de manieren waarop veiligheid wordt geleverd aan, en wordt ervaren door, de Palestijnen die in de West Bank wonen. Ik heb getracht te onderzoeken of een analyse van de zogenaamde '*security fabric*' in de West Bank inzichten kon bieden in *de kenmerken van verschillende actoren die 'menselijke veiligheid' proberen te leveren, de manieren waarop ze dit doen, welke vormen van interactie er tussen hen plaatsvinden en hoe de context van de Israëlische bezetting de dynamiek tussen de actoren beïnvloedt.*

Het *security fabric*[136] is een nieuw concept, waarin de dynamiek wordt beschreven tussen de diverse actoren die, respectievelijk *menselijke veiligheid van bovenaf* en *van onderop* leveren.

Gedurende een jaar veldwerk in de West Bank heb ik het *security fabric* van deze regio geanalyseerd en getracht te beschrijven hoe de zich snel ontwikkelende Palestijnse Autoriteit (PA) – in het bijzonder de veiligheidsdiensten – zich verhoudt tot sociale instituties en fenomenen – zoals politieke bewegingen en het systeem van clans en stammen – die al eeuwenlang van vitaal belang zijn voor de veiligheid, voorafgaand aan de oprichting van de PA. In dit onderzoek is de context van de bezetting van groot belang, omdat het Israëlische leger onder andere de bandbreedte bepaalt waarbinnen de PA, maar ook de sociale instituties, kunnen opereren, in zowel geografisch, economisch en politiek opzicht.

Alvorens de onderzoeksresultaten te presenteren worden de belangrijkste concepten uit het onderzoek gedefinieerd.

Deel 1 – conceptuele context

Menselijke veiligheid

In de conceptuele context, zoals deze in hoofdstuk twee wordt gepresenteerd, stel ik voor om *menselijke veiligheid*[137] te interpreteren als 'vrijheid van individueel ervaren

[136] Omdat het concept 'security fabric' geheel nieuw is en zich zeer moeilijk laat vertalen, heb ik ervoor gekozen het niet te vertalen. Een vertaling die het concept het best zou benaderen, is 'veiligheidsweefsel'.

angst', specifiek toegepast in de context van een gewapend conflict, waarin menselijk geweld de primaire bron van onveiligheid is. Deze interpretatie illustreert de belangrijke bijdrage die *menselijke veiligheid* biedt, namelijk als een individuele benadering van wat veiligheid betekent en hoe deze het beste verbeterd kan worden. Hierbij dient wel opgemerkt te worden dat de sociale verbanden en de manieren waarop mensen zich organiseren in gemeenschappen, de basis vormen voor de analyse.

Het belangrijkste verschil met reeds bestaande interpretaties van *menselijke veiligheid*, is dat mijn aanpak het vermogen[138] van mensen en lokale gemeenschappen om zelf hun situatie te beïnvloeden in door oorlog verscheurde gebieden, erkent en als uitgangspunt voor een analyse neemt.

Operaties gericht op het verbeteren van de *menselijke veiligheid,* ontworpen en bedacht door staten en internationale organisaties – zoals de operaties in Libië – vinden niet plaats in een vacuüm, aangezien de lokale bevolking niet lijdzaam afwacht op buitenlandse hulp. De belangrijkste kwestie in het verbeteren van de *menselijke veiligheid* dient dan ook te zijn hoe veiligheid van bovenaf en die van onderop geharmoniseerd kunnen worden.

Security fabric

Samenstelling van een specifiek gebied, in termen van de daar aanwezige veiligheidsarchitectuur, die bestaat uit de betrokken actoren, hun (soms zelfgeformuleerde) mandaten en daadwerkelijke taken, de territoriale grenzen waarbinnen ze opereren en de invloed die ze daar kunnen uitoefenen, en hun respectievelijke etnische, religieuze, sociale en culturele affiliaties. Anders verwoord, bestaat het *security fabric* uit het 'weefsel' van formele en informele actoren die betrokken zijn bij veiligheidskwesties; de diensten die deel uitmaken van het officiële veiligheidsapparaat van de staat, die ik definieer als *menselijke veiligheid van bovenaf*, en de niet-statelijke actoren – zoals de hieronder genoemde veiligheidsgemeenschappen en -zones – die *menselijke veiligheid van onderop* leveren.

Het *security fabric* bestaat echter niet alleen uit tastbare elementen. Een belangrijk onderdeel dat door het 'weefsel' loopt – en het op plaatsen zowel versterkt

[137] 'Menselijke veiligheid' is een Nederlandse vertaling van het concept 'human security'. Hoewel deze vertaling niet geheel recht doet aan het origineel, heb ik er omwille van leesbaarheid toch voor gekozen een Nederlandse variant te hanteren.

[138] "Het vermogen om zelf je situatie te beïnvloeden" is een poging om het, in de sociale wetenschappen veel gebruikte concept *'agency'* in het Nederlands te vertalen. Het is een onderdeel van de welbekende sociaalwetenschappelijke 'structure-agency dichotomie', die de discussie aangeeft over enerzijds de wijze waarop sociale structuren en patronen het menselijk handelen vormen en beperken, versus, anderzijds, de nadruk op individuele autonomie.

als verzwakt – is vertrouwen, aangezien dat een vitaal aspect van 'je veilig voelen' vormt. Dat vertrouwen is onlosmakelijk verbonden met de legitimiteit van de diverse actoren, of ze nu van bovenaf of van onderop komen.

Veiligheidsgemeenschappen[139]

Veiligheidsgemeenschappen, zoals ze in deze studie worden omschreven, bestaan uit groepen mensen, zowel levend in enkele staten als verspreid over verschillende staten, met duidelijke, sociaal geconstrueerde grenzen, waarvan de leden met een (ingebeelde) gedeelde identiteit hun veiligheid en hun fysiek, cultureel en economisch welbevinden associëren met hun 'lidmaatschap' van de gemeenschap. De gedeelde identiteit kan draaien om onder andere verwantschap, geografische nabijheid, of een politieke, religieuze of etnische affiliatie. Echter, deze gedeelde eigenschappen kunnen elkaar kruisen en overlappen, en 'lidmaatschap' van een gemeenschap sluit andere affiliaties zeker niet uit. Mensen kunnen tegelijkertijd tot een bepaalde clan behoren, lid zijn van een politieke beweging, een specifieke religieuze stroming aanhangen en, als zodanig, dus meerdere gedeelde identiteiten hebben. Tijdens een conflict, waarin verschillende groepen tegenover elkaar kunnen komen te staan, transformeren de specifieke, betwiste eigenschappen – zoals soennieten tegen sjiieten, Bosnische Serviërs tegen Bosnische Moslims, of Ierse Katholieken tegen Protestanten – deze groepen tot veiligheidsgemeenschappen.

Veiligheidszones[140]

In deze studie worden veiligheidszones gedefinieerd als begrensde geografische gebieden waarbinnen het staatsmonopolie op het gebruik van geweld op succesvolle wijze is overgenomen door derden. Dit zouden zowel andere statelijke actoren kunnen zijn, zoals VN-missies, als niet-statelijke actoren als milities of rebellengroepen.

Deel 2 – analyse

Tijdens mijn veldwerk heb ik mij met name gericht op twee gebieden: de noordelijk gelegen Nablus, inclusief het vluchtelingenkamp 'Askar, en de zuidelijk gelegen stad Hebron en de omringende dorpjes. Door middel van twee casestudies heb ik mijn onderzoeksresultaten inzichtelijk proberen te maken.

[139] Veiligheidsgemeenschappen worden in het Engels 'security communities' genoemd.

[140] Veiligheidszones is een vertaling van 'security zones'.

Hebron

Het is allereerst belangrijk om op te merken dat er grote verschillen bestaan tussen de A- en B-gebieden in en rond de stad. Dat er nauwelijks Israëlische soldaten in H1 (het A-deel van de stad) aanwezig zijn, heeft een tijdelijk evenwicht tussen de verschillende actoren van bovenaf en onderop gezorgd. Met name tussen de clans en informele rechtssystemen aan de ene kant en de politie aan de andere, is er een machtsevenwicht ontstaan, waarbij er meer sprake is van samenwerking dan van concurrentie.

Echter, zoals een grafische weergave van het security fabric van de A-gebieden laat zien, de andere Palestijnse veiligheidsdiensten, in het bijzonder Preventive Security en de Inlichtingendienst, hebben een aanzienlijke machtspositie verworven, ondanks het feit dat ze geen onderdeel vormen van het machtsevenwicht. Hoewel hun aanwezigheid logischerwijs veel minder zichtbaar is dan de geüniformeerde politieagenten, is hun invloed voelbaar. Zeker mensen die met een andere beweging dan het leidende Fatah geaffilieerd zijn, voelen constant de – terechte – angst om gearresteerd te worden. Zelfs Fatah-leden geven toe dat de politieke arrestaties een schande zijn, schadelijk voor de Palestijnse eenheid en, als zodanig, een bron van onveiligheid.

Dat het Israëlische leger regelmatig optreedt binnen de grenzen van H1 ondermijnt de legitimiteit van de Palestijnse veiligheidsdiensten. Hun invloed is dan wel beperkt, maar aangezien zij overduidelijk de grenzen bepalen waarbinnen de Palestijnse diensten kunnen opereren, wordt het vertrouwen in de mogelijkheden en capaciteiten van het Palestijnse veiligheidspersoneel ernstig ondergraven. Met name de invallen van het Israëlische leger worden als zeer negatief ervaren, aangezien het in dergelijke gevallen verboden is voor Palestijns veiligheidspersoneel om zich daar in de buurt te begeven. Hoewel de Israëlische soldaten er met hun aanwezigheid ook voor zorgen dat de meeste mensen zich 'koest zullen houden', ontstaat er in de gebieden rondom deze invallen wel een tijdelijk machtsvacuüm.

Het feit dat de veiligheidsdiensten slechts sporadisch in bepaalde B- en (heel soms) C-gebieden mogen opereren, en in sommige nooit, ondermijnt logischerwijs hun effectiviteit. Ten grondslag aan deze ineffectiviteit liggen echter niet alleen de logistieke beperkingen, maar een belangrijk deel ervan is ook gerelateerd aan het gebrek aan legitimiteit dat ook in de A-gebieden aanwezig is en te maken heeft met de heersende perceptie van inadequaat veiligheidspersoneel.

De veiligheidsgemeenschappen, aan de andere kant, ontlenen hun legitimiteit aan lang gerespecteerde tradities en hebben een aanzienlijke invloed in het security fabric van de B- en C-gebieden. Zoals verwacht, bestaat er een duidelijk verband

tussen de invloed van de clans en de macht van het centrale veiligheidsapparaat. Inderdaad, zoals verscheidene clanoudsten al suggereerden, bij afwezigheid van een centraal georganiseerd overheids- of veiligheidsapparaat, vullen veiligheidsgemeenschappen dit gat op door alternatieve vormen van veiligheid te bieden en op deze wijze stabiliteit, rust en rechtvaardigheid binnen de samenleving kunnen bewaken.

Nablus

Evenals in en rond Hebron, bestaan er grote verschillen tussen de A-, B- en C-gebieden in de regio rond Nablus.

Na de chaotische en gewelddadige periode van al-falatan, waarin niet-statelijke actoren zoals milities een aanzienlijke bron van onveiligheid vormden, is de orde en stabiliteit grotendeels teruggekeerd in de stad. De militantenfacties die deel uitmaakten van verschillende veiligheidsgemeenschappen, en in sommige gevallen zelfs complete veiligheidszones wisten te creëren, hebben hun wapens neergelegd, zijn gearresteerd of zijn deel gaan uitmaken van de veiligheidsdiensten. Ook in Nablus is er een machtsevenwicht tussen de verschillende actoren ontstaan. Echter, door het eenzijdig integreren van, met name, de militanten van de al-Aqsa Brigades (gelieerd aan Fatah) met de officiële PA-veiligheidsdiensten, heeft het veiligheidspersoneel te maken met aanzienlijk meer wantrouwen dan hun collega's in Hebron.

IDF-operaties binnen de stadsgrenzen komen vaker voor dan in Hebron, maar daartegenover staat dat ze voorspelbaarder zijn, aangezien ze met name 's nachts plaatsvinden. Deze voorspelbaarheid heeft als belangrijk nadeel, echter, dat die mensen die misbruik willen maken van de nachtelijke afwezigheid van Palestijnse veiligheidsdiensten, hun misdaden vrijwel straffeloos kunnen begaan.

Zoals in veel Arabische samenlevingen, blijven tribale tradities een belangrijke rol spelen, maar de invloed is veel onopvallender dan in Hebron. Dit komt met name door de 'geworteldheid' van Hebronitische families, terwijl in Nablus relatief veel nieuwkomers zijn komen wonen, na een grote toestroom van vluchtelingen uit Tel Aviv, Haifa en andere gebieden in de West Bank, na de oorlogen van 1948 en 1967.

Met name in de vluchtelingenkampen spelen tribale tradities een nog kleinere rol, met name door de totale ontworteling van op de vlucht geslagen families en een opgedrongen egalitarisme, wat wordt verergerd door de, voor iedereen gelijke noodhulp van UNRWA, die ervoor zorgde dat clanleiders hun aan rijkdom gekoppelde status kwijtraakten.

Andere niet-statelijke actoren, in het bijzonder de politieke facties en bewegingen, werden belangrijker, met name doordat hun populariteit direct verband

houdt met hun strijd tegen de Israëlische bezetting. Hoewel ze ook voor onveiligheid zorgen, onder andere door hun onderlinge competitie en gewelddadige strijd, zijn ze de meest zichtbare beschermers van het Palestijnse volk, zeker door de afwezigheid van een nationaal Palestijns leger.

Aangezien "alles politiek is", spelen de verschillende facties een belangrijke rol in het handhaven van orde en stabiliteit, vergelijkbaar met de wijze waarop de clans dit in Hebron doen. Onderlinge spanningen blijven echter bestaan, hoewel ze niet langer leiden tot onvoorspelbare erupties van geweld, zeker na de ontwapening van de meerderheid van de militante cellen, en de re-integratie van andere.

Deel 3 – Conclusies

De specifieke interpretatie van *menselijke veiligheid* heeft consequenties voor mijn analyse van het Israëlisch-Palestijns conflict. De 'bottom-up' benadering van het kijken naar veiligheidskwesties verlangt een andere manier van kijken naar wat er 'op de grond' gebeurt. In plaats van slechts te kijken naar hoe de traditionele leveranciers van veiligheid, of het nu de staat of een samenwerkingsverband van verschillende VN-lidstaten betreft, de veiligheid kunnen verbeteren, dient men ook in aanmerking te nemen wat er al gebeurt in het conflictgebied; er dient goed gekeken te worden naar wat mensen *zelf* al doen om hun veiligheid te verbeteren.

In de context van de zogenaamde tweestatenoplossing, leveren internationale actoren een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid steun aan de zich ontwikkelende Palestijnse staatsinstituties, in het bijzonder aan de veiligheidsdiensten. Na de Tweede of al-Aqsa Intifada, werd er met volle kracht begonnen aan dit staatopbouwproject, maar tot nu toe, grofweg zeven jaar later, blijft de legitimiteit van de PA onder de Palestijnse bevolking achter bij het niveau van haar institutionele ontwikkeling. De belangrijkste redenen worden hieronder uiteengezet.

Infrastructurele problemen; ondanks zowel de Palestijnse als de internationale inspanningen, lijdt de PA nog steeds aan een structureel gebrek aan infrastructuur, zowel in fysieke als institutionele zin.

Gebrek aan prestatie-georiënteerde legitimiteit; **a**angezien het de PA niet toegestaan is om in grote delen van de West Bank te opereren, beschouwen de meeste mensen die in deze gebieden wonen de PA niet als hun vertegenwoordiging en dus zien ze zich genoodzaakt om hun eigen veiligheid te organiseren; omdat de Palestijnse veiligheidsdiensten zelden in de B- en C-gebieden kunnen komen, laat staan dat ze de

Palestijnen tegen Israëlische soldaten en kolonisten kunnen beschermen, blijven ze een onbekende en verre entiteit.
Maar ook binnen de door de PA geregeerde A-gebieden kunnen de Palestijnse veiligheidsdiensten niet voldoen aan de verwachtingen van de bevolking. In combinatie met de wijdverspreide corruptie binnen de PA, zorgen deze tekortkomingen voor een negatieve invloed op het vertrouwen in de autoriteiten.

Het belang van traditionele, sociale instituties; dat de PA lijdt aan een gebrek aan legitimiteit komt niet alleen door de evidente onmacht in de strijd tegen de bezetting en het onvermogen om de eigen bevolking veiligheid te bieden of door de openlijke samenwerking met de bezetter. Er zijn ook oorzaken die hun oorsprong vinden in de Palestijnse samenleving zelf en die zijn terug te leiden tot tijden ver voor de oprichting van de PA en de staat Israël. Aangezien er nooit een daadwerkelijke Palestijnse staat heeft bestaan, in de zin van een gecentraliseerd bestuur en een monopolie op het gebruik van geweld, draaide het politieke leven altijd om niet-statelijke actoren, die op lokaal niveau in veiligheidsgemeenschappen georganiseerd waren. In het *security fabric* waren de veiligheidsgemeenschappen altijd geconcentreerd rond clans en stammen en geografische nabijheid, en speelde het bestuur zich af op dorpsniveau. Deze structuur heeft een sterke invloed op de wijze waarop het *security fabric* nu gekarakteriseerd kan worden.

Interne politieke strijd; Gaza en de West Bank, welke samen de Palestijnse staat zouden moeten worden, worden beide geregeerd door autoritaire regimes die bovendien in strijd met elkaar zijn. Door politieke en op familie gebaseerde veiligheidsgemeenschappen – de veiligheid van onderop – stevig te onderdrukken, hebben beide regimes hun legitimiteit zelf ernstig aangetast. Wat de onvermijdelijke conclusie is van de ontwikkelingen van de laatste jaren is dat een levensvatbare Palestijnse staat, en bovendien een staat die geen bedreiging voor de omliggende landen vormt, zonder de steun van de eigen bevolking, op dit moment dus alleen kan bestaan als een autoritair regime.

Israëlische alomtegenwoordigheid; de ervaren onmacht van de PA wordt overduidelijk verergerd door Israëlische restricties. Dat de Palestijnse veiligheidsdiensten niet mogen opereren in meer dan de helft van de West Bank is slechts één van de vele beperkingen. Hoewel de samenwerking tussen Israël en de Palestijnen is verbeterd gedurende de laatste jaren, en het de laatsten zo nu en dan toegestaan is om in voorheen verboden gebieden te werken, blijft het proces van coördineren rondom het

verkrijgen van toegang tot de B- en, soms, C-gebieden zo tijdrovend dat de effectiviteit van de PA praktisch ongedaan gemaakt wordt. De checkpoints tussen de verschillende A-gebieden verergeren het probleem bovendien ook nog eens.

Geopolitieke invloeden; het is praktisch onvoorstelbaar dat een toekomstige Palestijnse staat levensvatbaar zal zijn als de veiligheid van de Palestijnen ondergeschikt gemaakt wordt aan de belangen van andere staten, Israël in het bijzonder, in plaats van deze stevig op de eerste plaats te zetten. Ondanks het feit dat de EU en de VS, onder andere, de ontwikkeling van een Palestijnse staat unaniem steunen, in het kader van de tweestatenoplossing, lijken geopolitieke overwegingen met betrekking tot regionale stabiliteit en veiligheid, en daarnaast de historische belofte om aan de zijde van Israël te blijven staan, boven de legitimiteit van, en de steun van de Palestijnse bevolking voor, Palestijnse instituties te gaan.

Het beschrijven van het *security fabric* – een overzicht van de verschillende actoren die betrokken zijn bij veiligheidskwesties, hun respectievelijke eigenschappen, de manieren waarop ze betrokken zijn, en hoe ze zich tot elkaar verhouden – is een nuttige methode om te analyseren hoe de situatie op de grond eruitziet in een gewapend conflict.

Ik wil ervoor pleiten dat het *security fabric* vitale informatie bevat, die nodig is om te bepalen wat voor buitenlandse hulp nodig is, aan wie deze verstrekt moet worden en, om te beginnen, of hulp überhaupt nodig is. De interactie en de machtsrelaties tussen de verschillende actoren zijn met name belangrijk om in kaart te brengen, want een dergelijke analyse zou tot gevolg kunnen hebben dat men, als buitenstaanders, genoodzaakt is om de kant van een van de partijen te kiezen om zo effectief mogelijk de veiligheid van zo veel mogelijk mensen te verbeteren.

De focus op grote, collectieve entiteiten als naties, volkeren en staten, die inherent is aan bestaande strategieën rond het concept *menselijke veiligheid,* is in mijn ogen het belangrijkste tekort. Staat-centrische, collectieve manieren van het leveren van veiligheid zijn uiteraard niet altijd ineffectief, sterker nog, in veel landen is een stabiel staatsmonopolie op geweld de enige manier waarop veiligheid op succesvolle wijze wordt georganiseerd. Echter, om de effectiviteit en de legitimiteit van veiligheidsoperaties in gewapende conflicten te vergroten, dient men deze eigen ervaringen buiten beschouwing te laten, zich aan te passen aan de lokale omstandigheden en er ervoor te zorgen dat interventies altijd aansluiten op lokale initiatieven van onderop.

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